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Abstract 
Three factors in Referential Communication are worthy of special consideration: 
the utterance, the speaker's internal representation, and reality. These 
relationships form the 'referential triangle' of communication. This thesis 
explores how children and adults evaluate utterances when all three elements of 
the referential triangle need to be considered. The main aim was to investigate 
why utterances might be more difficult to understand than other externalisations 
of internal representations, such as pictorial representations ofbelief. 
Chapter 2 investigated the usefulness of presenting an internal 
representation as a cartoon thought bubble. Children with autism performed 
significantly better on false belief tasks when they saw the protagonist's belief 
encapsulated in a thought bubble, compared to a false belief task without a 
bubble. This suggests that thought bubbles can be easily understood as 
representations of mental states. Given this facilitation, the use of thought bubbles 
was extended to the referential communication paradigm in Chapter 3. Presenting 
speech and thought bubbles alongside the array allowed the referential triangle to 
be depicted as separate, substantive elements. Children aged 6-10 years tended to 
overlook the pragmatic adequacy o f ~ n a m b i g u o u s s utterances when they could see 
the speaker's meaning depicted in a thought bubble. In Chapter 4, the speaker's 
meaning was not shown directly, but had to be inferred from the story context 
Under these circumstances, children and adults tended to focus more on the 
relationship between the utterance and the array when deciding whether a 
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message was adequate or not. Chapter 5 explored whether adults inappropriately 
overextended their focus on the utterance-array relationship. In some cases, adults 
seemed to be influenced by their own knowledge of utterance-array link when 
making evaluations from the perspective of a naive listener protagonist. 
The general pattern of results suggests that listeners are particularly 
attuned to discrepancies between elements in the referential triangle. It is possible 
that utterances as externalisations of internal representations are difficult to 
understand because children have to learn when it is appropriate to accord the 
discrepancy prominence versus situations when isomorphism between other 
elements in the triangle might be more important for utterance evaluation. 
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General Introduction 1 
CHAPTER! 
Externalisations of internal representations: Beliefs, utterances and thought 
bubbles. 
1.1. Extemalising the representational mind. 
The development of a conception of mind is fundamental to our ability to 
function as social beings. It enables us to exist in a social environment in which 
we interact in groups and depend on others for many of our needs (Mitchell, 
1997). There are two key benefits ofhaving a conception of mind. Firstly, we are 
able to consider self and others as organisms that think and believe, and who 
behave in accordance with those beliefs about the world. Secondly, a conception 
of mind allows us to communicate with others and interpret what they say. It is 
not sufficient in conversation simply to attend to the words that are contained in 
people's utterances. Instead, the context of the communication and the speaker's 
motives, intentions or beliefs must be considered in order for the interaction to be 
sensible and meaningful. 
In both cases it is crucial to understand that beliefs and utterances are 
representations: a belief is a representation of reality, whilst an utterance is an 
aural representation of a belief (which, in tum, is a representation of reality). 
Beliefs, therefore, have a direct relationship with reality since the former is simply 
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a representation of the latter. By contrast, utterances have a more complicated 
relationship with reality, since they can only be interpreted via the mediating 
mind of the speaker. 
Normally developing children typically find beliefs as representations 
easier to understand than utterances as representations. Usually, an understanding 
of the representational nature of beliefs develops around the age of four years 
(e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983), whilst a consistent understanding of utterances as 
representations emerges at around the age of six years (e.g. Robinson & 
Whittaker, 1987). The fact that the speaker's belief about reality is made explicit 
via their utterance, does not seem to help children to treat the utterance as a clue 
to the speaker's representation. This stands in contrast to literature which suggests 
that an understanding of beliefs as representations can be facilitated if the belief is 
externalised in some way, usually through the use of pictorial media. It might be 
that the more complicated representational relationship that characterises 
utterances, compared to beliefs, is responsible for the extra difficulty experienced 
in treating utterances as extemalisations of representations. Not only must the 
utterance's relationship with reality be considered, but so too must the speaker's 
belief and how it corresponds with reality. 
This thesis aims to investigate how the relationships between utterance, 
reality and belief are handled by children and adults in an attempt to find out why 
utterances might be especially hard to process correctly. The remainder of this 
chapter provides some detail about how children are helped to understand the 
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mind by seeing extemalisations of beliefs via pictures, and seemingly not helped 
to understand the mind by hearing extemalisations of beliefs via utterances. 
1.2. Background literature: Using externalisations of representations to 
facilitate understanding of beliefs. 
Since the publication of Wimmer and Pemer's seminal paper in 1983, 
there has been a wealth of research conducted into the developing child's 
understanding of the mind. This research has served to focus our attention on 
when and how 3- and 4- year-old children come to understand that beliefs are 
representations of reality. Most children aged about 4 years are able to make the 
distinction between belief and reality, as evidenced by their success in a standard 
false belief task. 
In the task, a story protagonist's belief is discrepant with the current state 
of reality. For example, Paul thinks the chocolate is in the drawer where he left it, 
but the chocolate has been moved to the refrigerator in Paul's absence. Once 
children come to understand that the belief Paul holds is a representation of 
reality, they realise that he will respond on the basis of his outdated belief (he will 
look for the chocolate in the drawer, where he thinks it is). By contrast, if children 
did not understand the representational nature of beliefs, then they would predict 
Paul's behaviour based on what they (the participant) knew about reality, rather 
than on what Paul (the protagonist) knows about reality. 
Although there is considerable debate about how children ultimately arrive 
at an understanding that the mind is representational (see Lewis & Mitchell, 1994, 
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for a review), it is, nevertheless, widely accepted that being able to predict 
behaviour from inferences of others' belief states is a crucial aspect of social 
cognition. Without such insight, the social world would be a confusing and 
unpredictable place, since there would be no understanding that another's 
perspective or beliefs might differ from one's own. Consequently, other people's 
actions would often be difficult to fathom. 
Reputedly, this is the unfortunate state experienced by people with Autism 
and Asperger's Syndrome, who have often been demonstrated to experience great 
difficulty in treating the mind as a representational entity. For example, they are 
significantly more likely to fail false belief tasks compared to normally 
developing children, or children with Down's Syndrome (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie & Frith, 1985). They also often have significant difficulties treating speech 
as emanating from the mind, favouring overly literal interpretations instead (e.g. 
Mitchell, Saltmarsh & Russell, 1997; and Frith, 1989, for anecdotal evidence). 
Aside from experimental observations, people with autism who have talked or 
written about their experiences, state that the social world can be a strange and 
frightening place. In Oliver Sacks' book 'An Anthropologist on Mars' (1995), 
Temple Grandin- an American academic with Asperger's Syndrome- says that 
she avoided dating, finding ' ... such interactions completely baffiing and too 
complex to deal with ... [because]. .. she was never sure what was being said, or 
implied, or asked, or expected' (p.272). 
Given the importance of understanding the mind as representational, there 
have been many attempts to facilitate understanding, or provide conditions in 
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which nascent insight into the representational nature of beliefs can be 
demonstrated, both within the normally developing and autistic populations. 
Focusing on normal development, Mitchell and Lacohee (1991) demonstrated 
false belief understanding in children younger than 4 years. In a standard 
deceptive box procedure (Pemer, Leekam and Wimmer, 1987), the child is shown 
a Smarties tube and asked what is inside. After the child responds 'Smarties' the 
tube is opened and revealed to contain pencils instead. The lid is then replaced 
and the child asked to anticipate what another- uninformed- person would think 
was inside the tube. 3-year-olds typically said that the other person would think 
there were pencils inside the box, whilst 4-year-olds correctly replied that the 
other person would think the tube contained Smarties. 
In Mitchell and Lacohee's 'posting' procedure, 3-year-olds were allowed 
to post a picture of Smarties into a postbox at the time they first stated what was 
inside the tube (before their belief was exposed as false). Children in this 
condition were significantly more likely to give the correct response (Smarties) 
compared to children who received a standard version of the task. Freeman and 
Lacohee (1995) replicated and extended this finding, reporting that children were 
significantly more likely to be aided by a pictorial representation of the belief 
item compared to an actual sample ofthe item (e.g. a picture of an egg compared 
to a real egg). Mitchell (1996) argues that the reason why pictorial representations 
serve as such useful facilitators is because they embody an intangible entity 
(belief) with a tangible counterpart in reality (a picture). This allows the belief to 
exist at an equivalent salience to reality. Mitchell (1996) suggests that the child 
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has an evolutionary bias towards reality since, at least to start with, reality is much 
more useful and advantageous for the child to negotiate than the mental realm. 
Therefore, there might be a bias towards reality which 'masks' children's 
understanding of beliefs as mental representations. It is only as the child matures 
that the salience of reality diminishes, allowing the child to think about the mental 
realm. Consequently, by elevating a belief on to an equivalent par with reality, the 
salience of reality is diminished, resulting in the child being able to think about 
mental states as representations which are separate from reality. 
Video evidence of children's beliefs has also been shown to promote more 
correct acknowledgments of false belief compared to a standard procedure. 
Saltmarsh and Mitchell (1999) videoed children when they first saw the Smarties 
tube and said that they thought there were Smarties inside. After children were 
shown that the tube contained pencils, and just before they were asked what they 
thought was inside the tube when they first saw it, children saw a playback of 
themselves reporting their initial belief. They were significantly more likely to 
acknowledge their earlier false belief in the video condition, compared to a 
standard deceptive box task. Children were also significantly more likely to report 
their earlier false belief in a condition where the videotape was paused just before 
the child's initial belief was articulated. This suggests that the facilitation was not 
simply due to children repeating what they had heard themselves say on the tape 
without understanding why this answer was the 'correct' one. Once again, by 
providing belief with a physical counterpart in reality, children were much more 
likely to make correct judgments about belief. 
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In both of the above approaches, children benefited from seeing an 
externalisation of an internal representation. Both paradigms relied on the indirect 
route of finding out what children understand about mental representations by 
providing an analogue of the belief in a different format. Wellman, Hollander and 
Schult (1996) developed a more direct way of assessing what children understand 
about mental representations. Rather than using a picture as a clue to an earlier 
belief, Wellman et al., presented mental contents as a picture in the form of 
cartoon thought bubbles. By using pictures to represent mental content directly, 
thought bubbles (and hence, thoughts) can be interpreted as having their own 
representational content. Consequently, thought bubbles might be useful devices 
for facilitating understanding of the mind, since they perform the crucial function 
of raising mental content to the same level as reality. 
Wellman et al., presented 3- to 4-year-olds with a number of different 
tasks involving thought bubbles. At the most basic level, even the youngest 
children understood that thought bubbles represented entities that could not be 
seen or touched, unlike 'public' representations such as photographs. Children 
also knew that thought content was person-specific, and was different to physical 
actions that the protagonist was shown performing. Moreover, children used the 
thought bubbles as a source of information about what the protagonist had seen 
inside a box. The child participant could not see inside the box and so their use of 
the thought bubble content suggests that they understood the thought as being 
specifically about a particular state of affairs in the world. Importantly, children 
were able to judge correctly about a protagonist's false belief as depicted in a 
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thought bubble. However, they were not tested on a standard false belief task, so 
evidence of facilitation was only tentative. Nevertheless, young children's 
understanding of thought bubbles as devices that depict mental phenomena was 
impressive. They seemed to understand the basic representational nature of 
thought bubbles from an early age, suggesting that thought bubbles may serve as 
especially useful externalisations of internal representations. 
One way of assessing the usefulness of thought bubbles as clues to mental 
representations would be to present them to people with autism. Wellman et al., 
(1996) predicted that children with autism would find thought bubbles extremely 
difficult to understand because they lack any insight into the representational 
nature of the mind. Children with autism seem to have difficulties understanding 
mental representations specifically, and not with representations in general 
(Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Leekam & Pemer, 
1991). Consequently, the use of alternative, non-mental, representations to 
augment weaknesses in the mental domain within the autistic population has 
proved to be a popular approach amongst researchers; albeit with varied success. 
For example, McGregor, Whiten and Blackburn (1998a) adapted the 
posting procedure (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991) for use with people with autism. 
Participants were instructed to post a photograph of the original location of some 
chocolate, into a mannequin doll's head. Compared to pre-instruction 
performance, people with autism were significantly better at giving correct false 
belief judgments once they had been taught that the photograph could show them 
what the doll was thinking. However, unlike normally developing three-year-olds, 
General Introduction 9 
the children with autism failed to generalise this understanding to novel false 
belief tasks. In a separate study by the same authors (McGregor, Whiten & 
Blackburn, 1998b), people with autism were helped by the 'picture-in-the-head' 
procedure to judge correctly about false belief scenarios presented on video. 
However, in both studies a period of repetitive teaching was necessary before any 
facilitation could be seen, and in the latter study, only a small subset of the 
individuals were able to apply their understanding of the picture-in-the-head 
procedure to the video scenarios. 
Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez and Walsh (1996) also used 
photographs as an analogue to mental states, in order to teach children with 
autism that a picture-in-the-head depicting a particular state of affairs can be 
useful in predicting behaviour. Whilst this method was successful in promoting 
more correct predictions about the protagonist's behaviour, none of the children 
with autism used the photographs to infer mental states. This suggests that the 
children may have learned a strategy for predicting behaviour, but seemed to have 
no insight that this was based on a mental representation. The authors suggest that 
a good way to make mental states more concrete (and by implication, help 
children to understand mental representation rather than simply behaviour) would 
be to present children with "cartoon think-bubbles" (p.86). The authors cite 
personal experience of a single case study in which a person with autism was 
helped to pass false belief tasks with the aid of thought bubbles. However, there 
has been no systematic exploration of whether children with autism might benefit 
from seeing thought content depicted in such a direct and tangible way. 
General Introduction 10 
Such an approach could have dual value. Firstly, autism could be a good 
assay for assessing the strength of thought bubbles as a representational clue. If 
children with autism showed an understanding of thought bubbles as 
representational entities, it would suggest that thought bubbles might be a 
particularly helpful way of externalising internal representations such that even 
one of the populations most impaired in this domain could derive some benefit 
Secondly, if children with autism did understand, and derive benefit from, thought 
bubbles, this could provide evidence that there might not be a deficit in 
understanding the representational nature of the mind to the extent that some 
authors suggest (e.g. Leslie, 1987; 1994; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Indeed, 
Wellman et al., (1996) state that "At least when children develop a 
representational understanding of mind, [thought bubbles] might prove a sensible 
and easy to understand way to describe thoughts" (p.769). The implication is that 
only with some understanding of mental states as representational entities can 
children understand thought bubbles in any sensible way. These issues are tackled 
in Chapter 2. 
1.3. The special case of utterances as extemalisations of internal 
representations. 
It would seem that externalisations of internal representations can be 
extremely valuable for revealing underlying competence in understanding the 
mind. However, utterances seem to provide children with more difficulty than the 
above statement would suggest Utterances are aural representations of what a 
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speaker thinks, knows or believes. As such, uttemnces are extemalisations of the 
speaker's m e a n i n g ~ ~ but these two things might not always be isomorphic. Indeed, 
a speaker may choose to reveal as much or as little about their private thoughts 
and beliefs, with the implication that what is said may not always be exactly the 
same as what is meant. Therefore, a crucial insight into communication concerns 
the understanding that utterances are not merely direct reflections of reality, but 
are, instead, products of the speaker's mind. As a result, it is not sufficient in 
everyday communication to rely solely on the specific words that people say. 
Rather, communication is an active experience in which the listener may often 
infer underlying meaning from otherwise incomplete or inadequate messages. 
Children below the age of 6 years seem to have difficulty treating 
utterances as products of the mind. Mitchell, Robinson and Thompson (1999) 
presented children aged between 3 and 6 years with a task which required 
interpreting utterances as representational cues. The task involved seeing a story 
protagonist, David, playing with some toy cars. He puts one of the cars in a toy 
gamge and another on the racetrack and then leaves the room. In David's absence, 
Samh plays with the cars and swaps their locations. David then calls to Sarah 
from another room, asking for one of the cars. In the message-desire discrepant 
condition, David states 'I would like the one in the garage please.' The child 
participant was asked to point to the car that David wanted. 
If children considered the speaker's belief framework, they would know 
that David hasn't seen the swap and judge that David wants the car that was in the 
gamge, but is now on the racetmck. This requires making a nonliteml 
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interpretation of the utterance. By contrast, children who do not interpret the 
utterance according to David's knowledge would respond literally- and pick the 
car in the garage. The children who interpret the utterance nonliterally can be said 
to understand that utterances are products of a speaker's mind. They realise that it 
is necessary to consider the speaker's internal representation of a particular state 
of affairs in order to make a 'correct' response. It was not until the age of about 6 
years that children performed at ceiling on making a nonliteral interpretation in 
this condition. 
The children who make a nonliteral interpretation of the utterance are able 
to discount the literal interpretation and respond according to the speaker's 
meaning instead. They understand that utterances are dual representations, 
consisting of a literal representation (the actual words of the utterance) and a non-
literal representation (what the speaker means). The findings of Mitchell et al., 
(1999) correspond closely to the literature on referential communication which 
suggests that it isn't until around the age of about six years that children easily 
handle the distinction between what is said and what is meant (e.g. Robinson, 
Goelman & Olson, 1983). 
Before this age, children tend to conflate literal and speaker meaning 
(Bonitatibus, 1988a). Young children often treat ambiguous utterances as 
adequate (e.g. Flavell, Speer, Green & August), presumably because they have 
little understanding of literal meaning aside from their own assumptions about 
what the speaker means (Beal & Belgrad, 1990). In addition, children younger 
than six years have difficulty understanding that it is the speaker's responsibility 
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to provide a good enough utterance such that a particular item can be picked out 
of an array of similar items. They tend to blame the listener, rather than the 
speaker, when the wrong item is chosen (Robinson, 1981). Seemingly, children 
have little understanding that the words of the utterance carry a specific meaning 
which determine communicative success. 
Based on the analysis contained in the previous section (1.2) in this 
chapter, one of the problems with understanding utterances as extemalisations of 
internal representations could stem from the fact that utterances are not 
substantive (Robinson, 1994). Unlike pictures, utterances are not permanent, 
visible representations and so they might not provide children with strong enough 
cues about the speaker's belief or meaning. In order to fortify utterances with 
substantive qualities, Bonitatibus and Flavell (1985) showed children the words of 
an utterance written on a board to see whether this might help them to detect 
ambiguous utterances. This manipulation did promote a significant improvement 
amongst 6-year-old children; they were much more likely to detect ambiguity 
when they could see the words of the utterance, compared to a control condition 
in which the message was illegible. 
However, the key point is that the children who benefited from the 
manipulation were aged around six years. Younger children were not tested and 
the 6-year-olds were not at ceiling on the task. This suggests that even younger 
children would experience significant difficulties in detecting ambiguity, despite 
the words of the utterance being clearly presented. Consequently, the difficulty 
with treating utterances as representational cues does not simply seem to be a 
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function of them being ephemeral entities. Instead, there seems to be something 
special about utterances that makes them particularly hard to understand. This 
sentiment is echoed in Mitchell et al., (1999) who state that 'perhaps the 
interpretation of utterances should be viewed as a special kind of inferential 
problem' (p.63). 
The question, then, is why are utterances a special case? Why do children 
seem to find it more difficult to treat utterances as externalisations of internal 
representations, compared to pictorial representations of belief? The central theme 
of this thesis is that utterances are one element of a tripartite relationship; the 
remaining two elements being the speaker's meaning and reality. To understand 
utterances as externalisations of internal representations, it is not sufficient simply 
to understand the dual representational nature of utterances (i.e. that what is said 
is a representation of what is meant). It also requires an understanding of how 
what is meant and what is said are related to a particular reality or context (cf 
Robinson & Whittaker, 1987). This relationship is depicted in Figure 1.1. 
Utterance (External 
representation) 
Reality/Array 
Meaning (Internal 
representation) 
Figure 1.1: The triangular relation between reality, utterances and speaker meaning. 
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One of the most important qualities of this triangular relationship, is that 
all three elements could be different from each other. What the speaker means 
might be different from what the speaker says, which, in tum, could be different 
from the state of reality. For example, the speaker could say 'I really like the 
green house on the hill', but secretly mean 'I really hate the green house on the 
hill'. However, the speaker could be mistaken (for whatever reason: colour-
blindness, reduced visibility, out-of-date knowledge etc.), and the house is 
actually red. By contrast, the relationship between an externalisation of a belief 
and reality is much more straightforward. Although the belief can be discrepant 
with reality, as in a false belief scenario, the external representation (e.g. picture) 
and the belief have to be isomorphic because the former is a direct 'stand in' for 
the latter. Thus, whilst it is crucial for the child to understand that the picture or 
photo is identical to the belief in false belief tasks, it is equally crucial for the 
child to understand that the external representation (i.e. the utterance) in 
communication tasks may differ from the speaker's meaning. 
The notion of a three-way relationship characterising referential speech is 
by no means a new one (e.g. Robinson & Whittaker, 1987; Robinson, 1994). 
However, attempts to explore what children understand about the representational 
nature of utterances have tended to focus on only two aspects of the relationship 
rather than three. For example, Beal and Flavell {1984) chose to focus on 
knowledge of speaker meaning to see how this influenced judgments of message 
adequacy. They pointed to the intended referent before asking 6-year-olds 
whether the words of the utterance could refer to any of the other items in the 
Generallntroduction 16 
array. Children who were shown the intended referent in this way, were 
significantly less likely to detect ambiguous messages compared to children who 
were not shown which object the speaker 'was thinking about.' The authors 
argued that knowing the speaker's meaning led children to overlook the problems 
with the actual words of the utterance, because children have difficulty keeping 
the literal and non-literal representations separate. Consequently, a conflation of 
literal and non-literal meaning was interpreted as a sign that children have 
difficulty treating utterances as clues to the speaker's internal representation. 
Beat and Flavell assumed that their methodology could stand to be 
informative about how children understand utterances in relation to the speaker's 
meaning and the array. They also assumed that, in referential communication, the 
speaker's meaning and the array are isomorphic; hence it is possible to infer the 
former from the latter. However, the problem with the first assumption in terms of 
the referential triangle (Figure 1.1 ), is that reality and meaning were confounded, 
since children were informed about the speaker's meaning by seeing a particular 
item in the array. Therefore, it is not possible to tell whether children were more 
concerned with utterance-array relations or utterance-meaning relations. The 
problem with the second assumption is that it is not inevitable that the speaker's 
internal representation and the array will be perfectly matched. Therefore, 
inferring the speaker's meaning from the array may not be the best way to access 
the speaker's internal representation. As a result, Beal and Flavell's procedure 
tells us little about how knowledge of the speaker's internal representation might 
influence judgments of utterance adequacy. 
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The difficulty in knowing which aspects of the referential triangle children 
are more concerned with, is a significant problem in ambiguity research 
(Robinson & Whittaker, 1987; Robinson & Mitchell, 1992). This is because the 
speaker's meaning is always assumed to be an exact match with the intended 
referent in the real world. Hence, when a problematical utterance leads to a failure 
to uniquely identify an item from a set of alternatives, it is not clear whether 
children judge the message to be bad because they notice that the utterance 
underspecifies the array or because they think there is a discrepancy between what 
was said and what was meant. The reliance on using reality as a means of 
inferring speaker meaning is perhaps a reflection of the difficulty in presenting 
mental states directly. However, the previous section (1.2) suggests that thought 
bubbles might provide an ideal way of informing children about a speaker's 
internal representation. 
This would mean that, for the first time, the three components of the 
referential triangle could be depicted as separate, substantive elements. The 
referential array can be depicted alongside the utterance (contained in a speech 
bubble) and the speaker's meaning (contained in a thought bubble). This could 
allow a direct investigation into what makes utterances, in the context of 
referential communication, especially difficult to understand. Chapter 3 tries to 
elucidate where this difficulty might lie. Of course, in the real world, utterance 
and meaning are not usually substantive. Therefore, the direct approach outlined 
above needs to be supplemented with a paradigm in which the three components 
of the referential triangle are manipulated as separate elements, but in the absence 
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of concrete markers. It is possible that children might respond very differently to 
situations in which the speaker's meaning is clearly depicted via a thought bubble, 
versus situations in which the speaker's meaning is known to the participant, and 
differs from the array, but is not augmented by a pictorial representation. This 
approach forms the content of Chapter 4. 
Finally, just as knowledge of the speaker's internal representation might 
influence judgments of how the message relates to reality, so too might 
knowledge of reality influence judgments about how a message relates to a 
speaker's belief. This possibility has not been investigated directly, but there is 
some indirect evidence that adults, at least, seem unable to ignore privileged 
knowledge about reality when they are required to reason about false beliefs. 
Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs and Nye {1995) presented adults, and 5- and 9-year-
old children, with video scenarios in which a story protagonist heard a message 
that supposedly informed them about a particular state of reality; for example, 
they were told that there was milk in a jug in the kitchen. The protagonist who 
heard the message had previously seen the contents ofthejug. In some instances, 
the message contradicted the protagonist's belief(the protagonist had seen orange 
juice in the jug). In all cases, the observing participant had privileged knowledge 
about the truth or falsity of the speaker's message (e.g. they had seen the speaker 
swap the contents of the jug), and had to judge whether the listener would believe 
or disbelieve the message. 
Both groups of children answered according to a 'seeing-leads-to-
knowing' rule. That is, they judged that if the protagonist had seen inside the jug, 
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he would believe what he had seen rather than what he had been told. These 
judgments were made irrespective of children's knowledge about the truth of the 
message. By contrast, adult participants judged the believability of the message 
according to what they themselves knew about reality; they indicated that the 
protagonist would believe a message that they (the participant) knew to be true 
and disbelieve a message that they knew to be false. 
It is possible that adults may be similarly 'contaminated' by their own 
knowledge if they were asked to make a judgment about the adequacy of an 
ambiguous message from the perspective of the listener. If they could be 
presented with scenarios in which they (the participant) knew whether a speaker's 
utterance was ambiguous or not, would they tend to judge the adequacy of the 
utterance on the basis of what they themselves know, or what the uninformed 
listener knows? In other words, adults might be more influenced by their 
knowledge of the utterance-reality relationship, even though this should be 
irrelevant to the judgment about the l i s t e n e r ~ ~ perspective. Alternatively, they 
might consider the utterance-meaning relationship to be more important, since the 
l i s t e n e r ~ ~ perception of utterance adequacy should be based on how what is said is 
related to what the speaker means. Whatever the outcome, this kind of approach 
could help to illustrate which elements of the referential triangle are deemed to be 
of particular significance in judgments about whether an utterance is adequate or 
not and is tackled briefly in Chapter 5. 
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1.4. Summary 
This thesis is concerned with finding out more about how children and 
adults process externalisations of internal representations. The first step is to see 
whether thought bubbles might be useful externalisations for depicting internal 
representations. If thought bubbles are useful, then the depiction ofthe referential 
triangle as clearly separable, substantive elements becomes a possibility. The next 
step is to try to manipulate the elements that form the referential triangle -
utterance, belief and reality- so that it becomes possible to speculate about which 
aspect(s) might be responsible for the apparent difficulty in treating utterances as 
externalisations of internal representations. 
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CHAPTER2 
Can tltougllt bubbles facilitate understanding ofmental representations in 
people witlt autism? 
The following chapter forms part of the publication: 
Parsons, S. & Mitchell, P. (1999). What children with autism understand about 
thoughts and thought bubbles. Autism, 3, 17-38. 
2.1. Introduction 
Thought bubbles are a well-known pictorial convention for informing 
people about what someone might be thinking. They provide an observable and 
concrete way of presenting thoughts and even very young children seem to 
understand them easily. Since a thought bubble is used to depict thoughts directly, 
it might be that they are an especially useful way of providing children with clues 
that thoughts are representational. Given that people with autism often struggle 
with this type of understanding, thought bubbles might equip them with enough 
representational support to be able to improve their performance on false belief 
tasks. If people with autism derive some benefit from seeing thoughts depicted in 
this way, thought bubbles could be interpreted as effective extemalisations of 
beliefs. 
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2.2. Background literature 
Within the cognitive domain, children with autism have been widely 
reported to suffer profound deficits in understanding the representational 
character of the mind (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 
1989; Frith, 1989; Pemer, 1991; Leekam & Pemer, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; 
Happe, 1994; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi, Shulman & Pilowsky, 1996). 
Specifically, it seems that children with autism have difficulty understanding 
beliefs as special kinds of mental representations ' .. .intended to capture something 
real' (Wellman, 1990). That is, beliefs are conceptually distinct from other mental 
states such as dreams or fantasy in the sense that they purport to be about a real, 
external state of affairs. Although it is possible to have thoughts about non-
existent entities (e.g. a thought about a unicorn), a belief about something entails a 
conviction that it is true (Wellman, 1990). The finding that many children with 
autism fail to acknowledge false belief suggests they might lack a 'Theory of 
Mind'. 
In the test of false belief, a story protagonist is denied perceptual access to a 
change in reality (e.g. some chocolate is moved from a drawer to a fridge without 
the protagonist's knowledge), and the child participant is asked to infer where the 
ignorant protagonist will look for the chocolate. Normally developing 3- and 4-
year-olds and many children with autism, even with verbal mental ages (VMAs) 
greater than four years, fail this task by reporting that the protagonist will look for 
the chocolate in its present location (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985). Supposedly, people with autism do not understand that beliefs depict 
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reality as being a certain way (that is, beliefs are only representations of reality), 
and consequently just report reality when questioned about belief(Pemer, 1991). 
Further evidence suggested that children with autism might have a very 
specific impairment in understanding the representational character of the mind. 
Leslie and Thaiss (1992; also Leekam & Perner, 1991) tested children with autism 
on Zaitchik's (1990} 'false-photo' task. Photographs, like beliefs, are 'reality-
oriented' representations (Wellman, 1990} in the sense that they depict, or 
capture, a state of affairs in the real world. In this task, children watch as a 
Polaroid photo is taken of, for example, a doll in a green dress. Whilst the photo 
develops, the doll's dress is changed for a red one and children are asked to say 
what colour the doll's dress is in the picture. The photograph contains a 
representation of an outdated state of reality in much the same way as the 
protagonist's belief in the false belief task. However, children with autism found 
it much easier to anticipate the image in an outdated photograph than to anticipate 
the content of a person's outdated belief, suggesting that not all 'reality-oriented' 
representations pose a problem for children with autism. Furthermore, Charman 
and Baron-Cohen (1992) report that children with autism found 'false drawings', 
which depicted an obsolete state of reality, were much easier to understand than 
false beliefs. In all three of the above studies, normally developing preschoolers 
found the false photo/drawing tasks and the tests of false belief to be equaJly 
difficult. Thus it seems that people-with autism experience great difficulty in 
understanding mental phenomena as representations, compared to their virtually 
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unimpaired understanding of non-mental representations such as drawings and 
photographs. 
It is difficult to predict how children with autism would interpret a thought 
bubble. Whilst the bubble is essentially a drawing (a non-mental representation), 
it is nevertheless designed to represent the mental content of someone's mind. As 
such it seems to be a hybrid form of representation, neither exclusively mental or 
non-mental. Focusing on the mental aspect of thought bubbles, Wellman, 
Hollander and Schult (1996) predicted that children with autism would fail to 
understand bubbles as representing the content of someone else's mind, viewing 
them instead as a ' ... devilishly strange device' (p.787). In a series of experiments, 
Wellman et al. (1996) tested normal 3- and 4-year- olds' understanding of 
thoughts as simple representational entities, in the sense of ' ... capturing, 
.. depicting, .. or showing' something else (p.776). Even the youngest children 
understood thought bubbles to be private, intangible entities which depicted 
something in the world, in contrast to photographs which were judged as public 
and observable representations (see also Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1995). Indeed, 
they easily contrasted what a protagonist was thinking with a physical action they 
were involved in, suggesting that children as young as three understand thoughts 
as mental, rather than physical, activities. 
Children were then asked to judge about the unseen contents of a box. A 
story protagonist was depicted looking into a box and in the next scene there 
appeared suspended above his head a picture of some scissors encapsulated in a 
thought bubble. Under another condition, a protagonist was shown taking a photo 
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of the content of a box, and in the next scene she held up the resulting photo of a 
ball. Under a third condition, a protagonist was shown reaching into a box and in 
the next scene was holding a book with a large picture of a teddy bear on the 
cover. The interior of the box could not be seen in any of the conditions. Children 
were asked to judge what was inside the box. If participants understood thought 
(bubbles) to be about reality, then they could utilise it as a basis for inferring the 
content of the box. If they did not, then various clues would be available to 
suggest as much. It might be that participants did not regard the thought bubble as 
revealing what the protagonist thought about reality in which case they would be 
confined either to saying that they did not know, or guessing. 1 
If they guessed, they might base this on any conspicuous image, such as 
the information contained within the thought bubble or photograph. If that was the 
basis of their judgment, then a tell-tale error should become apparent in their 
performance on the 'book' control task. In this, the protagonist lifted a book from 
the box which displayed a picture of a teddy on the cover. Hence, the 
conspicuously framed image associated with the protagonist was a teddy bear. If 
participants were judging correctly for the wrong reason in the thought bubble 
task, then presumably this would become apparent in their wrongly reporting 
1: If participants were simply intetpreting the thought bubble as something detached from 
reality, like daydreams [similar to Pemer' s (1991) notion of 'thinking of] there would not be 
much evidence from the children of linking what the protagonist had seen with what they were 
thinking. Instead, children would be no more likely to answer the test question with the content of 
the thought bubble than with any other salient image in the scene, such as the cars on the floor. 
By contrast, if a child made correct judgments about the content of the box from the information 
in the thought bubble, they would be showing an understanding that seeing a certain thing 
conjures up an image of that thing in the mind, with the implication that this image is about 
reality ('thinking t h a t ' ~ ~ Perner, 1991 ). 
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'teddy' as the content of the box in the book control task, when they should be 
reporting 'book'. 
Wellman et at's (1996) youngest participants had few problems inferring 
the contents of the box from the thought bubble and the photograph and 
importantly, almost never referred to the teddy in the 'book' task. They, 
therefore, demonstrated a sensible understanding of thought bubbles as simple 
representational entities which could be used to inform them about reality. Also, 
contrary to Wellman's prediction that children with autism would find it difficult 
to understand thought bubbles, Parsons (1996) found that children with autism 
performed almost at ceiling on Wellman et at's thought bubble tasks outlined 
above. Moreover, the same group of children with autism performed 
significantly better on a test of false beliefwhen a thought bubble depicted the 
protagonist's false belief compared to a standard task. Given the previous 
demonstrations of autistic children's impaired understanding of mental 
representations, it was expected that children with autism would perform poorly 
on tasks involving thought bubbles, but in line with normally developing four-
year-olds on tasks requiring an understanding of photographic representations. 
Instead, however, it seemed to be the case that investing an intangible, mental 
representation (which autistic children have difficulty understanding) with a 
physical, observable embodiment (which they do understand), helped children 
with autism to attune to the representational character of thoughts. 
McGregor, Whiten and Blackburn (1998a) obtained results consistent 
with such an hypothesis using a 'picture-in-the-head' procedure. They found that 
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people with autism were helped to give correct judgments on false belief tasks if 
they had previously posted a photograph of the original location of the chocolate 
into a slot in a specially modified doll's head. Creating a tangible image ofthe 
doll's belief seemed to enable people with autism to contrast belief and reality 
when these were discrepant. Importantly, McGregor et al. emphasised the notion 
of the posted picture being an indicator that the doll thinks something is a 
particular way and would subsequently act on the basis of this belief By 
contrast, Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez and Walsh (1996) did not explicitly 
teach children about the link between a picture-in-the-head and a thought. 
Instead, they attempted to provide autistic participants with an alternative 
reasoning route that avoided 'thoughts' altogether, telling children that seeing 
something would lead to a picture-in-the-head which would then guide the 
protagonist's behaviour. This difference in emphasis could account for the 
finding that none of the children in Swettenham et al. (mean VMA 6:0) were able 
to use photos as a basis to infer mental states. 
It would appear that emphasising 'thoughts' m tasks designed for 
children with autism does not seem to promote confusion and this is supported 
by the finding that children with autism can benefit from the inclusion of thought 
bubbles in tests of false belief However, one limitation of the results from 
Parsons (1996) was that there was a general failure to find any differences 
between a group of normally developing 5-6-year-olds and the children with 
autism. Usually, it would be expected that the 5-6-year-olds would perform 
significantly better than the children with autism. In addition, there was a strong 
Autism and Thought Bubbles 28 
positive correlation between VMA and success on the false belief tasks. The 
mean VMA of the group of children with autism was relatively high (7:6} and 
the mean CA of the group was much higher than 5-6 years (12:0), leading to the 
possibility that it is only the more high functioning individuals with autism that 
might benefit from thought bubbles. Other studies, too, have noted the ability of 
high functioning autistic participants to pass false belief tasks and even second 
{higher) order belief tasks {e.g. Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995; Holroyd & Baron-
Cohen, 1993; Leekam & Perner, 1991). It was therefore decided to conduct a 
further study to investigate whether thought bubbles could help autistic children 
with lower VMAs to pass false belief tasks. In addition, it was important to 
establish the general usefulness of thought bubbles in helping different 
populations to attune to the representational content of the mind. 
Experiment 2.1 
2.1.1. Introduction 
A clarification of the relative influence of verbal mental age to an 
understanding of thought bubbles could be achieved by testing children with 
autism with lower VMAs on a partial replication of Parsons {1996). In particular, 
the main point of interest was a comparison between a standard false belief task 
and a false belief task that also included a thought bubble. In Parsons (1996} the 
Standard task asked the children about a change of location, whilst the Bubble 
task required children to recall the contents of a box. Perhaps the observed 
improvement in performance on the Bubble task was attributable to the much less 
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interesting possibility that judging about contents is simply easier than judging 
about location. In the present experiment, children with autism, with lower 
VMAs, (between four and seven years) were tested on false belief tasks 
controlling for this possibility. 
There were also additional improvements to the methodology. First, it could 
be that only presenting one test under each condition of false belief(Standard and 
Bubble), either over- or under- estimates children's ability. Participants could be 
credited with mentalistic understanding when correct responses have simply been 
fortuitous; or they could answer incorrectly due to extmneous task variables such 
as nervousness in the testing situation, and therefore be erroneously described as 
lacking any insight into mind. This concern echoes that of Happe (1995) who 
suggests that in some cases ' ... success on a single [false belief] task was due to 
chance' (p. 851 ). Two versions of each false belief task were, therefore, included. 
Second, a group of children with non-specific learning disabilities, also with 
VMAs between the ages of four and seven years, were included. Their 
participation allowed an investigation into the issue of the specificity of a Theory 
of Mind deficit in people with autism compared to learning disabled groups more 
generally. It also provided an opportunity to investigate whether children with 
learning disabilities can benefit from the addition of a thought bubble in false 
belief tasks. 
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2.1.2. Method 
2.1.2.1. Participants. Four groups of children were included: normally 
developing 3-4-year-olds and 5-6-year-olds; children with autism and children 
with learning disabilities of mixed or unknown aetiologies. Both groups of 
normally developing children attended a primary school in a predominantly 
working class area of Birmingham. All of the 19 children with autism attended 
schools specifically catering for children with disorders along the autistic 
continuum.2 Every child in this group had a statement of Special Educational 
Needs which explicitly included a diagnosis of'Autism' (and in one case only, a 
diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome). Teachers of the children with autism were 
asked to identify possible candidates with verbal mental ages greater than four 
years. Parents of identified candidates were then contacted to grant permission for 
their children to participate in the Study. Nine children attended the same school 
in Hampshire visited in Parsons (1996). Four children attended a day school for 
children with autism in Dorset and the remaining six attended an independently 
funded boarding school, also in Dorset. All nineteen children were tested for 
receptive language comprehension on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982). Participants in the learning 
2. 5 out of the 9 children were participants in the first study 18 months previously. These children 
tended to give incorrect judgments on the standard false belief task in Parsons (1996) and correct 
judgments on the Bubble task. Their responses on the false belief tasks in the present study were 
less u n i f o r m ~ ~ ranging from 0-4 correct responses, therefore suggesting little evidence of cany-over 
from Parsons ( 1996). 
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disability group attended a special school for mild/moderate learning disabilities 
in the Birmingham area; none had received a diagnosis of autism. Background 
details of participants are supplied in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Participant details ofChronological age (CA) and Verbal Mental Age 
(VMA). 
MeanCA Mean BPVS VMA (range 
(range in years:months) in years:months) 
Autistic 13:5 5:7 
(19 male) (8:7 to 18:3) (3:5 to 7:10) 
Learning Disability 8:11 4:9 
(13 male, 6 female) (7:2 to 1 0:8) (3:4 to 7:5) 
Normal 3-4 years 4:2 
-
(15 male, 13 female) (3:8 to 4:11) 
-
Normal 5-6 years 5:10 
-
(15 male, 15 female) (5:1 to 6:11) 
-
2.1.2.2. Materials. All introductory tasks and the four story scenarios 
were illustrated with coloured cartoon pictures and presented on A4 laminated 
sheets of card (examples of experimental stimuli and story scripts for all 
experiments in Chapters 2-5 are included in the Appendix. See pp. ix-xi for a 
summary). Each false belief story was presented on a total of three cards, despite 
small differences in number of illustrative pictures within each scenario. 
2.1.2.3. Introduction to thought bubbles. This was based on the 
shortened version of Wellman et at's (1996) thought bubble tasks. Children were 
first shown a picture of a girl with a large thought bubble above her head 
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containing a bunch of flowers. The experimenter told the child that this was Susie 
and then pointed to Susie's jeans and T- shirt asking 'What's this?' each time. 
Next, the experimenter gestured broadly to the thought bubble and its contents 
and asked children what it was. If children made reference to mental states such 
as thinking or dreaming the experimenter confirmed this was correct, and if the 
participant gave a different answer or did not respond, the experimenter 
announced that the thought bubble ' ... shows us what Susie is thinking about.' 
Children were then asked 'So what is Susie thinking about?' The second picture 
showed a different girl, Jane, with a thought bubble encapsulating a picture of a 
birthday cake. The experimenter asked 'What is Jane thinking about?' The next 
two pictures required children to explicitly contrast mental activity with physical 
action. The first showed Peter, kneeling down, holding a dog by its lead. Above 
Peter's head was a thought bubble containing a picture of a car. Children were 
asked 'What is Peter thinking?' and 'What is Peter doing?', in fixed order. Next, 
children saw a picture of Ann, pushing a toy pram, and above her head was a 
thought bubble depicting a drink. Children were asked 'What is Ann doing?' and 
'What is Ann thinking?' in fixed order. 
2.1.2.4. Main Procedure. Each participant was then presented with four 
false belief tasks. Children were shown four story scenarios involving the 
protagonists Susie, Claire, Paul and John. The Susie and Claire scenarios were 
'contents' stories as in 'What does x think is inside the box/bag?', and the Paul 
and John scenarios were 'location' stories as in 'Where does x think the (item) 
is?' Each story had two versions; one containing a thought bubble encapsulating 
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the protagonist's false belief in the final picture (Bubble condition) and one which 
did not (Standard condition). Children in each diagnostic group were split into 
two experimental groups. Group 1 received the Bubble followed by the Standard 
version for the content and location stories: They saw the bubble version of Susie 
and the Standard version of Claire, followed by Paul (Bubble) and John 
(Standard). Group 2 received the story narratives in exactly the same order, but 
the Bubble and Standard conditions were reversed. 
The narrative from the John story provides an example of the style and 
length of stories used. Where necessary the experimenter pointed to the relevant 
details to make sure each participant was following the correct sequence of 
pictures: 
'Here's John. John is playing with his toy cars on the table (picture 1), but John 
wants to watch TV in the other room. So John packs his cars away into a drawer 
(picture 2) and then leaves the room (picture 3).' 
Children were then asked a prompt question: Where did John put his cars? 
The narrative continues: 
'Whilst John is watching the TV, his brother Mark is looking for the toy cars. He 
finds them in the drawer (picture 4) plays with them for a while (picture 5) and 
then puts the cars in the toy-box instead of back in the drawer (picture 6). • 
Check question: Did John see Mark do that? No, he didn't did he ........ !fhat's 
right.. ..... 
...... 'John was watching the TV so he didn't see Mark put the cars in the toy box. 
John has come back into the room now (picture 7). • 
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Children were then asked a ftxed-order series of questions: 
Belief question: Where does John think the toy cars are? 
Reality question: Where are the toy cars now? 
Memory check: Where did John put the toy cars at the beginning of the story? 
·content' stories were identical in format except the protagonist was 
depicted putting something into (e.g.) a bag which was subsequently removed and 
replaced with a different item in the protagonist's absence. Children were then 
asked the belief question in the following form: 'What does Susie/Claire think is 
inside her bag/box?'; followed by the reality question: •What is inside Susie's bag 
now?', and the memory check: 'What was in Susie's bag at the beginning of the 
story?' 
Each child completed the Introductory tasks and the four false belief 
scenarios in two separate sessions. During the ftrst session, children completed 
the 'Introduction to thought bubbles' procedure, followed by the Susie and Claire 
scenarios. On a different (usually consecutive) day, children were reminded of the 
Introductory tasks and were then presented with the two remaining false belief 
tasks (Paul and John). The children with autism and the children with learning 
disabilities were seen on a previous occasion where they were assessed for 
receptive VMA on the BPVS. Children were randomly assigned to experimental 
groups. The majority of children were tested individually in a quiet room, but a 
few of those with autism who reacted badly to environmental change were tested 
in their classrooms. 
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2.1.3. Results3 
2.1.3.1. Introduction to thought bubbles. The majority of children did 
not refer to mental phenomena when the experimenter asked 'What's this?' whilst 
gesturing to the thought bubble on the first occasion it was presented. The most 
common response was to report the contents of the bubble (flowers); twenty 5-6-
year-olds (66%) gave this response, as did 25 (89%) 3-4-year-olds, 17 (89%) 
children with learning disability, and 15 (78%) children with autism. Of the 
remaining children, seven 5-6-year-olds, and one child in each clinical group used 
mental vocabulary to describe the bubble, such as 'thinking', 'dreaming' or 
'wishing', but none of the clinically normal preschoolers did so. Other responses 
were either 'don't know', no response or mention of'cloud', 'bubble' or a colour 
in the picture (9 responses in total). 
After being told by the experimenter that the bubble 'shows us what Susie 
is thinking', all in the total sample, except for one 3-4 year old, answered 
correctly that Susie was thinking about 'flowers'. An identical pattern of 
responding was found for the second picture of Jane; only one 3-4 year old gave 
an answer other than the correct one of 'cake'. Next, contrasting the actions of 
protagonists with their depicted thoughts, all but three children with autism said 
correctly that Peter was thinking about a car. The majority in each group also 
3. To avoid the loss of potentially useful data. all children were included in these analyses. Some 
analyses of the data from the reality question only are also included, to assess directly whether the 
presence of the thought bubbles causes a decrement in correct reality judgments. 
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correctly referred to Peter's depicted action (holding a dog): 25 (89%) 3-4-year-
olds, 17 (89%) children with autism, 28 (93%) 5-6-year-olds and 18 (94%) 
children with learning disability. Children performed similarly well on the final 
introductory picture of Ann. All of the 5-6-year-olds, 24 (86%) 3-4-year-olds, 15 
(80%) children with autism and 17 (89%) children with learning disability 
correctly referred to the pram that Ann was pushing when asked what she was 
doing. Also, 18 (94%) children with autism and children with learning disability; 
92% (26) of 3-4-year-olds and 100% (30) of 5-6-year-olds, mentioned the 
contents of the thought bubble ('drink') when asked what Ann was thinking. 
Generally, the majority of children had few difficulties understanding a thought 
bubble as a basis for judging what someone may be thinking. 
2.1.3.2. Main Procedure: Comparing groups and conditions on the 
belief and reality questions. Each child was credited with a score of 0-2 to 
record how many (out of 2) stories they passed for the Standard and Bubble 
conditions. A score of 0 was awarded for incorrect answers on both story 
scenarios within each condition, a score of 1 for one correct answer, and a score 
of 2 was given for correct answers on both story scenarios. Table 2.2 shows the 
number of children in each group scoring 0,1 or 2 correct responses for the 
Standard and Bubble conditions. A belief judgment was only counted as correct if 
the accompanying reality question was also answered correctly; if the reality 
question was answered incorrectly the child automatically received a score of zero 
for that particular story. Diagnostic group was entered into an ANOV A as the 
between group variable while type of task (Standard or Bubble) was entered as 
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the repeated measure. The ANOV A revealed a significant main effect for 
diagnostic group [E(3,92) = I5.89, n<0.001] and type of task [E(I,92) =I3.23, 
n<0.001]. The interaction between task and group was not significant Table 2.3 
contains a summary of mean scores for each group. 
To determine where the main effect between groups lies, data was 
combined across conditions to yield a score of 0-4 for each child, indicating 
correct judgments on the belief and reality questions for the four false belief tasks. 
Post-hoc Tukey's multiple comparisons revealed that 5-6-year-olds, 
Table 2.2: Numbers of children in each group scoring 0, 1 or 2 correct responses 
for the Standard and Bubble tasks. 
Group Tasks Correct 
Standard Bubble 
0 1 2 0 I 2 
Autistic 13 I 5 7 7 5 
Learning Disability 4 7 8 3 6 IO 
Normal 3-4 years 18 6 4 I3 7 8 
Normal 5-6 years 2 7 21 I 3 26 
children with autism and the learning disability group achieved significantly 
higher scores on average than the youngest normal children. In addition, the 
learning disability group performed significantly better than the children with 
autism but significantly worse than the normal 5-6-year-olds (Q< 0.05 in all 
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cases). There were no significant order effects detected in the data. That is, correct 
responses to the belief questions in the Standard and Bubble conditions were not 
dependent on which version children saw first. 
2.1.3.3. Main Procedure: Comparing groups and conditions on the 
reality question only. The following analyses are based on the data from the 
reality questions only, irrespective of whether the belief question was answered 
correctly. Table 2.3 contains a summary of the mean scores for each diagnostic 
group for the reality question. None of the groups scored lower on the Bubble 
condition than on the Standard condition. Children were assigned a score of 0-2 
for correct judgments on the reality question for the Standard and Bubble 
Table 2.3: Mean scores (and standard deviations) on the belief and reality 
questions, and the reality question only, for the Standard and Bubble conditions. 
Group Mean scores (from a total of2) 
Test and reality questions Reality question only 
Standard Bubble Standard Bubble 
Autistic 0.58 0.89 0.95 1.11 
(0.90) (0.81) (0.85) (0.81) 
Learning Disability 1.21 1.37 1.53 1.58 
(0.79) (0.76) (0.61) (0.61) 
Normal 3-4 years 0.50 0.82 0.89 1.14 
(0.75) (0.861 (0.83) (0.85} 
Normal 5-6 years 1.67 1.83 1.80 1.93 
(0.61) .(0.46) (0.48) (0.25) 
tasks, and the data were entered into a repeated measure ANOV A design' as 
before. There was a significant main effect for group [E(3,92) =12.4, v_<O.OOl] 
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and for task [E(1,92) =5.44, g<0.05], but no significant interaction between the 
two factors. Combining data across conditions (yielding scores of 0-4) for 
Tukey's post-hoc analyses, revealed that the 5-6-year-olds and the children with 
learning disabilities performed significantly better than the 3-4-year-olds and the 
children with autism. There were no significant differences between the former or 
the latter two groups. A two-tailed pairwise comparison of performance on 
Standard versus Bubble tasks combining across groups revealed that children 
made more correct reality judgments in the presence of a thought bubble than 
without this prop [!(95) = 2.53, g<0.05]. Therefore, there seemed to be no 
decrement in correct judgments of reality in the presence of the thought bubble. 
2.1.3.4. Main Procedure: The influence of VMA. The following 
analyses are based on the combined theory of mind score from all four tasks 
(providing a score of0-4 for each child). Separate analyses from the Standard and 
Bubble tasks are not included because they did not differ significantly from the 
combined score. In the autism group there was only a weak and non-significant 
association between VMA and total theory of mind score (r = 0.26). However, in 
the learning disability group there was a significant correlation between verbal 
mental age and theory of mind score r = 0.51, g<0.05. Additional analyses 
examined whether children passing all four tasks tended to register higher VMAs 
on average than those failing all four, or those who gave 'inconsistent' responses 
(scoring 1-3 correct answers). Amongst the children with autism, the mean age of 
the 'passers' was 6:5 (n=4; range 4:7 to 7:1) compared to a mean of 6:2 for the 
'failers' (n=6; range 4:6 to 7:10). The average age of the 'inconsistent' children 
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was lower than both of these groups at 5:6 (n=9; range 3:5 to 7:2). The children 
with learning disability showed a clearer grouping of responding according to 
VMA, as would be expected from the strong correlations between VMA and 
Theory of Mind task success reported above. Seven children were correct on all 
four tasks and had a mean VMA of6:1 (range 4:8 to 6:11). There were only two 
'failers' (mean VMA4:7), but 10 'inconsistent' children (mean= 4:9; range 3:4 to 
5:9). Overall, VMA seemed to be an influential factor on false belief task 
performance for the children with non-specific learning disabilities, but not for the 
children with autism. 
2.1.4. Discussion 
Contrary to Wellman et.al's (1996) prediction that children with autism 
would fail to understand thought bubbles, at least some children in the autism 
group seemed to understand thought bubbles as representational devices that can 
be used to talk about the contents of thoughts and beliefs. Whilst the 5-6-year-olds 
and the children with learning disability generally performed better than the 
children with autism and the 3-4-year-olds, the evidence in the latter two groups 
was still largely consistent with their being able to derive some benefit from 
having a pictorial representation of a false belief. The only group not to show a 
significant benefit from the bubble consisted of the children with learning 
disability. Nevertheless, the results from the children with learning disability were 
in the same direction as the other groups, suggesting that there was a similar, but 
weaker, effect in operation. However, the lack of a significant effect amongst the 
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children with learning disability makes the significant difference in the group of 
children with autism all the more striking. In short, many children were helped to 
attune to the content of a belief when this was encapsulated in a thought bubble, 
and when this contrasted with the current state of reality. 
Alternative explanations for this fledgling competence, such as 'hacked-out' 
solutions (Frith, Morton & Leslie, 1991; Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991}, possible 
cueing effects or guessing, seem unlikely due to children's ability to judge 
appropriately about reality. If the bubble simply served as a general memory 
marker (or promoted low-level 'associative' responses such as linking the word 
'think' with whatever was contained in the bubble), thereby prompting 
superficially correct belief judgments, then children would be led to make errors 
when asked about reality. That is, children could interpret the contents of the 
thought bubble as reality rather than as a representation of reality and, therefore, 
judge that what is contained in the thought bubble is really the contents of the box 
or the location of the object This pattern of responding was apparent in the 3-
year-olds in Parsons (1996), but not in those with autism in either study. 
Therefore, using correct judgments about belief and reality as the criterion for 
'passing' provides persuasive evidence that children's understanding of false 
beliefs in the context of a thought bubble is appropriately representational. 
These findings are particularly encouraging in the light of other research 
which suggests children with autism can only be helped to pass false belief tasks 
after periods of explicit teaching (e.g. Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin & Hill, 
1996; Swettenham et al., 1996). The instruction in those studies was not always 
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successful and, as mentioned earlier, none of the autistic children in Swettenham 
et al. (1996) were able to use photos as a basis to infer mental states. Why should 
thought bubbles serve as a potentially more powerful aid to understanding mental 
phenomena? 
Wellman (1990) makes the distinction between reality-oriented 
representations, such as beliefs and photographs, and fictional representations, 
such as drawings and other mental states like dreaming and fantasy. Since beliefs 
and photographs are both reality-oriented representations, it. makes sense to 
predict that a photograph could serve as a useful 'metaphor' of belief 
(Swettenham et. al., 1996). However, drawings (so-called 'fictional' 
representations) seem to provide a more intuitively plausible link with mental 
phenomena: Both can refer to reality, can depict hypothetical states of affairs, and 
can accommodate non-existent entities (Wellman, 1990; Freeman, 1994). By 
contrast, a normal photograph can only represent what was in front of it at the 
time the button was pressed. It is not an active and constructive representational 
device like a mind, and cannot depict hypothetical or non-existent states as 
drawings can. 
This is not to say that children hold an explicit concept of the similarities 
between drawings and beliefs, but rather that they understand both as 
representations and, at the very least, recognise a difference between the fixed, 
observable and veridical nature of photographic representations and the more 
accommodative and changeable nature of beliefs and drawings (cf. Zaitchik, 
1990). In short, thought bubbles seem to make some kind of 'intuitive sense' to 
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children, enabling them to overcome difficulties in the department of 
representation by investing an intangible belief with a tangible counterpart in 
reality. Therefore, if a normal preschooler or a child with autism has even the 
rudimentary cognitive foundations in place for basic representational 
understanding (see Grant, Riggs & Boucher, in press, for additional evidence), 
perhaps such nascent insight can be augmented by a tangible suggestion of 
thoughts as representations (see also McGregor et al., 1998a). 
This is consistent with Mitchell & Lacohee (1991; also Freeman & 
Lacohee, 1995) who found that 3-year-old children were significantly more likely 
to acknowledge their own earlier false belief, if they had previously posted a 
picture of their belief into a toy postbox. Indeed, Freeman (1994) suggests that 
children are able to understand the similarity between representations (e.g. 
between beliefs and pictures) at a "primordial level". That is, children possess 
some conscious understanding of the symbolic nature of representations before an 
understanding of representations becomes available to verbal report (the 
'secondary' level). This results in the child being significantly aided by symbolic 
representations of beliefs in various tasks because a drawing (for example) serves 
as a symbolic 'tracer' which allows the child to contrast the referent of the belief 
with the belief itself. Therefore, the thought bubble might make 'intuitive sense' 
because it serves as a symbol which targets children's understanding of 
representations at an earlier stage than that required for a standard task. 
The finding that upon initial presentation ofthe thought bubble, very few 
children spontaneously mentioned thinking or thoughts does not threaten the 
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'intuition' hypothesis. The important point is not whether children immediately 
recognised thought bubbles as such, but rather, whether they demonstrated a rapid 
understanding of thought bubbles once they had been told what the bubbles were. 
Indeed Wellman et al. (1996) emphasise this point: ' ... our data ..... suggest that the 
introduction and pretraining needed for young children to understand and use 
thought-bubble depictions appropriately can be minimal '(p. 786). 
What remains a puzzle, however, is why children with autism typically go 
on to fail 'standard' tests of false belief (and other tasks requiring a 
representational understanding of mental states) if they possess some kind of 
rudimentary notion of thoughts as representational entities. Indeed, in treating the 
thought bubble effectively as a clue to reality rather than as reality itself, the 
children with autism seemingly related to the thought bubble differently than they 
routinely relate to speech. Referential speech can be regarded as an aural 
representation of reality. In other words, we allow ourselves to be informed by 
speech even in the absence of first-hand direct experience. Despite this, we do not 
regard speech as being reality itself, but only as a clue to reality that comes to us 
via another mind (Mitchell & Robinson, 1994; Robinson & Mitchell, 1992, 1994). 
However, children with autism are different, and they do tend to interpret speech 
literally, as though it were reality itself and seemingly do not apprehend the mind 
behind the message (Mitchell & Isaacs, 1994; Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Perhaps children with autism understand enough about representation to be 
able to recognise a plausible suggestion, but not enough to be able to formulate 
the content of a representation unaided. Evidence in support of that view arises 
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from Mitchell and Isaacs (1994, Experiment 2), who report that children with 
autism succeeded in accepting a suggestion of verbal misrepresentation, whilst 
correctly rejecting untrue distracter suggestions. These same children seemingly 
were unable to acknowledge verbal misrepresentations without assistance in the 
form of suggestion. It might be that sensible, intuitively plausible suggestions as 
to the correct content of a representation, can be used to help children with autism 
understand instances of'mental misrepresentation'. 
2.1.5. Conclusion 
The facilitatory effect of the bubble in the present study coupled with the 
competence of higher functioning children with autism reported in Parsons 
(1996), suggests that children with autism can be helped to answer appropriately 
about belief with the aid of thought bubbles. Moreover, at least for the children 
with autism, this benefit was not restricted to those with higher VMAs since there 
were no significant correlations between success on false belief tasks and verbal 
ability in the present study. Consequently, thought bubbles appear to be a 
powerful method for extemalising internal representations, such that even 
members of a population documented to be significantly impaired in 
understanding the mental realm, can be helped by them. 
In addition, it seems that normally developing children can also derive 
significant benefit from seeing the protagonist's false belief depicted in a thought 
bubble. By endowing a (usually) intangible belief with a physical embodiment, 
children can be helped to answer correctly about a protagonist's false belief. 
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Generally, it seems that competence in understanding the mind, both amongst 
normally developing children and those with autism, can be revealed by the use of 
thought bubbles. This suggests that the use of thought bubbles could be extended 
to alternative contexts in which seeing a protagonist's mental representation 
directly could provide a new perspective on children's understanding of the mind. 
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CHAPTER3 
Ambiguity and thought bubbles: What do children understand about speaker 
meaning as an internal representation? 
3.1. Introduction 
The results from Chapter 2 suggest that thought bubbles can serve as 
useful clues to the content of mental representations. In this sense, there is a 
parallel between thought bubbles and speech, since speech also provides 
information about the content of a speaker's beliefs. However, whilst normally 
developing children aged around 4 years can be significantly aided in 
understanding a thought bubble as an externalisation of a belief, it is not until 
around the age of 6 years that children typically begin to understand how an 
utterance functions as an externalisation of a speaker's internal representation or 
meaning. Beal (1988) states that' ... an important component of the child's theory 
of mind is the understanding that the communicative quality of messages can 
determine the mental states of the self and others' (p.315). A substantial body of 
research carried out in the 1970's and 1980's lead to the general conclusion that 
children have difficulty with this type of understanding until the age of around six 
or seven years. Therefore, a thought bubble (as a clue to an internal 
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representation) does not seem to have the same effect as speech since there is at 
least a two-year gap between understanding the former compared to the latter. An 
important question, then, is why might there be extra difficulty in understanding 
speech as an externalisation of a representation? 
The following three experiments were designed to explore this question 
using a procedure based on the Referential Communication literature and utilising 
the more contemporary thought bubble paradigm. The usefulness of thought 
bubbles in (a) helping children to treat beliefs and reality as separate 
representations and (b) informing children directly about the content of a 
protagonist's belie( might also help us to determine where the source of 
children's difficulty lies. 
3.2. Background literature. 
Referential communication is defined as " ... communication about an 
object, location, etc., that would enable a listener to select a referent from 
nonreferential alternatives" (Sonnenschein, 1984; p.251 ). The referential 
communication paradigm was widely used to investigate children's understanding 
and production of utterances that underspecify the referent; that is, utterances that 
are ambiguous with respect to the alternative referents in a display. The typical 
approach required children to produce or respond to messages based on a small 
selection of items in an array (for example, pictures, building blocks or dolls). The 
items in the array were manipulated so that they differed from each other in terms 
of specific attributes such as colour, size, adornments and shape. Using this basic 
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set-up, researchers could investigate children's ability to successfully produce 
utterances so that a listener would be able to pick the referent that the speaker had 
in mind. Also, the paradigm provided a controlled situation in which children 
could interpret and evaluate utterances from a speaker who may, or may not, have 
done a very good job of describing a particular referent. 
The general finding from this approach was that it is not until around age 
six or seven that children begin to understand the special role of language as a 
representation of the speaker's beliefs, thoughts or knowledge (e.g. Beal, 1988; 
Robinson & Whittaker, 1987). This understanding requires the child to consider 
the dual representational nature ofverbal messages: (1) as a literal representation 
comprising the actual words spoken and (2) as a (sometimes incomplete and 
approximate) representation ofthe speaker's meaning (Bonitatibus, 1988a). 
Developmentally, it is well known that children tend to focus on speaker 
meaning before they come to appreciate that an utterance has a literal meaning 
also. For example, children can recall the 'gist' of an utterance much more easily 
than the actual words of the message (Olson & Hildyard, 1983) and tend to 
respond to the underlying intention or 'illocutionary force' of the utterance before 
being able to respond only to the actual words spoken (Ackerman, 1981). 
Moreover, Beat and colleagues (Beat & Flavell, 1984; Beat & Belgrad, 1990; 
Beat, 1988) explicitly varied the accessibility of the speaker's meaning, by 
pointing to the intended referent, in message evaluation tasks. They found that 5 
and 6-year-olds were significantly worse at detecting ambiguous utterances (or 
pictorial 'clues' in Beal & Bel grad, 1990) when they knew the speaker's intended 
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referent, compared to an 'uninformed' group who did not know the speaker's 
meaning. Beal (1988) argues that these difficulties arise because children younger 
than about six years are unable to ' ... maintain a distinction between the literal 
meaning and intended meaning of the speaker' (p.317) and, therefore, tend to 
conflate the two (Bonitatibus, 1988a, 1988b; Robinson, Goelman & Olson, 1983). 
The failure to treat utterances as dual representations has been manifested 
in various ways. For example, children younger than age six will often judge an 
ambiguous or uninformative utterance to be adequate (e.g. Flavell, Speer, Green 
& August, 1981; Markman, 1977, 1979) and will tend to blame the listener, rather 
than the speaker, when communication fails and the wrong item is chosen 
(Robinson & Robinson, 1977, 1983). Moreover, the children that fail to detect 
referential ambiguity tend to be the same children who accept disambiguated 
versions of the original message as what was actually said (Robinson, Goelman & 
Olson, 1983). Correct performance on these tasks requires the child to understand 
that the actual words in the utterance carry a specific meaning, which is preserved 
independently of what the underlying intention of the speaker might be. These 
fmdings therefore suggest that, prior to the age of about six years, children seem 
to have difficulty discriminating the literal representation of the utterance from 
what may have been meant by it. 
Research by Bonitatibus (1988b; Bonitatibus & Flavell, 1985) also 
supports the idea that problems in detecting ambiguity in utterances arise from a 
difficulty viewing the literal and speaker meanings as separable representations. 
Bonitatibus and Flavell (1985) presented 6-year-olds with a task in which a hand 
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puppet "'Mr.Lion" wrote two-word messages (ambiguous and unambiguous) on a 
board, and the children were asked to judge whether they had been told enough to 
enable them to choose the referent. Children were significantly more likely to 
detect ambiguous utterances in this condition, compared to a condition in which 
the message was written in indecipherable scrawl. Using a slightly different 
procedure, Reid (1996) obtained similar results. It seems that drawing children's 
attention to the 'very words' of the utterance helped them to consider the role of 
the literal representation ofthe utterance in communication tasks. 
By contrast, informing children ofthe speaker's meaning can lead them to 
overlook the role of literal meaning and, hence, cause them to judge inadequate 
messages to be informative. Beat and Flavell (1984) pointed out the intended 
referent to the child before asking them to evaluate the adequacy of the utterance. 
Their procedure involved placing a photograph of a girl 'Sheri' beneath one of the 
referents in an array so that it looked like Sheri was pointing to the object above 
her head. The children were then told that this was the picture/object that Sheri 
wanted them to find. The words of the utterance were also presented on message 
cards when children were asked to make an evaluation ("Do these words 'the blue 
one', let you pick this picture?"). Six-year-olds informed about Sheri's meaning 
were significantly less likely to judge the message to be ambiguous (i.e. say that 
the message would not let them to pick another item), compared to children 
ignorant of Sheri's meaning. The authors concluded that this was because 6-year-
olds find it difficult to separate the speaker's meaning from the ' ... referential 
possibilities of the literal meaning of her message' (p.924). In other words, 
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knowing the speaker's meaning led children to overlook the referential problems 
with the message; they were less likely to attend to the pragmatic relationship 
between the actual words of the utterance and the items in the array. As a result, 
they judged the message to be adequate because they overlooked the fact that the 
utterance did not allow them to identify the referent uniquely. 
In Beat's approach, children's detection of ambiguity was impaired by 
knowing the referent rather than by knowing the speaker's representation of the 
referent. This is an important distinction since the former focuses on meaning as 
the intended outcome, whilst the latter considers meaning to be an internal 
representation of the speaker (Robinson & Whittaker, 1987). The distinction 
between these two characterisations of meaning can be made clearer with 
reference to Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Figure. 3.1 depicts the linear relationship 
assumed in characterising meaning as intended outcome (as in Beat's work), 
whilst Figure 3.2 represents the triangular relationship necessary for 
characterising meaning as an internal representation. 
Utterance - - - - - - - - l l ! l l l ~ ~ Reality (meaning) 
Figure 3.1: The linear relationship between the utterance and reality. 
Reality 
Utterance 
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Meaning (Internal 
Representation) 
Figure 3.2: The triangular relation between reality, utterances and speaker meaning. 
Initially, children tend to be outcome focused in their message evaluations. 
If a message results in the correct referent being chosen, even when a correct 
choice is merely fortuitous, children aged around 5 years will tend to judge that 
the message was adequate (Robinson & Whittaker, 1986; Ackerman, 1981). It is 
only when children come to understand the importance of the literal 
representation of the message that they are able to evaluate according to the 
informational value of the utterance rather than the outcome (Robinson & 
Whittaker, 1987). However, Beat's procedure might simply encourage children to 
retain focus on meaning as intended outcome, rather than making the next step to 
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considering meaning as an internal representation. Beat assumes that pointing to 
the intended referent is tantamount to revealing the speaker's internal 
representation. However, the problem with procedures that are covered by Figure 
3.1 is that reality and meaning are confounded, such that it is impossible to tell 
whether the child is more concerned with utterance-array (referent in the real 
world) relations or utterance-meaning relations. Hence, it is not possible to make 
any conclusions about whether it is knowing the speaker's meaning (as an internal 
representation) that is responsible for children's difficulties in assessing the 
pragmatic value of the utterance. In addition, in Beat and Flavell (1984; also Beat 
& Belgrad, 1990) the experimenter points to a referent in the display, thereby 
ostensively providing an interpretation of the utterance. This could unwittingly 
supply the child with a cue on how the utterance should be interpreted, thus 
diverting attention away from the utterance such that they fail to fully consider all 
of its 'referential possibilities.' A linear relationship between the utterance and a 
particular referent, as depicted in Figure 3.1, has been pre-specified by the 
experimenter, perhaps making it difficult for the child to say that the words of the 
utterance could refer to any other items in the array. 
A procedure that allows the three components of referential 
communication, Figure 3.2, to be separated out would provide a more direct test 
of how children handle knowledge of the speaker's meaning. In the three 
experiments that follow, children were informed about a speaker's representation 
directly by seeing a thought bubble suspended above the protagonist's head in a 
cartoon story. Thought bubbles are ideal vehicles for explicitly informing children 
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about internal representations, and for dissociating meaning (as depicted in a 
thought bubble) from the utterance (presented in a speech bubble) and from the 
referent array. In addition, revealing the speaker's meaning to children via a 
thought bubble removes the problem of making an ostensive interpretation ofthe 
utterance. Since the speaker's meaning has not been explicitly represented before, 
it is unclear how children should be expected to behave in situations where the 
speaker's internal representation is shown directly. However, it is possible to 
make a two-tailed prediction based on some of the findings outlined above. On 
the one hand, given that many researchers (e.g. Beal, 1988; Bonitatibus, 1988a; 
Robinson et al., 1983; Robinson & Whittaker, 1987) argue that difficulties with 
ambiguous utterances arise because young children conflate literal and intended 
meaning, thought bubbles (combined with speech bubbles) might help children to 
make correct judgments because the two types of meaning are visually separated. 
By contrast, Beal and Flavell {1984) might argue that children would continue to 
experience difficulty on ambiguity tasks because being informed about the 
speaker's meaning- in whatever form- is problematic for younger children. 
Whether or not the utterance was represented in a speech bubble was also 
manipulated in Experiment 3.1. As noted above, Bonitatibus and Flavell (1985) 
and Reid (1996) demonstrated that children were significantly better at detecting 
ambiguity when utterances were written on cards rather than spoken. Therefore, it 
might be the case that any facilitatory effect of the thought bubble is especially 
noticeable when a speech bubble is also present because the literal and speaker 
meanings are clearly separated. On a more general level, Ackerman (1993) 
Ambiguity and Thought Bubbles 56 
showed that children were much more likely to make correct judgments about 
ambiguous utterances if they were presented with information that aided access to 
relevant details in memory. Providing the utterance in a speech bubble means that 
children do not have to struggle to remember exactly what was said. Therefore, at 
least some of the time, children were presented with stimuli that provided the best 
chance of giving correct evaluations. 
Children aged between 7 and 9 years were included in Experiment 3.1 and 
children aged 5 to 10 years were included in Experiments 3.2 and 3.3. This was so 
that any developmental trend in the understanding of meaning as an internal 
representation could be assessed. Robinson and Whittaker (1987) suggest that 
understanding meaning as an internal representation is a later development than 
understanding meaning as an intended outcome. Therefore, perhaps only the older 
children would derive any benefit from the depiction of meaning in a thought 
bubble. 
Experiment 3.1. 
3.1.1. Introduction 
In the following experiment, one of the main interests was in the effect of 
presenting the utterance in a speech bubble in addition to the effect of displaying 
the speaker's internal representation in a thought bubble. To maintain consistency 
of media between thought and speech, the information in the thought bubbles was 
presented in written form. 
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3.1.2. Method 
3.1.2.1. Participants. 19 Year 3 children (11 males and. 8 females; mean 
age, 7:5; range 7:2 to 8:1) and 20 Year 5 children (13 males and 7 females; mean 
age, 9:9; range 9:6 to 10:1) were included. All attended a LEA maintained 
Primary School in Derbyshire. 
3.1.2.2. Materials. With the exception of the 'Batman and Superman' 
comic, stories were illustrated with coloured cartoon pictures and presented on A4 
card. Pictures were placed in clear plastic wallets and mounted in a Lever Arch 
File. The comic was no.41 in the 'I love to Read' series published by The Redan 
Company Ltd (1999). 
3.1.2.3. Design and Procedure. All children received a senes of 
Introductory tasks, completed in fixed order, before the experimental stories were 
presented. They then received a total of eight story scenarios, four of which 
contained a speech bubble and four which did not. Half the children in each age 
group received all eight stories with a thought bubble present and the remaining 
children received all stories without a thought bubble. 6 stories (3 speech bubble 
absent and 3 speech bubble present) were Ambiguous and 2 stories (1 speech 
bubble absent and 1 speech bubble present) were Unambiguous. Thought Bubble 
present/absent was, therefore, a between-subjects classification and Speech 
Bubble present/absent was a within-subjects classification. Story scenarios were 
divided into two blocks and the order in which the stories were presented in each 
block was fixed across all subjects. The order of Unambiguous and Ambiguous 
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trials was rotated within each block and was identical for both speech bubble 
absent and speech bubble present trials. Presence or absence of the speech bubble 
was mapped onto each block, so children received all four stories (3 ambiguous 
and 1 Unambiguous) with speech bubble absent followed by all four stories with 
speech bubble present (for example). The order in which children received speech 
bubble absent and speech bubble present stories was alternated between subjects. 
3.1.2.4. Introduction to Thought and Speech Bubbles. Children were 
shown a copy of a ·satman and Superman' comic, with a large picture of 
Superman on the front cover. The experimenter then turned to the first page and 
started to read the story and the dialogue in the speech bubbles (there were no 
thought bubbles on the first page). At the end of the first page, the experimenter 
pointed to the speech bubbles and asked the children •so, what is special about 
these bubbles? What are these bubbles showing us?'. The majority of children 
correctly responded that they were speech bubbles. In the rare situation of a child 
not knowing about speech bubbles, the experimenter explained that the bubbles 
•show us that someone is saying something.' 
On the second page, there was a combination of speech and thought 
bubbles and the experimenter continued to read these aloud. At the end of the 
second page, the experimenter pointed to the thought bubbles and said •These 
bubbles are a bit different to the others aren't they? What are these bubbles 
showing us?' If the children were not sure what the bubbles were, the 
experimenter explained that 'they show us what someone is thinking'. The 
experimenter clarified the difference between the bubbles once again by pointing 
Ambiguity and Thought Bubbles 59 
to a speech bubble and saying 'So this bubble shows us what someone is saying' 
and, pointing to a thought bubble, 'this bubble shows us what someone is 
thinking'. 
Children were then presented with two Introductory pictures, both of 
which depicted a protagonist with a speech bubble and a thought bubble. The first 
picture showed Paul kneeling on the floor, holding a dog by its lead. The words 
'good dog' were contained in the speech bubble and the word 'football' in the 
thought bubble. Children were asked 'Can you show me which bubble shows us 
what Paul is saying?' The majority of children were able to point to the correct 
bubble and were then asked to read what the words said. Children were asked 
'Can you show me which bubble shows us what Paul is thinking?' and asked to 
read the content of the thought bubble. If children pointed to the wrong bubble 
initially, they were prompted by the experimenter 'Is that his speaking bubble or 
his thinking bubble?'. This was sufficient for children to change their response 
and point to the correct bubble for 'saying' and 'thinking'. This procedure was 
repeated for the second picture of Sheila who was shown pushing a pram, saying 
'hello' and thinking 'drink'. The only difference was that children were asked 
about thinking before they were asked about speaking. 
Children were told: 'Now we are going to look at some stories together 
and in each of the stories, someone tells us something that they like or something 
that they want Some of the people are quite good at doing this and some ofthe 
people are not so good, and I need you to help me figure out who's doing a good 
job and who's not doing such a good job, OK?'. 
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3.1.2.5. Main Procedure. Each story scenario included a protagonist who 
saw a display of four items (e.g. bags). In the Ambiguous trials, ail four were the 
same colour but differed in additional details (shape/stripes/spots etc.). In the 
Unambiguous trials, the four items were exactly the same as the ones in the 
Ambiguous trials except that each was a different colour. So, for example, in an 
Ambiguous scenario where Rosie is getting ready to go swimming the first picture 
shows Rosie standing in the changing rooms where there are four yellow bags. 
The observing child participant was told 'Rosie is getting ready to go swimming'. 
They were then shown the second picture of Rosie in the swimming pool with her 
friend Megan and told 'In the pool, her friend Megan wants to borrow Rosie's 
swimming goggles and asks Rosie which bag is hers. Rosie says "the yellow 
one"'. The only difference in the Unambiguous condition was that only one of the 
bags was yellow. 
If the trial included a speech bubble, the experimenter pointed to each 
word as Rosie's utterance was read aloud. Very often, children spontaneously 
read the utterance aloud with the experimenter. The utterance was read twice by 
the experimenter. If a thought bubble was included, the experimenter then pointed 
to the bubble and said ' ... and Rosie thinks 'the yeilow one with the flowers"; 
making sure to point to each word as it was read. The content of the thought 
bubble was repeated by the experimenter. The protagonist's thought was always 
read after the utterance. Note, in the Ambiguous trials, the content of the thought 
bubble allowed the utterance to be disambiguated by the child participant because 
only one of the yellow bags had flowers on it. By contrast, the information 
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contained in the thought bubble on Unambiguous trials was redundant since there 
was only one yellow bag and it also had flowers on it 
Children were then asked the test question 'Did (speaker) tell listener 
exactly which (object) was his/hers? Or 'Did (speaker) tell listener exactly which 
(object) he/she wanted?' (depending on story c o n t e x t ~ ~ from Sodian, 1988). The 
experimenter recorded the child's response on pre-prepared data sheets. Each 
child was seen individually in a quiet room at the school. At the end of the 
procedure, children were given a sticker for their participation and thanked for 
their help. 
3.1.3. Results. 
Children received a score of I every time they said 'no' to the test 
question; indicating that the speaker did not say exactly which item they wanted. 
A summary of overall means can be seen in Table 3 .1. 
Table 3.1: Summary of overall mean scores- saying 'no'- (and standard 
deviations) for the Ambiguous and Unambiguous conditions for Years 3 and 5. 
Ambiguous (max. = 6) Unambiguous (max. = 2) 
Year3 3.58 0.68 
(2.67) (0.88) 
Year5 5.90 0.90 
(0.31) (0.79) 
3.1.3.1. Ambiguous condition. The data were analysed in a 2 (Year 
Group) x 2 (Thought Bubble: present or absent) x 2 (Order: Speech Bubble 
present or absent first) x 2 (Speech Bubble: present or absent) mixed design 
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ANOV A Year Group membership, Order and presence or absence of Thought 
Bubble were between group factors, and presence or absence of Speech Bubble 
was a within subjects factor. 
There was a significant main effect of Year Group [E(1,31) = 15.38, 
n<0.001). The 9-year-olds were significantly more likely to say that the speaker 
had not said exactly which item they wanted (mean= 2.95, from a total of3, SD = 
0.82) compared to the 7-year-olds (mean = 1.91, SD = 0.82). There was also a 
main effect for Order [E(1,31) = 6.47, 1!<0.05], which was qualified by a Year 
Group x Order interaction [E(1,31) = 6.47, 1!<0.05]. Figure 3.3 illustrates this 
interaction and shows that the Year 3 children were much more likely to say 'no' 
if the first block of trials they received contained a speech bubble compared to the 
group who received speech bubble absent trials first. 
There was no order effect for the Year 5 children, who were performing 
virtually at ceiling on this task. There was no significant main effect for Speech 
Bubble and no main effect for Thought Bubble (although the latter only narrowly 
missed significance: 1:(1,31) = 3.89, I!= 0.058). The trend was in the direction of 
higher 'no' scores in the presence of a thought bubble (mean= 2.69, SD = 0.82) 
compared to when it was absent (mean= 2.17, SD = 0.82). There were no further 
significant interactions between any of the variables. 
3.5 
~ ~ 3 
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Figure 3.3: Mean scores for the Evaluation question (saying ' no ') for both Year 
Groups according to the order of presentation of Speech Bubble present or absent 
trials. 
3.1.3.2. Unambiguous cond ition. The data were submitted to the same 
ANO A design as before. There was a significant main effect ofThoughtBubble 
[.E(l ,31) = 58.43 , p< O.OO I]. Children were significantly more likely to report that 
the speaker did not ay exact! what he/she wanted in the presence of a thought 
bubble (mean = 0.81 , from a total of 2, SO = 0.28) than in its absence (mean 
=0.13 , SD = 0.28). There were no main effects for Speech Bubble or Year Group, 
but there was a significant Thought Bubble x Year Group interaction [E(1 ,31) = 
9.96, Q<0.005) , which is illustrated in Figure 3.4. This shows that whilst both 
group were more likely to say ' no ' in Thought Bubble present compared to 
Thought Bubble absent trials, this effect was more pronounced amongst the 7-8-
year-olds . The difference between thought bubble absent and present trials 
maintained for each ear group independently [Year 3 : F(l ,18) = 46.15 , p<O.OOI ; 
Year 5: F(l 19) = 13.23 , p<0.005]. 
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Fi ure 3.4: Mean scores for the Evaluation question (saying ' no ') for both Year 
Groups according to presence or absence of Thought Bubble. 
There was also a stgnificant difference between the year groups in the Thought 
Bubble absent trials independently of Thought Bubble Present trials [E(l , 19) = 
6.0 g,<O.OS]. Howe er, this was probably due to a floor effect because the 
children in Year 3 never said ' no ' in this condition . There was no significant 
difference between ear groups when the Thought Bubble Present trials were 
analy ed independent) of Thought Bubble Absent trials. 
3.1.4. Di cus ion 
Overa ll , the 9-year-o lds demonstrated an almost ceiling perfonnance on 
the Ambiguous trials ; reporting that the speaker had not said exactly which item 
he/she wanted. Although the 7-year-olds demonstrated a fairl y good 
understanding of ambiguity, they were still significantly poorer than the 9-year-
olds in thi respect. That is , they were significantly less likely to acknowledge that 
the speaker did not a exact) what he/she wanted. The average score for the 7-
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year-olds on the Ambiguous trials was 1.89 (from a total of 3, SD = 0.88), 
suggesting that there was room for improvement if the presentation of the 'very 
words' of the utterance were encapsulated in a speech bubble, thereby possibly 
facilitating performance (Bonitatibus & Flavell, 1985). This was not the case, 
however, since there was no effect of speech bubble for either year group. This 
suggests that drawing children's attention to the literal words of the utterance did 
not help children to detect ambiguity using the present procedure. 
Perhaps more importantly though, knowledge of the speaker's meaning in 
the Ambiguous trials did not significantly reduce children's ability to answer the 
test question appropriately, in contrast to the findings of Beal and colleagues 
(Beal & Flavell, 1984; Beat & Belgrad, 1990). If this had been the case we would 
expect to find a significant reduction in mean 'no' responses in the thought bubble 
present condition compared to thought bubble absent. However, there was no 
significant main effect for thought bubble when the speaker's utterance was 
Ambiguous. In fact, the direction of mean scores according to whether the thought 
bubble was present or absent was in the opposite direction to that suggested by 
Beat's hypothesis. It might be that children do not have difficulty making 
judgments about utterance adequacy when speaker meaning is made known to 
them (as an internal representation). Rather the problem arises because, in 
previous studies, speaker meaning has been construed as intended outcome rather 
than as an internal representation (but maybe not- see below). 
Unlike the Ambiguous trials, children performed similarly on the 
Unambiguous trials, irrespective of Year Group. Also, somewhat surprisingly, 
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both groups of children demonstrated a significant tendency to say that the 
speaker did not say exactly what he/she wanted when there was a thought bubble 
present compared to when it was absent. This resulted in children seemingly 
judging adequate messages to be insufficient or faulty in some way. Perhaps this 
is not so surprising if we consider what children were actually asked to do. That 
is, the information contained in the thought bubbles was always in the form of 
'the referent plus x' (e.g. 'the yellow one with the flowers'), whereas the utterance 
was always in the form of 'the referent' only (e.g. the yellow one). Therefore, it 
was always the case that the information in the utterance was not exactly the same 
as that which appeared in the thought bubble, hence it is likely that children 
noticed the discrepancy between utterance and thought and judged in accordance 
with this. In addition, children saying 'no' in the Ambiguous condition could also 
have been judging negatively because they noticed the discrepancy between 
thought and speech rather than noticing that the utterance was ambiguous with 
respect to the referent display. In other words, children could be credited with 
especially good performance in the Ambiguous condition for the wrong reason. It 
might be that seeing the speaker's meaning does result in children overlooking the 
pragmatic 'fit' between the utterance and the array, as suggested by the findings 
of Beat and Flavell (1984) and Beal and Bel grad {1990), but it is not possible to 
tell using the present procedure. One way to address this issue would be to ask 
children to justify their evaluations. This would provide some insight into whether 
children are judging according to the utterance-thought discrepancy or whether 
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they are aware that it is the utterance-array relationship that is important for 
determining ambiguity of reference. 
There are additional improvements that could be made to the procedure. 
Firstly, children could have focused on the relationship between thought and 
speech because they were 'cued' to do so by the length of the phrases in the 
utterance and thought bubble. That is, the length of the phrasing in the thought 
bubble was always longer than the phrasing in the utterance. This may have made 
it difficult for children to overlook the utterance-thought discrepancy, thereby 
making it less likely that they would notice (in the Unambiguous trials) that the 
statements expressed were mutually equivalent with respect to reality (they both 
adequately specified only one referent). Secondly, children need to be provided 
with an equal number of Ambiguous and Unambiguous trials. This ensures that 
performance in one condition can be directly compared to performance in the 
other. Finally, younger children need to be included in order to test more closely 
the claim made by Bonitatibus and Flavell (1985) that presenting the actual words 
of the utterance in written form significantly improves children's ability to detect 
ambiguous utterances. It might be that an effect of the speech bubble would be 
found with slightly younger children who perhaps have a more fledgling and 
tentative understanding of the role of the literal representation of meaning in 
communication tasks. 
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Experiment 3.2. 
3.2.1. Introduction 
The main aims of this experiment were, firstly, to continue to explore the 
role of literal and speaker meaning in tasks of referential ambiguity and, secondly, 
to investigate the interesting result from Experiment 3.1 that children tended to 
focus on the discrepancy between thought and speech in the Unambiguous 
condition, rather than the relationship between speech and reality. To summarize 
the methodological improvements: 
(1) Children were asked to justify their responses to the test question so that it 
was possible to investigate whether children used the utterance-reality or the 
utterance-thought relationship as the main criterion for their utterance 
evaluations. 
(2) The written statements included in the thought bubble and the utterance were 
made equal in length. 
(3) Children received an equal number of Ambiguous and Unambiguous trials. 
(4) 5- and 6-year-olds were included in addition to 7- and 9-year-olds. 
3.2.2. Method. 
3.2.2.1. Participants. 35 Year 1 children (21 males, 14 females; mean 
age, 5:11; range 5:5 to 6:5), 30 Year 2 children (15 males, 15 females; mean age, 
6:11; range 6:6 to 7:4), 36 Year 3 children (23 males, 13 females; mean age, 7:10; 
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range 7:5 to 8:5) and 33 Year 5 children (21 males, 12 females; mean age, 9:9; 
range 9:6 to 1 0:4) were included. Children in Years 2, 3 and 5 attended a LEA 
maintained Primary School in Derbyshire. The Year 1 children attended an LEA 
maintained Infant School, also in Derbyshire. 
3.2.2.2. Materials. Exactly the same stimulus materials were used as in 
Experiment 3.1. The only difference was that extra words were added to the 
Speech Bubbles to make the phrases equal in length to those in the Thought 
Bubbles. 
3.2.2.3. Design and Procedure. The procedure was identical to 
Experiment 3.1 except for the following alterations. Firstly, instead of receiving 2 
Unambiguous and 6 Ambiguous trials in total, children were presented with 4 
trials of each type. Secondly, Unambiguous and Ambiguous trials were alternated 
throughout the procedure and the order in which they appeared alternated between 
participants. Thirdly, to control for the number of words in the utterance 
compared to the thought bubble, a redundant phrase was added to the utterance. 
For example, an utterance which previously read 'the yellow one' was changed to 
'the yellow one in the changing rooms'. The additional phrase (e.g.) ' ... in the 
changing rooms' did not alter the utterance-reality relationship in either condition, 
since, for all scenarios, the information was equally relevant to all items in the 
display (all bags were in the changing rooms). The information in the thought 
bubble remained the same as that presented in Experiment 3.1, for example' the 
yellow one with the flowers'. Finally, after the test question was asked 'Did ' 
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(speaker) tell (listener) exactly which (item) he/she wanted?', children could 
justify their response by answering the question 'Why/why not?' 
3.2.3. Results 
3.2.3.1. Responses to the test question. As in Experiment 3.1, children 
received a score of 1 every time they said 'no' to the test question; indicating that 
the speaker did not say exactly which item they wanted. This was a correct 
judgment in the Ambiguous condition, but an incorrect judgment in the 
Unambiguous condition. Data were analysed in a 4 (Year Group) x 2 (Thought 
Bubble: present or absent) x 2 (Order: Ambiguous first or Unambiguous first) x 2 
(Speech Bubble: present or absent) x 2 (Condition: Unambiguous or Ambiguous) 
mixed design ANOV A The first three factors were between subject 
classifications and the remaining two were within subject classifications. 
There was a significant main effect for Condition [E(1,118) = 124.31, 
n<0.001]. As expected, children were significantly more likely to acknowledge 
that the speaker did not say exactly which item they wanted in the Ambiguous 
condition (mean= 1.36, SD = 0.76) compared to the Unambiguous condition 
(mean = 0.64, SD = 0.66). However, this effect was confined to the children in 
Years 2, 3 and 5 as can. be seen in Figure 3.5, which illustrates a significant Year 
Group x Condition interaction [E(3,118) = 8.20, J2<0.001]. 
The children in the three older age groups showed a significant tendency 
to answer 'no' more often in the Ambiguous condition compared to the 
Unambiguous condition, and this was confirmed for each year group 
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mdependently [Year 2: 1(29) = 3.64, Q<O.OOl ; Year 3 : 1(35) = 7.28, Q<O.OOI ;Year 
5: 1(32) = 6.98, Q<O.OOl]. 
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Figure 3.5: Mean scores for the Evaluation question (saying ' no ' ) for each Year 
Group in the nambiguous and Ambiguous conditions. 
This trend was also found for the Year I children, but the difference between 
cores for the Ambtguous and Unambiguous conditions was not significant [1(34) 
= 1.87, Q = 0.07]. Post hoc Tukey's comparisons showed that the Year 1 children 
differed significant) from the other three year groups in the Ambiguous 
condition (children in Years 2, 3 and 5 did not differ significantly from each 
other) . That is, the Year I children were significantly less likely than the other 
three groups to evaluate negatively in the Ambiguous condition . A simi lar pattern 
of responding was found in the Unambiguous condition also, where Year 1 
children were significantly less likely to say ' no ' compared to the other three 
group . 
There was a significant main effect for Thought Bubble [.E(1 , I 1 8) = 8.68, 
p<O.OO ]. hildren were much more likely to respond ' no ' (that the speaker did 
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not say exactly what they wanted) in the presence of a thought bubble (mean = 
1.15 , D = 0.61) than in its absence (mean = 0.84, SD = 0 .6 1). A significant 
Thought Bubble X ondition interaction (Figure 3.6) [.E(l , 118) = 20.09, u<0.001] 
indicates that the tendenc to answer ' no ' in the presence ofthe thought bubble 
was confined to the nambiguous condition. 
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Figure 3.6: Mean scores for the Evaluation question (saying ' no ') across all Year 
Groups for the namb1guous and Ambiguous conditions, according to presence 
or ab ence of Thought Bubb le. 
To examine whether the difference between scores in the Unambiguous 
condition maintained independently of scores in the Ambiguous condition, data 
were submitted to a one-wa ANOVA with Thought Bubble Present or Absent as 
the between subjects factor. The ANOVA confirmed that children were 
significantly more likely to say ' no ' in the Unambiguous condition when a 
thought bubble was present rather than absent [E(l , 133) = 26.73 , Q<O.OOl]. 
The onl other significant result was a 3-way interaction of Condition x 
Year Order [E(3 ,118) = 4.37, Q<0.01]. ln an attempt to interpret the 3-way 
interaction pairwise comparisons were used to check the differences in mean 
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(5) Making reference to the listener's mental state e.g. the shopkeeper will know 
which one, Dad won't be able to tell which picture. 
(6) No answer/don't know/not sure. 
(7) Invoking hypotheticals e.g. there could have been more there, she might have 
looked somewhere else. 
(8) Other e.g. he wanted that one, she told the truth, he forgot his money. 
Table 3.2 contains a summary of children's justifications for the 
Ambiguous condition according to Thought Bubble Present or Absent In the 
absence of a thought bubble, the majority of children answering that the speaker 
had not said exactly which item he/she wanted tended to give an array based 
justification. That is, a clear majority in all age groups in the Ambiguous 
condition mentioned multiple similar items in the referent display. Even though, 
in total, there was a low number of negative responses amongst the 5-6-year-olds, 
it is still noticeable that 70% of justifications from the youngest children who 
made correct evaluations mentioned the ambiguous array as the source of the 
problem. Generally though, the majority of the 5-6-year-olds evaluated positively 
in the Ambiguous condition with most (53%) being unable to provide a 
justification, and many (36%) providing uninformative or nonsensical 
explanations. There were only 5 justifications, across all four year groups, that 
were utterance based; that is, saying that the speaker did not provide enough 
information about the desired referent. 
In the presence of a thought bubble, the 5-6-year-olds responded very 
similarly to those who did not see a thought bubble. Again, the majority (67%) of 
I 
Table 3.2: Total number of justifications (and percentages) • for the Ambiguous condition according to Thought Bubble present or 
absent. 
Number of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
responses Multiple Single Not enough Thinking Listener's No answer/ Hypotheti- Other 
(%ge) objects object info it/not mental state Don't know cats 
s ~ n g i t t Totals 
Year} 
Yesb 0 2 0 0 2 28 (54) 1 19 (36) 52 
No0 14 (70) 0 1 0 3 1 0 1 20 
TB Absent Year2 
Yes 7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 14 
No 42 (93) 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 45 
Year3 
Yes 0 0 0 0 4 7 0 1 12 
No 52 (87) 0 3 0 2 0 2 1 60 
YearS 
Yes 4 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 11 
No 55 (96) 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 57 
Year} 
Yes 1 6 0 0 0 23 (49) 0 17 (36) 47 
No 14 {67)_ 1 3(14) 2 1 0 0 ... 0 21 
TB Present Year2 
Yes 1 2 1 0 0 9 0 1 14 
No 14 (30) 1 24 (52) 5 0 0 1 1 46 
Year3 
Yes 1 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 12 
No 20 (33) 3 16 (27)· 8 2 8 1 2 60 
YearS 
Yes 1 0 0 0 0 9 0 1 11 
No 27 (55) 0 7 (14) 1 2 10 0 2 49 
. For the sake of brevity, only the modal percentages of high response categories are provided. 0 Yes or No indicates response to the Evaluation Quest10n . 
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the children who evaluated negatively made reference to the multiple similar 
items in the array; whilst those who gave positive evaluations either did not 
answer (49%) or gave uninformative replies (36%). By contrast, there were 
markedly different patterns of responding within the three older groups of 
children. Around a third of the 6-7 and 7-8-year-olds, and just over half of the 9-
10-year-olds mentioned the ambiguous array when justifying their negative 
evaluations. The 6-7-year-olds seemed to be especially heavily focused on the 
utterance with 52% of justifications falling into this category. Thereafter, there 
was a decrease in the tendency to focus on the utterance with only 27% and 14% 
ofthis type ofjustification amongst the 7-8 and 9-10-year-olds, respectively. 
Table 3.3 contains a summary of children's justifications for the 
Unambiguous condition. Most of the children in Year 1 evaluated positively in 
the absence of a thought bubble, but could not give sensible reasons for their 
judgments; 42% could give no answer at all, whilst 43% gave uninformative 
replies. Amongst the older groups of children, there was an increasing tendency 
with age to single out the uniquely identified referent in the array when justifying 
positive evaluations. Even so, it is still surprising that amongst the 7-8 and 9-10-
year-olds, around a third in each case could not provide explanations for their 
judgments. 
In the presence of a thought bubble, responses were more mixed. 
Compared to the thought bubble absent trials, there were fewer children overall 
who answered positively and, amongst these children, relatively few mentioned 
the uniquely identified item in the array; only 39% and 38% of the Year 3 and 
. 
Table 3.3: Total number of justifications (and percentages) for the Unambiguous condition according to Thought Bubble present or 
absent. 
-
Number of l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
responses Multiple Single object Not Titinking Listener's No answer/ Hypotheti- Other 
(%ge) objects enough it/not mental state Don't know cals 
info saying it Totals 
Year] 
Yes" 1 5 (8) 0 0 3 26 (42) 0 27 (43) 62 
No" 2 1 2 0 2 0 0 3 10 
TB Absent Year2 
Yes 0 19 (43) 0 0 4 19(43) 0 2 44 
No 2 1 5 2 1 3 1 0 15 
Year3 
Yes 0 32 (55) 0 0 3 20 (34) 0 3 58 
No 3 4 1 0 1 0 5 0 14 
YearS 
Yes 0 37 (61) 1 0 0 21 (34) 0 2 61 
No 1 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 7 
Year} 
Yes 0 16 (31) 0 0 7 19 (36) 0 10 52 
No 3 2 5 (31) 0 0 2 2 2 16 
TB Present Year2 
Yes 0 14 (54) 3 0 0 8 (31) 0 1 26 
No 1 0 15 (44) 10 (29) 2 3 0 3 34 
Year3 
Yes 0 13 (39) 0 0 1 18 (54) 0 1 33 
No 0 1 22 (56) 7 (18) 1 2 4 2 39 
YearS 
Yes 0 11 (38) 0 0 0 17 (59) 0 1 29 
No 1 1 16 (52) 3 (10) 0 9 1 0 31 
- -- - -· -
'Yes or No indicates response to the Evaluation Question. 
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Year 5 children (respectively) answered in this way. Also, there was still a 
substantial proportion of children in each year group who were not able to provide 
justifications for why they had evaluated positively. The highest percentage for no 
answer/don't know was found amongst the 9-10-year-olds (59%). Of those 
evaluating negatively, many focused on the utterance, saying that the speaker had 
not provided enough information about the referent Also, a few of the children in 
Years 2, 3 and 5 reasoned that because there was no speech bubble visible on the 
page, the speaker had not said anything at all. 
3.2.4. Discussion 
All children, except the 5-6-year-olds, reliably discriminated between 
Ambiguous and Unambiguous trials, at least in some conditions. The three older 
groups were significantly more likely to acknowledge that the speaker did not say 
exactly what he/she wanted when the utterance was Ambiguous. The youngest 
children, in line with previous literature (e.g. Mitchell & Robinson, 1994), tended 
to respond positively (saying 'yes') on most trials - indicating that they 
experienced difficulty in acknowledging that the speaker's utterance was 
ambiguous. Moreover, the 5-6-year-olds often struggled, in both the 
Unambiguous and Ambiguous conditions, to give meaningful justifications for 
their answers. Often, their justifications included superfluous, fictional or 
meaningless information, such as 'because she said please', 'it was nice ofher' or 
'they are the same colour as his top.' This suggests that the youngest children had 
little understanding of the utterance as an object for scrutiny and evaluation 
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(Flavell, 1 9 7 7 ~ ~ Beal & Flavell, 1984) since they rarely interpreted the justification 
question as being about the utterance. 
At first glance, and in line with results from Experiment 3.1, there was no 
evidence to suggest that being informed of the speaker's meaning significantly 
reduced children's ability to detect ambiguity in utterances. Indeed, performance 
in Ambiguous trials, for all children, was almost identical whether a thought 
bubble was present or absent Ostensibly, most children seemed to do a good job 
of judging ambiguous utterances negatively, even when they knew the speaker's 
meaning. This seems to stand in contrast to the findings of previous research 
(Beal & Flavell, 1 9 8 4 ~ ~ Beal & Belgrad, 1990) which has suggested that children 
aged around 6 years are significantly impaired in their ability to detect ambiguous 
utterances if they are informed previously of the speaker's meaning. 
Experiment 3.1 highlighted the fact that children could have been 
responding negatively (a correct response in the Ambiguous condition) for the 
wrong reason. Instead of noticing that the utterance was inadequate with respect 
to the referent array, children could have been evaluating negatively because they 
focused on the discrepancy between what was said and what was meant 
Considering the types of justifications that children made in Experiment 3.2, it is 
clear that the criteria for evaluations differed markedly between Thought Bubble 
Absent and Thought Bubble Present trials. Generally, children almost never 
mentioned the utterance in their justifications when the thought bubble was 
absent. Instead, the majority of children in the older three groups made reference 
to the array in both Unambiguous and Ambiguous conditions. 
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However, in the presence of a thought bubble, children were much more 
likely to focus on the utterance and say that the speaker did not provide enough 
information about the item he/she wanted. That is, when children knew the 
speaker's meaning, they were more likely to overlook the relationship between 
the utterance and the array, choosing, instead, to focus on the discrepancy 
between thought and speech. This is consistent with Beat and Flavell's (1984) 
results, which demonstrated a significant tendency amongst 5- and 6-year-olds to 
focus on the speaker's meaning to the extent that the pragmatic value of 
Ambiguous utterances was ignored. The present approach suggests that this 
tendency diminishes gradually during the middle school years, with even some of 
the 9-1 0-year-olds still focusing on the utterance-thought relationship rather than 
on the utterance-array relationship. 
The most surprising aspect of the results, though, is the extent to which 
children seem to focus on the utterance-thought link in the Unambiguous 
condition. The significant effect in Experiment 3.1, whereby children were more 
likely to judge an Unambiguous utterance to be inadequate in the presence of a 
thought bubble, compared to when a thought bubble was absent, was replicated 
across all age groups. Moreover, there was no diminishing trend to focus on the 
thought bubble less as children got older. Instead, similar numbers of children in 
Years 2, 3 and 5 evaluated negatively and approximately half of the relevant 
justifications in each group indicated that the speaker had not provided enough 
information about the referent. Also, somewhat surprisingly, many children -
even amongst the oldest group - who evaluated negatively in the presence of a 
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thought bubble in the Unambiguous condition, were unable to provide 
justifications for their answers. This was not the case in the Ambiguous condition, 
where the vast majority of children (except in the youngest group) who evaluated 
negatively, were able to provide meaningful explanations. It could be that 
children experience some conflict when they say that an Unambiguous utterance 
is no good. They might know that the utterance is adequate in the sense that it 
uniquely specifies an item in the array, yet judge negatively because they focus on 
the difference between what is said and what is meant. As a result, they might be 
unwilling to give a justification that includes reference to the thought bubble 
because they know that this is 'wrong' in some way. Generally, it might be 
relatively easy for children to make an array based comparison when an utterance 
is Ambiguous, but this seems a harder process for Unambiguous utterances. In 
short, children can often see clear reasons why an utterance may be bad, but find 
it more difficult to realise why an utterance may be good. It seems they are not 
always satisfied that an utterance is sufficiently unambiguous. 
Despite the finding that children seemed to focus on the speech-thought 
relationship, there was no evidence to suggest that the speech bubble had any 
effect on children's judgments. On the one hand, the effect of judging negatively 
(in both conditions) in the presence of a thought bubble could have been 
especially strong with a speech bubble also present, because the difference 
between what was said and what was meant was clearly depicted and available for 
scrutiny. On the other hand, children might have been more likely to judge 
positively in the Unambiguous condition or negatively in the Ambiguous 
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condition because the literal meaning of the utterance was emphasised, as in 
Bonitatibus and Flavell (1985). It was suggested that the lack of such a facilitative 
effect in Experiment 1 may have been due to the omission of a younger group of 
children, since the seven-year-olds in the first experiment may already have a 
fairly robust understanding of the role of literal meaning in referential 
communication (Olson, 1970). As a result, children may have been able to 
appreciate the 'very words' of the utterance irrespective of whether they appeared 
in written form or not. However, even the youngest group of children in 
Experiment 3.2 seemed to derive no benefit from seeing the words of the 
utterance written in the speech bubble. In addition, older children tended to focus 
on the utterance-meaning relationship irrespective of whether the utterance was 
depicted in a speech bubble or not. This suggests that the tendency to mention the 
inadequacy of the utterance in the presence of a thought bubble was not simply 
because children could see that the words on the page differed according to what 
was said or what was meant. The most pertinent question, therefore, is what leads 
children to focus on the thought bubble to the extent that they overlook the 
relationship between the utterance and the array? 
Pedantically, one could argue that it is natural to attend to the utterance-
thought relationship in these circumstances, rather than the relation between the 
utterance and the array. Maybe it is 'correct' to say that the speaker did not say 
exactly which item they wanted since the utterance did not contain exactly the 
same words as the thought bubble. To assess this possibility, a group of15 mature 
students were presented with 2 Ambiguous and 2 Unambiguous stories (in 
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alternating order) with speech and thought bubbles present. They were exposed to 
the same story scenarios as the children and asked the same test questions. Whilst 
a significant majority of the children judged that the speaker had not said exactly 
which item they wanted in the Unambiguous conditions, the mature students 
rarely did so. Out of a total of 30 responses for the Unambiguous condition, only 
5 (17%) indicated that the speaker did not say exactly which item he/she wanted. 
Therefore, the majority of adult responses (83%) indicated that the speaker had 
said exactly which item they wanted. It seems that whilst adults interpreted the 
test question pragmatically (focusing on the utterance-array relationship), children 
were much more likely to focus on the utterance-thought relationship. 
A more theoretically interesting explanation could be that children only 
gradually relinquish their early tendency to attend initially to the speaker's 
underlying intent or meaning. This is in contrast to Olson (1981 - cited in 
Bonitatibus, 1988b) who argues that an understanding of ambiguity signals a 
revolutionary shift in the child's thinking in the early school years because they 
are able to •• ... differentiate what the speaker means from what the sentence 
means, and to pay attention to the latter" (p.7). Moreover, Bonitatibus (1988a), 
based on Olson's (1970) theory of reference explains how the sentence, or literal 
meaning, should be construed: 'the literal meaning [of the utterance] is 
instantiated by the set of all possible referents in the array ... [therefore] children 
capable of detecting referential ambiguity and attending to the literal meaning of 
the message should be attending to the very words of the message, as well as their 
multiple instantiations in the referent array' (p.329). In other words, children 
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experience a conceptual leap in their understanding of referential communication 
around the age of six years because they learn that speaker meaning can be 
different from literal meaning. In addition, they learn that the relationship 
between the utterance and the array is centrally important for deciding whether an 
utterance is ambiguous or not. It seems that Olson's (and also Bonitatibus, 1988a) 
account may be correct when considering the way adults make their judgments, 
but children older than 6 years seem to respond in a markedly different way. They 
continue to be influenced by the speaker's meaning at a time when they should 
have come to understand the primary importance of the utterance-array 
relationship. In short, it may be that acquiring a grasp of the relative importance 
of literal meaning, speaker meaning and their relationship to the array does not 
occur in a stage-like shift once the child understands that utterances can be 
ambiguous. 
It could still be argued, however, that children's understanding of the 
pragmatic importance of referential communication is being underestimated by 
the present procedure. It might be that the evaluation question encourages 
children to answer in a particular way - focusing on the utterance-thought 
discrepancy rather than on the utterance-array link. It is important to establish 
whether children can understand that although the speaker's utterance is not 
identical to their internal representation, the utterance is, nevertheless, sufficient 
in pragmatic terms. That is, the utterance still allows a unique referent to be 
identified. In Experiment 3.3, therefore, an additional question was included to 
see whether children would be able to make an accurate judgment about 
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knowledge sufficiency from the perspective of the listener ['will (listener) pick 
the right (referent)?]. Even children as young as five years (e.g. Ackerman, 1993) 
can discriminate reliably between Unambiguous and Ambiguous utterances when 
they are asked whether they 'knew enough to pick exactly the right object.' This 
judgment requires a straightforward comparison between utterance and the array 
to decide if the speaker has been told enough information to enable them to pick 
the referent. It does not require an appeal to the speaker's internal representation 
to work out what is meant. Therefore, even the youngest children should be able 
to answer this question correctly if they have a robust understanding of how 
utterances relate to reality. However, it could be that children's tendency to focus 
on the utterance-thought relationship results in them being less able to make 
accurate judgments about the listener's knowledge state. That is, children might 
think that if the speaker's internal representation is not identical to the utterance, 
the listener would not be able to pick the correct item from the array. This would 
suggest that children have a hitherto unknown difficulty in their ability to handle 
the relation between utterance and array, which is not confined to utterance 
evaluation. 
Experiment 3.3. 
3.3.1. Introduction 
Experiment 3.3 focuses on the Unambiguous condition only since it 
provides an opportunity to see whether there is a tendency to (incorrectly) judge 
negatively about a listener's knowledge state when a thought bubble is present If 
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they did, it would suggest they overly attend to discrepancies in speech and 
thought even when assessing the utterance's pragmatic adequacy. 
In Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, children were presented with textual thought 
bubbles only. In these experiments, thought bubble content was presented in 
written, propositional form to be consistent with speech, whereas Wellman et al. 
(1996) assumed that thought content should be pictorial. Given that the speech 
bubble had no effect on children's judgments in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, the 
requirement of consistency between thought and speech no longer existed. In 
Experiment 3.3, children, therefore, received thought bubbles in either written or 
pictorial format. 
3.3.2. Method 
3.3.2.1. Participants. Four groups of children were included: 24 Year 1 
children (14 males, 10 females; mean age, 6:0, range 5:7 to 6:7), 24 Year 2 
children (13 males, 11 females; mean age, 6:10, range 6:8 to 7:5), 26 Year 3 
children (10 males, 16 females; mean age, 8:1, range 7:7 to 8:7) and 26 Year 5 
children (8 males, 18 females; mean age 1 0:0, range 9:7 to 1 0:7). All attended a 
LEA maintained Primary School in Derbyshire. 
3.3.2.2. Materials. These were identical to Experiment 3.2, except that 
each story scenario was adapted so that the final picture could either contain a 
textual or pictorial thought bubble. 
3.3.2.3. Design and Procedure. All children received Introductory tasks, 
identical in format and procedure to Experiment 3.2, except that half of the 
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children saw pictorial thought bubbles and half saw textual thought bubbles. 
Children then received four story scenarios, all of which were Unambiguous and 
contained the speaker's utterance in a speech bubble. Children received two 
stories with a thought bubble and two without. The order of Thought Bubble 
Absent/Present trials was alternated for each participant and systematically varied 
between participants. Thought Bubble Present/ Absent was therefore a Within 
subjects factor and Bubble Type (words or pictures) was a Between subjects 
factor. A within-subjects design was employed in order to keep the sample size to 
a manageable level The order of story scenarios was fixed across all children. 
After the presentation of each story, children were asked the following questions 
in fixed order1: 
Evaluation: Did (speaker) tell (listener) exactly which object was his/he wanted? 
Justification: Why/why not? 
Knowledge: Will (listener) pick the right (object)? 
3.3.3. Results 
Children received a score of 1 every time they said 'no' to either test 
question; indicating that the speaker did not say exactly which item he/she wanted 
(Evaluation question) or that the listener would not be able to pick the correct 
referent (Knowledge question). Data for the Evaluation and Knowledge questions 
1. Ackerman ( 199 3) emphasizes the importance of presenting an evaluation question before 
children are asked to make a referent choice so that " ... children's knowledge evaluation [is] 
unconfounded by response decision processes involved in choosing a referent" (p.71). Test 
questions were, therefore, asked in fixed order to gain a more reliable estimate of the way in 
which children evaluate the utterance. 
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were analysed separately in a 4 (Year Group) x 2(Bubble Order: present or absent 
first x 2(Bubble Type: Words or Pictures) x 2 (Thought Bubble: present or absent) 
mixed design ANOV A The first three factors were between classifications and 
the final factor was a within classification. 
3.3.3.1. Evaluation question. There were no significant main effects for 
Year Group, Thought Bubble (present or absent) or Bubble Type (words or 
pictures). A Thought Bubble x Year Group interaction narrowly missed 
significance [1:(3,84) = 2.56, n. = 0.06]. However, given the pattern of results from 
Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, it was important to examine whether the tendency to say 
'no' more often in the presence of a thought bubble was evident in any of the year 
groups independently. Pairwise comparisons were performed between Thought 
Bubble Absent and Thought Bubble Present scores for each year group. There 
was a significant difference between scores for the 7-8-year-olds in the predicted 
direction [1(25) = 2.13, n.<0.05]. That is, the Year 3 children were significantly 
more likely to say that the speaker did not say exactly which item they wanted in 
the presence of a thought bubble (mean = 0.61, from a total of 2, SD = 0.75) 
compared to when a thought bubble was absent (mean= 0.31, SD = 0.62). Mean 
scores for the other three Year Groups did not differ significantly according to 
whether the thought bubble was present or absent Post-hoc Tukey's comparisons 
showed that the Year Groups did not differ significantly from each other in either 
the Thought Bubble Present or Thought Bubble Absent conditions. Thought 
Bubble Present or Absent did not interact significantly with Bubble Type. There 
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was a significant Thought Bubble x Bubble Order interaction [E(l ,84) = 8.81 , 
g<0.005], which is illustrated in Figure 3.7. 
Children were more likely to say ' no ' when the first story they saw 
contained a thought bubble (mean = 0.66, SD = 0.66) compared to children who 
saw a story without a thought bubble first (mean = 0.27, SD = 0.66) and this 
effect was confined to the Thought Bubble Present condition. Mean scores in the 
Thought Bubble Absent condition were very similar for Bubble Absent first 
(mean =0.43 , SD = 0.71) and Bubble Present first (mean = 0.48, SD = 0.71) trials. 
The effect for the Thought Bubble Present condition also maintained 
independently [1(1 ,99) = 8.55, g <O.Ol]. Bubble Order did not interact with Year 
Group, or with any other factor. There were no other significant interactions 
between any of the variables . 
e o.s 
0 0.6 
0 
~ ~ 0.4 
C'O 
(1) 
~ ~
0.2 
0 
Bubble 
absent first 
Bubble 
present first 
Presentation order 
--+-TB present 
--TB absent 
Fi ure 3.7: Mean scores for the Evaluation question (saying 'no ' ) according to 
presentation order of trials , and presence or absence of Thought Bubble. 
3.3.3.2. Knowledge question. The pattern of results for the Knowledge 
question was very similar to that found for the Evaluation question . There were no 
Ambiguity and Thought Bubbles 90 
significant main effects for Thought Bubble (present or absent), Year Group or 
Bubble Type. However, there was a significant Year Group x Thought Bubble 
tnteraction [F(3 ,84) = 4.3 8, p<O.O 1; see Figure 3 .8]. 
Pairwi e comparisons between Thought Bubble Absent and Thought 
Bubble Present scores were performed to determine whether mean scores differed 
for each Year Group independently. The 5-6-year-olds were significantly less 
like! to sa that the listener would be able to pick the referent in the absence of a 
thought bubble (mean = 0.50, SD = 0.78) compared to when a thought bubble was 
present (mean = 0.25 , D = 0.53) [!(23) = 2.30, Q<0.05]. The 6-7-year-olds 
showed a imilar trend in responses {Absent mean = 0.37, SD = 0 .57; Present 
mean = 0. 17, D = 0 .38) but their scores did not differ significantly. By contrast, 
the 7- - ear-old were ignificantly more likely to say that the listener would not 
be able to ptck the referent in the presence of a thought bubble (mean = 0.46, SD 
= 0.6 ) compared to when a thought bubble was absent (mean = 0.19, SD =0.57) 
0.6 
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Fi ure .8: Mean cores for the Knowledge question (saying ' no ') according to 
ear Group and presence or absence of Thought Bubble. 
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[1(25) = 2.27, g<0.05]. There was a trend for the 9-1 0-year-olds to answer in the 
same way (Absent mean = 0.23, SD = 0.51 ; Present mean = 0.31 , SD = 0.47) but, 
agam, this difference between scores was not significant There was a significant 
main effect (between subjects) for Bubble Order, which was qualified by a Year 
Group X Bubble Order interaction [E(3 ,84) = 3.59, n<0.05 ; see Figure 3.9]. 
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Figure 3.9: Mean scores for the Knowledge question (saying 'no ') according to 
Year Group and presentation order oftrials . 
A senes of one-way ANOV As revealed the source of the interaction. 
cores were combined across Thought Bubble Absent and Present trials , with 
Bubble Order (Absent or Present first) as the between subjects variable. Scores 
for each year gro up were analysed separately. The only significant difference was 
found in the Year I gro up of children . The 5-6-year-olds were significantly more 
likely to say ' no ' if the first story they saw contained a thought bubble (mean = 
1.42, D = 1.44) compared to children who saw a story without a thought bubble 
first (mean = 0.08, D = 0.29) [E(l ,23) = 9 .84, g<O.Ol]. 
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Analysing the data for each Bubble Order separately across all four Year 
Groups, showed that there were no significant differences between any of the 
groups for either the Thought Bubble Absent first or Thought Bubble Present first 
trials. There were no other significant main effects or interactions. 
3.3.3.3. Correlations between the Evaluation and Knowledge 
questions. Correlational analyses were performed to see whether children 
answered the two test questions similarly. A summary of results is contained in 
Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Correlation coefficients (Pearson's r)* for associations between 
responses on the Knowledge and Evaluation questions. 
Year Group Thought Bubble Absent 
(r) 
1 0.43a 
2 0.181> 
3 0.74 
5 0.66 
All 0.72 
*All coefficients stgmficant at p<0.001 except: 
a Significant at p<O.OS 
b Not significant 
Thought Bubble Present 
(r) 
0.89 
0.41. 
0.87 
0.69 
0.48 
Across all Year Groups there was a strong positive correlation between 
responses on the two questions, for both the Thought Bubble Absent and Present 
trials. This suggests that if participants answered the Evaluation question 
negatively they also tended to answer the Knowledge question negatively. This 
trend maintained for each Year Group independently in the Thought Bubble 
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Present trials and for all but the Year 2 children in the Thought Bubble Absent 
trials. 
3.3.3.4. Justifications of responses. Data were coded in exactly the same 
way as in Experiment 3 .2. There was a 92% agreement rate between the blind 
coder and the experimenter. Table 3.5 contains a summary of the types of 
justifications provided for each year group. There was no significant effect of 
bubble type on responses to the test questions, so justification data are combined 
across words and pictures. 
Children showed an increasing tendency with age to say that the speaker 
did say exactly which item they wanted (e.g.) 'because there is only one blue 
one'. That is, children tended to justify their positive evaluations by making 
reference to the one item in the referent array that matched the speaker's 
utterance. This trend was found in the Thought Bubble present and absent trials, 
with around 33-37% of the 5-6-year-olds mentioning the array, moving through 
to 85-90% of the oldest group responding in this way. The only noticeable 
deviation from this trend was amongst theY ear 3 children in the Thought Bubble 
Present trials. The 7-8-year-olds were significantly more likely to evaluate 
negatively in the presence of a thought bubble compared to when it was absent 
This is reflected in the types of justifications provided: 62% (1 0/16) of Year 3 
children who judged negatively said that the speaker had not provided enough 
information about the referent, compared to only 25-33% in the other three 
groups. 
Table 3. S: Total number of justifications (and percentages)' for the Unambiguous condition according to Thought Bubble present or 
absent. 
Number of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
responses Multiple Single Not enough Thinking Listener's No answer/ Hypotheti- Other 
(%ge) objects object info it/not mental state don't know cals 
saying it Totals 
Year 1 
Yesb 0 13 (33) 0 0 7 (18) 7 (18) 1 11 (28) 39 
Noo 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 10 
TB Absent Yeilr 2 
Yes 2 21 (66) 1 0 1 3 0 4 32 
No 2 1 7 0 0 2 2 1 15 
Year3 
Yes 0 37 (84) 0 0 4 0 3 0 44 
No 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 2 8 
Yeilr 5 
Yes 0 37 (90) 0 0 1 0 0 3 41 
No 1 0 5 0 0 2 3 1 12 
Ye11r 1 
Yes 0 15 (37) 0 0 5 7 (17) 2 11 (27) 40 
No 1 0 2 (25) 2 0 2 1 0 8 
TB Present Year 2 
Yes 0 24 (67) 0 0 1 5 0 6 36 
No 4 1 4 (33) 0 1 1 0 1 12 
Year3 
Yes 0 25 (69) 1 0 3 1 1 5 36 
No 3 0 10 (62) 0 0 0 3 0 16 
Yeilr 5 
Yes 0 34 (&5) 0 0 0 1 2 3 40 
No 2 0 4 (33) 0 1 1 3 1 12 
. Combined across words and pictures. o Yes or No indicates response to the Evaluation Question. 
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3.3.4. Discussion 
Unlike Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, there did not seem to be a general 
tendency to evaluate negatively when asked whether the speaker had said exactly 
which item he/she wanted. Nevertheless, the 7-8-year-olds did demonstrate a 
significant tendency to respond in this way - irrespective of whether the bubble 
appeared in text or picture format. Moreover, their tendency to focus on the 
utterance-thought relationship was supported by the types of justifications 
provided for their negative evaluations in the Thought Bubble Present condition. 
Almost two-thirds of these justifications made reference to the fact that the 
speaker did not give enough information, or did not say what was included in the 
thought bubble. The failure to find a general effect of judging negatively in the 
presence of a thought bubble could be due to the alteration in experimental design; 
from Thought Bubble present or absent as a between-subjects factor in 
Experiment 3.2, to a within-subjects factor in Experiment 3.3. It is possible that 
being able to contrast the two conditions directly in the second experiment 
enabled children to see that the information in the thought bubble was redundant, 
and therefore did not need to be considered in their utterance evaluations. Some 
support for this is provided by the Thought Bubble x Bubble Order interaction 
found for the Evaluation question. This showed that children, across all year 
groups, were significantly more likely to say 'no', in the Thought Bubble Present 
condition, if the first story they saw contained a thought bubble compared to 
children whose first story did not contain a thought bubble. In short, children 
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seemed to be responding in a similar way to those in the between-subjects design 
of Experiment 3.2. 
Even with the opportunity to contrast conditions in a within-subjects 
design, the 7-8-year-olds continued to judge negatively on the Evaluation question 
significantly more often in the presence of a thought bubble. Additionally, the 7-
8-year-olds were the only group who were significantly more likely to say that the 
speaker would not be able to pick the correct referent when they were privy to the 
speaker's internal representation. This result is not threatened by the significant 
Year Group x Bubble Order interaction, since the tendency to judge negatively if 
a thought bubble present story was presented first, rather than second, was 
confined to the 5-6-year-olds in Year 1. At least for the 7-8-year-old children, 
then, there seemed to be a difficulty in making accurate judgments about how well 
the utterance mapped on to the array, in terms of allowing a unique referent to be 
identified. It seems that the 7 -8-year-olds focused heavily on the utterance-thought 
relationship at the expense of the utterance-array relationship. That is, they were 
unable to dissociate what they knew about the discrepancy between the utterance 
and the speaker's internal representation, from how well the utterance adequately 
specified a particular referent in the array. In short, knowledge of the speaker's 
representation seemed to interfere with children's ability to evaluate and interpret 
Unambiguous utterances. 
By contrast, the 5-6-year-olds seemed to be helped by the presence of the 
thought bubble to make correct judgments about how the listener would be able to 
interpret the utterance. They were significantly more likely to say that the listener 
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would be able to pick the right referent when a thought bubble was present rather 
than absent. This seems to be consistent with the idea that younger children are 
more likely to judge utterances positively when they know the speaker's meaning 
(Beat & Flavell, 1984; Beat & Belgrad, 1990). Compared to these earlier studies, 
however, the novel finding is that this tendency was found in Unambiguous 
messages. This suggests that there may be at least some difficulty at this age with 
understanding how an utterance can be sufficiently Unambiguous in terms of 
allowing a unique identification of a referent in an array. It might be that younger 
children prefer to have more information about the referent before they can decide 
whether the utterance is 'good enough'. This is in line with previous research 
demonstrating that 4-5-year-olds tend to confuse quantity with quality and judge 
longer (but incomplete) messages to be more useful than shorter (but 
Unambiguous) ones (Sonnenschein, 1984). It seems that this tendency extends 
slightly beyond the age of 5 years though - at least for the children in the present 
sample. 
Finally, even though there was a general tendency amongst many children 
in Experiment 3.3 to judge positively, there was still a noticeable developmental 
trend in the types of justifications given for the Evaluation question. The youngest 
children rarely mentioned the 'goodness of fit' between the utterance and the 
array when justifying their positive evaluations, whereas the oldest children 
almost always did so. Again, as in Experiment 3.2, this is suggestive of a 
gradually developing understanding of the pragmatic importance of referential 
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communication, rather than a conceptual leap in this knowledge at around the age 
of6 or7 (cf. Olson, 1 9 8 1 ~ ~ cited in Bonitatibus, 1988). 
3.3. General Discussion 
The aim of this research was to investigate how children handle the 
triangular relation between an utterance, a speaker's meaning and reality when the 
speaker's internal representation (meaning) was explicitly presented in a thought 
bubble. In Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, children aged 5 to 10 years were shown 
stories in which a protagonist's utterance was either Ambiguous or Unambiguous. 
In support of earlier work by Beat and colleagues (Beat & Flavell, 1 9 8 4 ~ ~ Beat & 
Belgrad, 1990), being informed of the speaker's meaning resulted in children 
overlooking the relationship between the utterance and the array. This was 
evidenced by children being much more likely to make reference to the utterance-
meaning relation in their justifications for the Ambiguous condition. Moreover, 
this tendency was also found in the Unambiguous condition, leading many 
children to judge that a sufficiently informative utterance was inadequate. It 
would appear that whether speaker meaning is construed as intended outcome or 
internal representation, children are influenced by their knowledge about meaning 
and tend to disregard the pragmatic fit of the utterance to the array. Where the 
present results differ from Beat's findings however, is that children older than 
about 6 years continue to experience difficulty making evaluations about literal 
meaning, when the speaker's meaning is depicted as an internal representation via 
a thought bubble. This might be because, as Robinson and Whittaker (1987) 
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suggest, understanding speaker meaning as an internal representation may be a 
later developing ability than understanding meaning as intended outcome. 
Therefore, even 9-1 0-year-olds may struggle at times to understand how the 
speaker's internal representation relates to the utterance, the array and the success 
of the communication. 
Arguably, it might be perfectly reasonable to expect participants to 
interpret the evaluation question as a request to compare the information in the 
thought bubble with the information in the utterance, resulting in the observed 
neglect of the utterance-array link. However, adults almost never judged in this 
way in the Unambiguous condition, preferring a pragmatic interpretation of the 
question instead (saying that the speaker had said exactly which item he/she 
wanted). This suggests that adults mostly interpreted the question as an evaluation 
of how well the utterance singled out an item in the array, rather than how fully 
the utterance characterized the speaker's meaning. Moreover, the 7-8-year-olds in 
Experiment 3.3 also tended to respond negatively to the Knowledge question. This 
suggests that children's difficulty taking a pragmatic perspective was not simply a 
result of interpreting the evaluation question in a peculiar way. Instead, there 
seemed to be a more general difficulty understanding how the speaker's internal 
representation influences the communication process. One limitation to this 
explanation is that the evaluation question always preceded the knowledge 
question. Thus, the 7-8-year-olds may have shown a significant tendency to 
respond negatively to the knowledge question because they had already evaluated 
the utterance negatively. The strong, positive correlations obtained between 
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responses to the two questions are consistent with children adopting such a 
strategy. Question order was fixed to avoid any influence that choosing a referent 
might have on children's evaluations (cf. Ackerman, 1993; Note 1), so it would 
not have been helpful to incorporate counterbalancing in the design. Instead, a 
further experiment is required that asks children the knowledge question only. If 
they continue to judge that the listener would not be able to pick the referent, even 
though the utterance is sufficiently informative, this would provide stronger 
evidence that there is a particular difficulty in responding pragmatically when the 
speaker's meaning is directly presented in a thought bubble. 
Nevertheless, it might still be that the prese11t results are congruent with a 
conceptually based explanation. In particular, these findings do not seem to fit 
comfortably with Olson's (1970) or Bonitatibus' {1988a) account ofhow children 
come to solve the problem of referential ambiguity. Both authors argue that the 
crucial component in understanding how an utterance may be inadequate, is the 
recognition of the importance ofliteral meaning, over and above what the speaker 
may mean. That is, since the literal meaning of a referential utterance is dependent 
on the context of alternatives available in the array (Olson, 1970), children need to 
understand that it is the utterance-reality link which determines how good (or not) 
an utterance might be. For example, Bonitatibus {1988b) reports that children 
capable of detecting referential ambiguity tended to requestthe speaker's words as 
a 'clue' to help them diagnose the cause of communication failure, whereas 
children who failed to detect ambiguity were more likely to request knowledge of 
the speaker's meaning. It should follow, then, that children around the age of6 or 
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7 years would prefer to base their utterance evaluations on the link between 
utterance and reality rather than on the relationship between utterance and 
meaning, and this should be true of Unambiguous as well as Ambiguous 
utterances. This was not the case for many children in the present experiments, 
who tended to focus on utterance-meaning instead, both in the Ambiguous and 
Unambiguous conditions. 
Although the general tendency for children aged 6-10 years to answer 
negatively in the presence of a thought bubble was not replicated in Experiment 
3.3, the 7-8-year-olds did respond in this way. This discrepancy in results could be 
due to the within-subjects design of Experiment 3.3 (compared to the between-
subjects design in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2), or to sample differences. 
Nevertheless, the finding that the 7-8-year-olds responded in the same way as the 
children in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 despite such differences, suggests that there 
may be something particularly interesting occurring in the child's thinking around 
this age. 
One possibility is that children apply an overly rigid mentalistic criterion 
for interpretation such that they overlook the utterance-reality relationship. That 
is, once children come to realise that both the literal and speaker meanings are 
important components of the communicative act they then seem to have difficulty 
understanding the value of the utterance in the context of the array. It seems that 
the array is not the main reference point for judging the adequacy of utterances, at 
least around the age of six or seven years. Related evidence comes from an allied 
'theory of mind' domain in the form of reasoning about false beliefs. Mitchell, 
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Robinson, Isaacs and Nye (1996) found that adults, but not 5- or 9-year-old 
children, were significantly influenced by their own knowledge of whether an 
utterance was true or false when judging whether a listener protagonist would 
believe a message. Participants were presented with story scenarios in which they 
(the participants, but not the listener protagonist) were given privileged 
information about the truth or falsity of a speaker's utterance about the contents of 
a jug. Adults tended to judge that a message would be believed by a listener 
protagonist if they themselves knew that the message was true (and the listener 
was known to have no independent information regarding the truth of the 
message), and disbelieve a message that they knew to be false. By contrast, 
children were not influenced by their own knowledge in judging whether or not a 
listener would believe an utterance. Mitchell et al. argue that children were able to 
make 'uncontaminated' judgments about belief because they rigidly applied a 
newly learned rule that 'seeing leads to knowing' (also Sodian & Wimmer, 1987). 
The adults, instead, tended to adopt a more sophisticated role-taking perspective 
and tried to interpret the message from the perspective of the listener. This led 
them to believe that it would have been difficult to reach any other conclusion 
than the one they knew to be true. 
The main message from Mitchell et al. (1996) was that adults seemed to be 
influenced by a 'reality bias' in their judgments whereas 5- and 9-year-old 
children were not. However, this is not the same as saying that children are 
immune from the influence of reality at this age, but rather that any decline in the 
relative salience of reality is overshadowed by the application of a newly learned 
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rule. Generally, the authors argue for a gradually developing understanding of the 
mind that occurs due to an ' ... important decline [throughout childhood and into 
adulthood] in the tendency to focus inappropriately on reality in preference to 
belief (p.l8). The difficulty for the child might occur in deciding when to apply 
reality as the criterion for making judgments (as in the case of referential 
communication) and when not to (in the case of judgments about beliefs). 
Ironically, the adults more pragmatic, reality-based strategy may steer 
them away from negative ('incorrect') evaluations in the present procedure. It 
might be that the thought bubble procedure encourages negative judgments 
because a criterion for evaluation (the say-mean discrepancy) is suggested to the 
children ( cf. Mitchell & Robinson, 1994). This may override any natural tendency 
to think about the pragmatic importance of the utterance. Adults may not be so 
susceptible to this cue either because they have a more robust understanding of the 
significance of the pragmatic relationship in referential communication, or 
because, more generally, they tend to be influenced by what they know about 
'reality' (the state of the array). 
3.4. Conclusion 
Overall, children's understanding of literal meaning (the utterance-array 
relationship) may not be robust enough to withstand knowledge about the 
speaker's meaning. In particular children might find it difficult to consider the 
relationship between the utterance and the array when they know that what is said 
is discrepant with what is meant. It seems that children may find it especially hard 
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to understand how an utterance can be adequate even though thought and speech 
are not identical. This suggests that children's understanding ofhowthe elements 
of the referential triangle contribute to the formation of utterances undergoes 
further development beyond the age of 6-7 years. 
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CHAPTER4 
When do cltildren evaluate utterances according to tlte speaker's belief? 
Developments from middle cltildltood to adulthood. 
4.1. Introduction 
The experiments presented in Chapter 3 suggest that children as old as 10 
years often overlook the relationship between an utterance and an array when a 
speaker's internal representation is shown directly via a thought bubble. Instead, 
children tended to focus on the relationship between what the speaker said and 
what the speaker meant However, participants might respond quite differently in 
situations in which the speaker's internal representation is not shown directly in a 
thought bubble. Therefore, the following experiments explore whether children 
focus on the speaker's utterance-belief relationship when the speaker's internal 
representation is not presented pictorially. It is important to see to what extent 
children, and adults, include the speaker's meaning in their evaluations when an 
internal representation can only be inferred from the information provided in a 
story. 
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4.2. Background literature. 
The tendency for children to focus on the speaker's underlying meaning or 
intent before they come to appreciate the literal meaning of an utterance has been 
summarised in Chapter 3. According to the wealth of research into referential 
ambiguity, children can only begin to appreciate literal meaning at around the age 
of 6 years. At this age, children can reflect on the utterance as an object of 
scrutiny in it's own right and begin to realise that the utterance is crucial for 
determining communicative success. However, it is also vital for the child to 
understand that an utterance is not simply a faithful copy of reality, but is a 
representation of a speaker's knowledge, thoughts or beliefs. Therefore, not only 
must the relation between the utterance and the array be taken into account but so 
too must the speaker's conceptual framework. 
As Robinson and Whittaker (1987; and Robinson & Mitchell, 1992) point 
out, it is difficult to determine in standard ambiguity tasks whether the child 
participant is more concerned with utterance-array relations or utterance-meaning 
relations. This is because the speaker's internal representation is always 
isomorphic with the desired object in the array. The speaker knows what the array 
looks like, and they have only one object in mind, but may underspecify the 
referent As a result, it is impossible to tell whether children are judging about 
ambiguity on the grounds that the utterance does not uniquely identify an object in 
an array, or whether there is a discrepancy between what is said and what is 
meant. One of the advantages of the thought bubble paradigm used in Chapter 3, 
is that it was possible to examine the extent to which children did include the 
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speaker's meaning in their utterance evaluations - even though the speaker's 
internal representation and the array were identical, as in traditional ambiguity 
research. The main finding from Chapter 3 was that children older than 6- or 7-
years tended to concentrate on the utterance and the speaker's representation, 
rather than on the relationship between the utterance and the array. 
Another way to tackle the issue of whether children attend to the speaker's 
internal representation when evaluating and interpreting utterances, is to present 
situations in which the speaker's meaning and the state of affairs in the real world 
are no longer identical (Robinson & Whittaker, 1987). It then becomes possible to 
investigate which of these elements children are more concerned with when 
responding to problematical messages. Mitchell and Russell (1989, 1991; 
Mitchell, Munno & Russell, 1991) utilised and improved a task developed by 
Ackerman (1979). The basic task involves a speaker protagonist who provides an 
utterance that mismatches a referent in an array. The mismatch occurs because the 
speaker's internal representation of the object is faulty in some way. In other 
words, the speaker's belief or meaning is discrepant with the appearance of the 
object in the real world, whilst the speaker's utterance is an adequate 
characterisation of what they believe. 
For example, children in Mitchell and Russell's (1989) procedure were 
told a story about John who went to find a book that Mary had asked for. Mary 
said that the book had a dog on the cover, but the book John found actually had a 
picture of a cat on it Some children were told that Mary had a poor memory 
whilst others were told that Mary's memory was perfect In the first two 
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experiments from that study, children were asked whether the book was the one 
the speaker had intended. 5- and 6-year-olds very often said that it was not, but 
nevertheless judged that the listener would return to the speaker with the book. 
Therefore, the 5- and 6-year-olds seemed to be responding on the basis that if the 
speaker's description did not exactly match the found object, then the speaker did 
not actually mean that object. They would return with the book because they 
deemed it to be a good enough alternative. In other words, children did not seem 
to understand that even though the relationship between the utterance and reality 
could be discrepant, the utterance was, nevertheless, adequate from the speaker's 
point of view. Instead, children tended to focus on the discrepancy between the 
utterance and the object in the real world. Moreover, the 5-6-year-olds ·were not 
influenced by the information pertaining to the speaker's memory, ' ... they 
appeared not to recognize the connection between the informational state of the 
speaker and the accuracy of his/her ensuing description' (p.488). Generally, this 
group of 5-6-year-olds seemed to be more focused on utterance-world relations 
rather than utterance-meaning relations. 
However, evidence from Robinson and Mitchell (1992, 1994) suggests 
that even 4-year-olds are adept at including the speaker's representation in their 
judgments whilst also recognising the separate literal meaning of a message. In 
their 'message-desire discrepant task' children were presented with a scenario in 
which Mum put her two different bags of material into two differently coloured 
drawers. Whilst Mum was absent from the room, Jane swapped the bags around 
so that they were in the opposite drawer to their original location. Mum, sewing in 
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the other room, asked Jane to fetch the bag in the blue drawer. Children were 
asked which bag Mum really wanted. As many as 50% of the 4-year-olds 
correctly said that Mum really wanted the bag that was now in the red drawer. 
They made a correct nonliteral interpretation of the utterance, which required 
processing the literal meaning of the utterance first and recognising that this was a 
product of Mum's false belief. That is, many of the 4-year-olds seemed to 
understand that utterances consist of a literal meaning and intended meaning; and 
they based their judgments on Mum's representation of the state of affairs rather 
than simply on the relationship between the utterance and the array. 
There seems to be a disparity between the Mitchell and Russell (1989; 
Experiments 1 and 2) results on the one hand and the Robinson and Mitchell 
(1992, 1994) findings on the other. Both approaches presented children with 
scenarios in which the speaker's beliefwas discrepant in some way with reality, 
and both approaches required children to make an interpretation of the resulting 
discrepant utterance. However, the former studies indicated that 5-6-year-olds 
tend not to incorporate the speaker's intended meaning or belief state into their 
judgments, whereas the latter studies provided evidence that four-year-olds often 
utilised the speaker's representation as an aid to interpretation. It is arguable, 
however, whether the kind of interpretation required in both approaches is 
equivalent 
In the Robinson and Mitchell studies, children could simply point to one of 
two (or three) locations in response to the question 'Which bag did Mum really 
want?' What they needed to do was work out which bag matched Mum's (false) 
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belie£ In other words, it is possible to make a correct response on this task by 
considering the relationship between belief and reality. The speaker's utterance 
and belief are the same and so a simple match between belief and reality is all that 
is required to give a correct answer. 
By contrast, children needed to make a tacit evaluation of the utterance in 
the Mitchell and Russell studies when they were asked 'Is the book John found 
really the book Mary had been thinking about?' This question does not simply 
require a child to figure out which book matches Mary's belief since there is no 
alternative book, and there is no book in the real world that matches Mary's belief 
exactly. Instead, the child needs to make some kind of evaluation of how close a 
match the found object is to the one the speaker had in mind. This is more 
suggestive of a situation in which the referential triangle needs to be considered. 
The words ofthe utterance need to be compared to the speaker's belief and to the 
array because there is no direct match between belief and reality, or between the 
utterance and reality. All three components of the triangle need to be considered 
in order to work out the best answer to the question. It is worth noting that when 
children's understanding ofthe size of a discrepancy between what was said and 
the object in the real world was investigated directly, 5-6-year-olds, but not those 
aged 8-13 years, judged that communication would be successful irrespective of 
whether an utterance was slightly or grossly discrepant (Mitchell, Munno & 
Russell, 1991; Mitchell & Russell, 1991). Therefore, it seems that when judging 
about discrepant utterances, evaluation may be harder than interpretation. 
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Mitchell and Robinson (1994) investigated this possibility directly, using 
their message-desire discrepant (MDD) paradigm summarised above. In 
Experiment 1, children aged 4-7 years were presented with the MDD condition as 
well as a standard ambiguous condition. Following the stories, children were 
asked an evaluation question: 'Did (speaker) do a good job of saying which (item) 
she really wants?', and an interpretation question: 'Can you point to the (item) 
that (speaker) really wants?' Children of all ages were significantly more likely to 
interpret the utterance correctly in the MDD task (point to the item in the 
unspecified location), than they were to say that the speaker had done a bad job. In 
addition, performance on the MDD task and the ambiguous condition was 
significantly correlated in terms of types of evaluations. The younger children 
tended to evaluate positively (good job) on both occasions, whereas the older 
children evaluated negatively both times. Therefore, even though the older 
children could interpret the utterance on the basis of the speaker's representation, 
they tended to evaluate the utterance on the basis of a discrepancy with reality. 
As Mitchell & Robinson (1994) suggest, though, evaluating a discrepant 
utterance according to the speaker's internal representation might be a 
sophisticated criterion, which may only be available to children older than seven 
years. Children could judge that the speaker had done a good job on the grounds 
that the utterance is unambiguous vis a vis the speaker's representation. By 
contrast, younger children judge the speaker did a bad job because the utterance is 
discrepant vis a vis current reality. In other words, there might be a U-shaped 
development in which children initially evaluate positively because they have 
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limited understanding of the role of the literal meaning of the message in 
referential communication. Next, they evaluate negatively because they notice that 
the utterance is discrepant with reality, and finally they adopt a sophisticated 
criterion of judging according to the speaker's internal representation and, 
therefore, evaluate the utterance positively once again. Older children were not 
included in Mitchell and Robinson (1994), and this issue was not investigated 
directly, so it is not possible to tell what criteria children use for utterance 
evaluation as they get older. 
Nevertheless, Experiments 2 and 3 in Mitchell and Robinson (1994) 
indicated that children could evaluate discrepant utterances according to a more 
mentalistic criterion if they were cued into thinking that there was a discrepancy 
between what was said (and how that related to reality) and what was meant. 
Instead of the 'good job' question asked previously, children were asked 'Did 
(speaker) say the right thing for the (item) she really wants?'. The authors argue 
that this question alerts children to the idea that what is said is a clue or 
characterisation of what is meant and so they are able to focus on the say-mean 
discrepancy as the basis of their evaluation. Children with a mean age of 5 years 
showed no difference between interpretation and evaluation when the 'right thing' 
question was included. In addition, when the 'right thing' and 'good job' 
questions were directly compared in a within-subjects design, the 'right thing' 
question promoted significantly more correct (negative) evaluations than the 
'good job' question. The main point is that, like with the Mitchell and Russell 
(1989) study described above, children were ·significantly better at making 
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judgments based on a consideration of the say-mean discrepancy when they were 
provided with clues about the appropriate criterion for evaluation. 
It could be argued that the children in the thought bubble experiments in 
Chapter 3, were alerted to the possibility that there was a discrepancy between 
what was said and what was meant and so used this as the basis for their 
judgments, even when it was inappropriate to do so. In other words, children in 
those experiments were very good at recognising a mismatch between message 
meaning and intended meaning because it was clearly presented in front of them. 
Generally then, there are many examples of children incorporating the speaker's 
representation into their judgments when they are helped to do so by the provision 
of cues as to the 'correct' criterion for evaluation. However, the extant literature 
does not inform us about whether children spontaneously do evaluate utterances 
according to the speaker's representation when strong cues as to an appropriate 
criterion are absent. 
In the Mitchell and Robinson (I 994) study mentioned earlier, children 
around the age of seven years judged that the speaker had done a 'good job' when 
utterances were discrepant or ambiguous. As the authors note ' ... the "good job" 
question ... leaves the onus with the child for identifying the appropriate criterion 
for evaluation' (p.l221). However, at least in the MOD task, it is not clear 
whether children were judging' good job' because they had little understanding of 
the utterance as a separate object for evaluation, or because they noticed that the 
utterance was good according to the speaker's internal representation. The aim of 
the following experiments was to investigate this issue directly. The 'good job' 
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question was used since it allows participants to choose their own criterion for 
evaluation. This is important because everyday situations do not always provide 
clear clues about whether we should be wary of the possibility of a say-mean 
discrepancy occurring (and, therefore, we should be more mentalistic in our 
approach). 
A vital component of understanding of the mind, and, ergo, being a 
successful communicator is the knowledge that utterances are things that are 
based on the speaker's mental model of reality, rather than on reality itself. As 
Mitchell (1999) points out 'the ability to be informed by an utterance often 
depends on an ability to take into consideration the speaker's conceptual 
framework' (p.191). Evaluating utterances according to a more mentalistic 
criterion might, therefore, be an important skill in terms of understanding the 
referential triangle and how its various components contribute to communicative 
acts. Specifically, asking participants to evaluate utterances provides an 
opportunity to explore how they handle literal meaning in relation to the speaker's 
representation and the array. It allows an explicit look at which aspect(s) of the 
referential triangle participants assign the greatest value. This is in contrast to an 
interpretation question which could be answered based on more simple, linear 
relationships as described on pages 109-110 above. It is unclear at this stage when 
we might expect this ability to appear developmentally and so older children, as 
well as adult participants, were included to see whether they would spontaneously 
evaluate according to the speaker's internal representation. 
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The following methodology was based on a task from Mitchell, Robinson 
and Thompson (1999). The 'superficially ambiguous' task involves a speaker 
protagonist who sees an item placed in location x. They leave the scene and, in 
their absence, more items are added to the array. The speaker asks for the item in 
location x not knowing that their utterance is now ambiguous. In Mitchell et al., 
children aged 4 to 6 years were asked to interpret the utterance by pointing to the 
item that the speaker wanted. In order to do this correctly, children needed to 
make reference to the speaker's belief to choose the right item. Even the youngest 
children were able to make correct interpretations of the utterance, suggesting that 
they had few difficulties acknowledging the importance ofthe speaker's belief in 
this context. 
Children were not asked to evaluate the utterance, though, which has 
already been argued to allow great scope for participants to consider all three 
elements of the referential triangle. In the 'superficially ambiguous' condition, 
children can either evaluate according to the utterance-array relationship 
(objective criterion) or according to the utterance-meaning relationship 
(mentalistic criterion). If they evaluate according to the former, they would say 
that the speaker had done a 'bad job' because the utterance is discrepant with the 
current state of reality. However, if they take into account the speaker's belief 
state, they will say that he/she did a 'good job' because as far as they (the speaker) 
were concerned, there was only one item in location x. The implication of the 
results reported in Chapter 3 is that children may concentrate on representation in 
middle childhood. Additionally, the possibility of a U-shaped development in 
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terms of utterance evaluation- as suggested in Mitchell and Robinson (1994)-
implies the same thing. That is, children in middle childhood may adopt a more 
mentalistic criterion once they have come to appreciate the role of literal meaning 
and how this is instantiated by the array (Bonitatibus, 1988a). Therefore, it is 
expected that only children aged about seven years and older will be able to utilise 
the more sophisticated mentalistic criterion in their utterance evaluations. 
Interestingly, Mitchell and Russell (1989) found that it was not until around 14 
years that children could consistently base their evaluations on information 
pertaining to the speaker's internal representation (i.e. whether they had a good or 
a poor memory). Consequently, it might only be older children, and adults, who 
tend to consider the speaker's belief state when evaluating utterances under these 
circumstances. This may suggest that there are difficulties that extend beyond the 
age of about seven years in understanding how the speaker's internal 
representation influences communication. 
Experiment 4.1. 
4.1.1. Introduction 
The 'superficially ambiguous' (henceforth, the Not See) condition was 
compared to a See condition and a Control. In the See condition, the speaker 
protagonist saw that more items were added to the array and yet still 
underspecified the referent This is equivalent to a 'standard' ambiguity task in 
which the speaker's utterance is an adequate characterisation of the speaker's 
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internal representation (they have only one object in mind), but the desired item is 
not described adequately in order to establish unique reference. Therefore, the 
locus of the problem lies in the relationship between the utterance and the 
intended referent. In this condition, participants should judge that the speaker did 
a bad job because the utterance does not uniquely identify an utterance in the 
array. By contrast, in the Not See condition, the speaker's internal representation 
is discrepant with the current state of reality, but the utterance is again an adequate 
characterisation of the speaker's internal representation. Therefore, participants 
can adopt either a mentalistic or an objective criterion for evaluation. This 
condition allows a direct investigation of participants' utilisation of the 
components of the referential triangle: do they assess utterance quality according 
to representation or reality? The Control condition was included to check that 
participants were willing to say that the speaker had done a good job when no 
items were added to the array. In this condition, the speaker's internal 
representation, ensuing utterance and the state of external reality are all in perfect 
harmony and so there is no obvious reason to judge that the speaker's utterance 
was inadequate. 
The first experiment reported below is a pilot study involving adult 
participants. This was completed for two main reasons. Firstly, in order to provide 
a point of comparison for child participants, it was necessary to see how adults 
responded in each of the experimental conditions. Secondly, it was important to 
establish the extent to which adults would incorporate the speaker's belief state in 
their utterance evaluations when they were given the option of responding 
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according to either (a) the relation between the utterance and reality or (b) the 
relation between the utterance and the speaker's belie£ 
An Interpretation question was included alongside the Evaluation question. 
This was slightly different to the interpretations required from children in the 
Mitchell and Robinson (1994) and the Mitchell et al., (1999) studies mentioned 
earlier. In those studies, children were asked to make an interpretation from their 
own perspective (and they seemed to have very few difficulties making correct 
interpretations), whereas the children included in the present procedure were 
asked to make an interpretation from a listener protagonist's perspective. This 
provides an extra source of information concerning the criteria children use to 
process utterances. To expand, if children are focused too heavily on the link 
between utterance and representation (as in Chapter 3), they might judge good job 
in the Not See condition, and wrongly assume this implies the utterance is 
interpretable from the listener's point of view. There was no such problem 
anticipated with the adult participants, but the following experiment provided a 
useful opportunity to pilot the question. 
4.1.2. Method 
4.1.2.1. Participants. 134 second year Psychology Undergraduates took 
part in the pilot study. There were 97 females and 34 males (3 students failed to 
provide this information), with a mean age of20:9 (range 18:1 to 36:5). 
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4.1.2.2. Materials. All story scenarios were typed in 12pt Times Roman 
font and illustrated on A4 paper. Each story and accompanying questions 
appeared on a separate page, making a total of 3 pages for each participant. 
4.1.2.3. Design. Participants received a total of three story scenarios, one 
in each of the following experimental conditions: See, Not See and Control. The 
order of experimental conditions was rotated between participants and participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the possible rotations. Condition was mapped 
on to the type of story scenario, which was fixed across all participants. 
Participants were asked two main test questions and the order in which these 
appeared was counterbalanced across subjects and conditions. 
4.1.2.4. Procedure. All participants were seated in a lecture theatre, but 
completed the task individually. They were provided with a handout containing 
three story scenarios and were told to read the stories in the order in which they 
appeared. It was stressed that there were no right or wrong answers and that 
participants should respond according to the answer that they thought best. The 
three stories involved a boy seeing a bike in a shop window (Bike story); a girl 
displaying her picture for a school Open Evening (Picture story) and a boy 
wanting a biscuit from a jar in the kitchen (Biscuit story). The three experimental 
conditions can be illustrated using the Bike story. At the top of the page was a 
picture showing the initial state of reality e.g. one bike in a shop window. This 
was followed by a short story paragraph. In the Control condition participants 
were told: 
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'Dave is shopping in town with his friends when they walk past the toy shop. In 
the window is a new bike, which Dave stops to have a look at.* So, there is only 
one bike on display.* Later at home, Dave's Mum asks him if he has seen 
anything he would like to have for his birthday. Dave says "Yes, there was a bike 
in the toy shop window today. I'd like to have that." 
Between the points marked * the Not See condition differed from the Control 
condition, by including the additional information: 
'Whilst Dave walks home, the shopkeeper brings out more bikes to display in the 
window. There are lots of bikes on display now.' 
By contrast, in the See condition, participants were told: 
'Whilst Dave watches, the shopkeeper brings out more bikes to display in the 
window. There are lots of bikes on display now.' 
The procedure then differed depending on the order in which test questions were 
asked. Half of the participants were told: 'The next day, Mum goes to buy the 
bike ... '. On the page, there was an illustration of the state of reality at the time the 
utterance was made. For the See and Not See conditions, this was a display of 
three different bikes: the initial referent plus two others. For the Control condition, 
the picture contained the original bike since no bikes were added to the display. 
The picture of the bike/s was presented alongside a large, black question mark. 
This was to provide participants with the opportunity to say 'don't know' in 
answer to the Interpretation question. 
Participants were then asked: 
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(1) Interpretation question: Which bike will Mum think Dave wants? (Please 
circle one of the pictured bikes or the'?' if you think Mum won't be able to 
tell) 
(2) Evaluation question: Did Dave do a good job of saying exactly which bike he 
wants? Yes/No 
(3) Justification: Why/why not? 
The remainder of the participants were asked the Evaluation question 
followed by the Justification question. After the presentation of the main story, 
they were told 'The next day, Mum goes to buy the bike ... '; and were presented 
with the second picture of bikes added (See and Not See) or no bikes added 
(Control), and a big question mark. Finally, they were asked the Interpretation 
question. All questions were presented on the same page as the story and 
participants were required to write down their answers in the spaces provided. 
4.1.3. Results 
Preliminary analyses showed that there were no significant effects 
associated with question order or rotation order. 
4.1.3.1. Evaluation question: Participants could either say yes or no to 
whether the speaker had done a good job of saying exactly which item he/she 
wanted. Table 4.1 contains a summary of the total number of yes and no responses 
in the three experimental conditions. 
Evaluating discrepant utterances 122 
Table 4.1: Total number of yes and no responses (and percentages) to the 
Evaluation question in the Control, See and Not See conditions. 
Good job Bad job 
Control 116 (87) 18(13) 
See 8 (6) 126 (94) 
Not See 68 (51) 65 (49) 
There were clear differences in patterns of responding between conditions. 
In the Control condition, participants judged that the speaker had done a good job 
of saying exactly which item he/she wanted on 87% of occasions compared to 
only 6% of'goodjob' responses in the See condition. Participants rarely said that 
the speaker had done a 'bad job' in the Control condition, with only 13% of 
negative evaluations. They were much more likely to judge negatively in the See 
condition with 94% of responses saying that the speaker had done a 'bad job'. By 
contrast, responses were more evenly split in the Not See condition, with 51% of 
participants indicating that the speaker had done a 'good job' and 49% saying that 
the speaker had done a 'bad job'. 
4.1.3.2. Comparisons Between Conditions: A number of multiple 
comparisons were performed on the data from each year group. Each chi-squared 
analysis included Yates' correction for continuity, so applying additional 
corrections (such as the Bonferroni) would be overly conservative. 
It was more common for participants to judge 'good job' in Not See and 
'bad job' in See (n = 63), compared to the reverse (n = 3) [McNemar ·l 
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(corrected, df= 1, n = 66) = 55.4, p_<0.005]. By contrast, more participants judged 
'bad job' in the Not See condition and 'good job' in the Control (n = 58), 
compared to judging positively in Not See and negatively in the Control (n = 1 0) 
[McNemar ·l (corrected, df= 1, n =68) = 32.5, p_<0.005]. There was also a very 
strong trend for participants to judge negatively in the See condition and 
positively in the Control (n = 112), compared to the reverse (n = 4) [McNemar i. 
(corrected, df= 1, n = 116) = 98.7, p_<0.005]. 
4.1.3.3. Interpretation question: Responses to this question were coded 
into three main categories: (1) Referent: indicating that the listener would think 
the speaker wanted the initial referent shown to participants; (2) Question Mark: 
indicating that the listener would not be able to tell which referent the speaker 
wanted and (3) Other: indicating one of the alternative referents in the display. 
Table 4.2 contains a summary of responses for each condition, according to 
whether participants answered yes or no to the Evaluation question. 
Participants clearly discriminated between conditions in terms of whether 
the listener would be able to pick the referent that the speaker wanted. Overall, in 
the Control condition, the majority of responses (95%) indicated that the listener 
would pick the specific referent. By contrast, the majority of responses in the See 
(79%) and Not See (75%) conditions indicated that the listener would not be able 
to tell which item the speaker wanted. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of responses to the Interpretation question for each condition 
according to story scenario and response to the Evaluation question. 
Story type Biscuit Picture Bike Total 
Good Job? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Referent 
Control 42 2 35 6 36 3 113 11 
See 2 13 1 0 1 1 4 14 
Not See 16 8 1 1 0 0 17 9 
Can't tell 
Control 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 6 
See 1 16 1 45 2 39 4 100 
Not see 3 9 25 15 20 27 48 51 
Other 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
See 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 
Not See 1 5 1 0 0 0 2 5 
Comparing the number of referent versus nonreferent responses in the See 
and Not See conditions (see Table 4.3), there was no significant preference to 
judge that the listener would choose the referent more often in the Not See 
compared to the See condition [McNemar X: (corrected, df= 1, n = 38) = 2.13, 
n.s.]. This pattern would have been expected if participants judged message 
adequacy on the basis of the match between the speaker's utterance and internal 
representation. However, individual story scenarios seemed to produce markedly 
different patterns of responding. In particular, the biscuit story seemed to 
encourage participants to answer in a different way to the other two stories. For 
example, participants chose the referent a total of39 times across the See and Not 
See conditions in the Biscuit story, compared to only 5 times for the Picture and 
Bike stories combined. 
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Table 4.3: Total number of referent versus nonreferent responses in the See and 
Not See conditions. 
Condition See 
Response Referent Nonreferent 
Referent 3 24 
Not see 
Nonreferent 14 93 
4.1.3.4. Justifications - Good Job Question: The justifications to the 
Good Job question were coded according to eight different categories by the 
experimenter and a blind rater. Following Camaioni, Ercolani and Lloyd (1998), a 
sample of I 0% of justifications was scored independently by the second coder, 
with an interrater reliability of 96%1• Disagreements were discussed and, in most 
cases, the experimenter's choice of category was retained. The coding categories 
were as follows: 
(1) Pertaining to multiple objects in the array e.g. 'there are lots of bikes there 
now.' 
(2) Pertaining to one object e.g. 'there is only one biscuit in the jar,' ' there was 
only one bike there when he saw it' 
I: The method of using a I 0% sample to verify the consistency of coding was utilised due to the 
almost identical coding categories in Chapters 3 and 4, and the high level of agreement between 
raters, reported in chapter 3. Since the same independent rater coded the justifications in both 
chapters. rating I 00% of the justifications in Chapter 4 was felt to be unnecessary. 
Evaluating discrepant utterances 126 
(3a) Speaker did not provide enough information e.g. 'she didn't describe it 
enough.' 
{3b) Speaker described the referent adequately e.g. 'it was a clear description.' 
(4) Explicit mention of the speaker's mental state e.g. 'he didn't know there were 
more in the jar.' 
(5) Reference to the listener's mental state e.g. 'Dad won't be able to tell which 
picture is hers.' 
(6) No answer/don't know 
(7) Invoking hypotheticals e.g. 'there could be lots of bikes in the shop window 
now. 
, 
(8) Other 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of justifications for each experimental condition, 
according to whether participants answered yes or no to the Evaluation question. 
In the Control condition, most of the participants (116/134) answered 
positively and the vast majority of their positive justifications (83%) made 
reference to the fact that there was only one object in the jar. In the See condition, 
the majority of participants {126/134) answered negatively, but their justifications 
were grouped into two main categories. The modal response for negative 
evaluations {47%) was to make reference to the multiple objects in the array, and 
the second most popular response (37%) was to say that the speaker had not 
provided enough information about the referent. In the Not See condition, just 
over half of the participants responded positively {68/133) and the majority of 
their justifications (76%) made reference to the speaker's mental state (i.e. that the 
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speaker did not know that more items had been added to the display). For those 
answering negatively (65/133), the modal response was to mention the multiple 
items in the array ( 48% ), whilst the second most popular type of justification was 
to say that the speaker had not provided enough information {34%). 
Table 4.4: Total number of justifications (and percentages) for the Control, See 
and Not See conditions. 
Number 1 2 3a 3b 4 5 6 7 
of Multiple Single Not Enough Speaker' Listener' No Hypoth-
responses objects object enough Info smental smental answer/ eticals 
(% ge)* info state state Don't 
know 
Control 
Yes 0 96 1 7 5 1 5 1 
(83) 
No 0 2 9 0 0 1 2 2 
See 
Yes 0 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 
No 59 0 47 0 13 2 3 1 . 
(47) (37) 
Not See 
Yes 1 11 1 0 52 2 1 0 
(16) (76) 
No 31 1 22 0 4 5 0 1 
(48) (34) 
• For the sake ofbrevtty, only the modal percentages ofhtgh response categones are provtded. 
Given that there were very similar patterns of responding in the See and 
Not See conditions in terms of the types of justifications provided for negative 
judgments, it was necessary to see whether different participants use the same 
criterion for their judgments, or whether the same participants use different 
criteria depending on experimental condition. Of the 62 participants who 
answered negatively in both the See and Not See conditions, 33 (53%) gave the 
8 
Other 
0 
2 
2 
1 
0 
1 
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same category of justification and 29 (47%) gave justifications that fell into two 
different categories. Justifications in categories 1 and 3 made up the vast majority 
of the latter type of responses. 
4.1.4. Discussion 
Ovemll, adults showed a strong tendency to say that the speaker had done 
a good job of saying exactly which item he/she wanted in the Control condition, 
and a bad job of saying exactly which item he/she wanted in the See condition. 
Therefore, they were willing to make a positive evaluation when no items were 
added to the army, and a negative evaluation when items were added to the army 
and the speaker knew this. On the majority of occasions, participants justified 
their positive evaluations in the Control condition by mentioning the army. That 
is, they said that the speaker had done a 'good job' 'because there was only one 
bike in the window'. In the See condition, justifications based on the relationship 
between the utterance and the array can fall into two categories; either category 1 
(mentioning the array) or category 3 (mentioning the inadequacy of the utterance, 
presumably in relation to the array). If these two categories are considered 
jointlj, then 84% of justifications in the See condition were focused on the 
2: It was crucial to keep these categories separate in Chapter 3 since, in the presence of a thought 
bubble, the lack of infonnation refers to an underspecification of the speaker's representation 
rather than an underspecification of the array. By contrast, given that thought bubbles were not 
included in the present experiments, the lack of infonnation from the speaker refers to an 
underspecification of the array. This response indicates a recognition of the ambiguity of the array, 
as does the explicit mention of the array in category 1. Therefore, it was useful to combine the two 
categories in the present e x p e r i m ~ t s s as a measure of how often participants recognised that 
communication could be problematJc due to the relationship between the utterance and the array. 
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utterance-array relationship rather than on the fact that the speaker knowingly 
provided an ambiguous utterance. In these two conditions, then, adults seemed to 
focus on the importance of the relationship between the utterance and the array in 
determining whether the speaker had done a 'good job' or not. 
In the Not See condition, where it was possible to evaluate according to 
the speaker's internal representation, around half of the group were happy to do 
so. They were significantly more likely to judge positively in the Not See 
condition compared to the See condition. That is, rather than basing their 
judgments simply on the appearance of the array, they chose to use the speaker's 
belief state as the criterion for their evaluations and, therefore, judged that the 
speaker had done a 'good job'. This is supported by the types of justifications 
given for positive evaluations of the utterance in the Not See condition, where 
76% made explicit reference to the fact that the speaker had done a 'good job' 
because he/she was not aware that the array had been altered. It appears that 
around 50% of the adult group gave a higher priority to the role of the speaker's 
internal representation, compared to the utterance-array link, in tasks where the 
particular criterion for evaluation is deliberately ambiguous and unspecified. 
Nevertheless, roughly halfofthe group continued with a pragmatic strategy in the 
Not See condition. That is, they relied on the utterance-array relationship to judge 
the adequacy of the utterance. Given that adults are supposed to possess a mature 
understanding of the mind, which includes the knowledge that utterances are 
representations of speaker's beliefs, it is surprising that such a large percentage of 
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the group did not utilise a mentalistic criterion when making an evaluation of an 
utterance. 
A further aim of the pilot study was to obtain the consensus response 
concerning the listener's interpretation of the utterance. As expected, adults 
judged that the listener would pick the referent in the Control condition (because it 
was the only one there), but that the listener would not be able to tell which 
referent the speaker wanted in the See and Not See conditions. As predicted, then, 
there was no evidence that the adults' judgments of pragmatic adequacy (on 
behalf of the listener) were contaminated by their knowledge of the adequacy of 
the utterance-representation link. However, the percentages of 'can't tell' 
responses in the See and Not See conditions were lower than would be expected 
from this group (79% and 75% respectively). The Biscuit story seemed to be 
responsible for this effect due to the fact that quite a few respondents chose the 
referent in this story, compared to very few responses of this kind in the other two 
stories. The most likely explanation for this is that the initial biscuits were 
described as being the protagonist's - Adam's - favourite. Presumably, the 
listener (in this case Adam's Dad) would know that this would be Adam's 
preference and so would know which biscuit Adam wanted, irrespective of 
whether more biscuits had been added to the array. Therefore, this story was 
changed in the subsequent experiments to omit any reference to a stated 
preference. 
Additional changes to the stories were also needed in order to match the 
details of each scenario more closely. In the pilot study, there were only two items 
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added to the initial referent in the Bike story, three items added in the Picture 
story and multiple items added in the Biscuit story. This may not have influenced 
adults' responses, but such discrepancies may affect children since the baseline 
for picking the referent is altered in each case. Moreover, it is possible that 
children could judge that because only a couple of items were added to the array, 
this means that the utterance could be a 'better job' than if many items were 
added. The possibility that children can be sensitive to the magnitude of 
discrepancy between utterances and states in the world has some empirical 
support. Mitchell, Munno and Russell (1991; also Mitchell & Russell, 1991) 
report that 8 to13-year-olds (but not 5-year-olds) were more likely to judge a 
message to be adequate if it was only slightly discrepant with the real world state 
of affairs. By contrast, messages that were grossly discrepant were judged to be 
inadequate for uniquely identifying a particular target. Consequently, the 
following experiments contain stories in which 3 items were added to the array in 
the See and Not See conditions, making a total of four items in all three types of 
scenario. 
Experiment 4.2. 
4.2.1. Introduction 
The pattern of results from Experiment 4.1 seem quite clear with respect to 
the criteria on which adults base evaluations of utterances. It seems appropriate to 
suggest that if participants answer positively in the Control condition, it is because 
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they notice that the utterance is pragmatically adequate. Similarly, negative 
responses in the See condition suggest a pragmatic focus also since participants 
say 'bad job' because the utterance does not uniquely specify a referent. The same 
is true of negative responses in the Not See condition. By contrast, when 
participants judge positively in the Not See condition, presumably that is because 
they consider that the speaker's belief state- or representation of meaning- is 
relevant to their evaluation. 
This pattern provides a useful basis on which to interpret the children's 
responses in the following experiment. The main aim of Experiment 4.2 was to 
obtain a pattern of responses based on the evaluation and interpretation questions 
only to investigate to what extent children differ from each other and from adults. 
Children were not asked to justify their responses because it was thought that 
asking for additional information using the following procedure might prove to be 
too demanding, and therefore stressful, especially for the youngest group of 
children. This concern was based on Bonitatibus and Flavell's (1985) finding that 
6- and 7-year-olds provided uninformative explanations about ambiguous 
utterances. 
Sixth-form (Year 12) students were also included in the following 
experiment as an adult baseline group against which the child data could be 
compared. The inclusion of this group was necessaty on the grounds that the 
stimuli had changed between Experiment 4.1 and Experiment 4.2. It was, 
therefore, necessary to check whether the pattern of responding obtained in the 
pilot study could be replicated with a different group of adult participants. 
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4.2.2. Method 
4.2.2.1. Participants. 96 Sixth-fonn students and I49 children were 
included. There were 38 male and 47 female Sixth-fonn students (II students did 
not provide this infonnation), aged between I6:4 and I8:4 (mean = I7:4). All 
attended a LEA funded Comprehensive School in Binningham, West Midlands. 
There were 53 Year 1 children (25 males, 28 females; mean= 5:8; range 5:2 to 
6:6), 50 Year 3 children (28 male, 22 female; mean= 7:7; range 7:2 to 8:2) and 46 
Year 5 children (23 male, 23 female; mean= 9:7; range 9:2 to 10:2), all ofwhom 
attended a LEA funded Primary School in Sand well, West Midlands. 
4.2.2.2. Materials. 
Children: All story scenarios were presented on A4 laminated card and 
illustrated using cartoon pictures. Each story was presented on a maximum of four 
separate cards. The story narratives were printed on the stimulus cards in 16pt 
Times Roman font. Responses were recorded on pre-prepared data sheets. 
Sixth-fonn Students: Exactly the same stimulus cards were photocopied 
onto acetates to be shown to the students on an overhead projector. Test questions 
and stimulus arrays were printed on A4 sheets of paper. 
4.2.2.3. Design. This was identical to Experiment 4.1. 
4.2.2.4. Procedure. 
4.2.2.4. (a) Children: The experimenter introduced herself and explained 
to the child participant that they would be shown some stories in which someone 
'tells us something that they like, or something that they want.' Children were told 
that 'some of the people are quite good at saying what they want and some of the 
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people are not so good. I need you to help me figure out who is doing a good job 
and who is not doing such a good job, OK?' There were three different story 
scenarios: Bike, Picture and Coat. The Bike and Picture stories were identical to 
those included in the pilot study. The Coat story replaced the Biscuit story and is 
outlined below. Children were shown the first page of the story and the 
experimenter read the story aloud. For example, in the Coat story the first picture 
shows the protagonist hanging his coat above some bookshelves in the staff room 
at school. There are no other coats on any of the available pegs. The narrative for 
all experimental conditions began: 'At school, Mr. Riley walks into the staff room 
and hangs his coat above the bookshelves. So, there is only one coat hanging 
there.'* In the Control condition, the next picture children saw was ofMr. Riley 
standing behind his desk, talking to a boy in his classroom. The narrative 
continued: *'Later, Mr. Riley wants to show his class something outside and asks 
Nathan if he would fetch his coat from the staff room. Nathan asks how he will 
know which coat is Mr. Riley's. "It's the one above the bookshelves" says Mr. 
Riley. 
Between the points marked *the narrative included additional information 
in the other two conditions. In the See condition, children were shown a picture of 
Mr. Riley sitting on a chair in the staff room, next to the bookshelves. There were 
now four different coats on the pegs (including Mr. Riley's). Children were told 
'Whilst Mr. Riley drinks a cup of coffee, more teachers come in and hang their 
coats up. There are lots of coats above the bookshelves now. • In the Not See 
condition, the picture showed the same four coats on the pegs and an empty chair 
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beside the bookshelves. This time, children were told 'After Mr. Riley has left to 
go to his classroom, more teachers arrive and hang their coats up. There are lots of 
coats above the bookshelves now! For all conditions, children were then shown 
the final page of the story, which was divided vertically into two sections. On one 
side, there was a large black question mark and on the other side there was a 
picture of the listener protagonist, Nathan, looking at the coats above the 
bookshelves. The side of the page on which the question mark and the picture 
appeared was systematically varied between story scenarios. Participants were 
asked two test questions: 
(I) Evaluation: Did (speaker) do a good job of saying exactly which (item) he/she 
wants? 
(2) Interpretation: Which (item) will (listener) think (speaker) wants- or won•t 
he/she be able to tell? 
The order of these questions was col!-nterbalanced with rotation of experimental 
conditions. Before the Evaluation question, there was a linking sentence in the 
story, for example 'Nathan goes to fetch the coat... •. Children were seen 
individually in a quiet room. After the procedure they were thanked for their help 
and given a sticker for their participation. 
4.2.2.4. (b) Sixth-form Students: Students were told that they were 
helping with developmental research, in order to establish an adult baseline 
response. They were told that there were no right or wrong answers and that they 
should give the answer that they thought best. Stories were presented on overhead 
acetates and read aloud by the experimenter. Students responded on pre-prepared 
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answer sheets containing the test questions and pictures of the final referent array 
for each story. The Sixth-form students were also asked to justify their responses 
to the Evaluation question, by answering the question 'Why/Why not?' The 
procedure was completed in small groups of7-15 students. Discussion between 
participants was discouraged so that there was minimal opportunity for copying. 
4.2.3. Results 
Data from 16 Sixth-form students was disregarded due to an 
administrative error in the presentation of experimental conditions. 
4.2.3.1. Evaluation question: Participants could either say yes or no to 
indicate whether the speaker had done a good job of saying exactly which item 
he/she wanted. Table 4.5 contains a summary of the total number of yes and no 
responses in the three experimental conditions for the Sixth-form students and for 
the child participants. 
The children in Year 1 tended to answer positively on most trials, 
irrespective of experimental condition. Around 80% of the 5-year-olds in each 
condition judged that the speaker had done a good job of saying exactly which 
item they wanted. By contrast, the 7- and 9-yel;lr-olds seemed to discriminate 
between conditions, in the sense that the majority answered positively in the 
Control (74% and 63% respectively) and negatively in the See condition (62% 
and 78% respectively). Amongst the three groups of children, there was a 
tendency to judge negatively in the Not See condition with increasing age. Whilst 
only 21% of the 5-year-olds evaluated negatively in this condition, 76% of the 7-
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year-olds and 9I% of the 9-year-olds said that the speaker did not do a good job 
of saying exactly which item they wanted. In the Not See condition, the Sixth-
form students answered similarly to the 9-year-olds with 87% evaluating 
negatively. This was also true for the See condition, in which 99% of the students 
said that the speaker did not do a good job. Responses in the Control condition 
were much more mixed in the Sixth-form group with 53% judging positively and 
the remainder (47%) judging negatively. 
Table 4.5: Total number of yes and no responses (and percentages) to the 
Evaluation question for all groups of participants. 
Year I Year3 YearS Sixth-form 
(mean age= 5:8) (mean age= 7:7) (mean age= 9:7) (mean age =17:4) 
Good Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Job? (%of 
total) 
Control 44 9 37 13 29 17 42 38 
(83) (I7) (74) (26) {63) (37) (53) (47) 
See 43 10 I9 3I IO 35 I 79 
(8I) (I9) (38) (62) (22) (78) (1) (99) 
Not See 4I 11 12 38 4 42 IO 70 
(79) (21) (24) (76) (9) (91) (13) (87) 
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4.2.3.2. Comparisons between conditions. (see Table 4.6 for a summary 
of data). 
4.2.3.2. (a) See versus Not See: Only five of the 5-6-year-old children 
gave differing judgments in the two conditions. This number was too small for 
statistical analysis. Similarly, only a few (n = 1 0) 7-8-year-olds changed their 
responses between these conditions and there was no significant difference 
between answering positively on one task and negatively on another. There were 
equal numbers of9-10-year-olds (6 in each case) who gave differing evaluations 
in the two tasks. Unlike the three groups of children, the Sixth-form students did 
show a significant tendency to answer in a particular way when their judgments 
on the two tasks differed. They were significantly more likely to answer 'good 
job' in the Not See condition and 'bad job' in the See condition (n = 10) compared 
to the reverse (n = 0) [McNemarx.2 (corrected, df= 1, n = 10) = 8.1, v.<0.005]. 
4.2.3.2. (b) Control versus Not See: Very few children answered 
differently on the two conditions {n = 8) so numbers were too small for analysis. 
By contrast, the 7-8 year-olds showed a strong tendency to respond differently to 
the two conditions; they were significantly more likely to say that the speaker had 
done a 'bad job' in the Not See condition and a 'good job' in the Control (n = 26) 
compared to the reverse (n = 1) [McNemar ·l (corrected, df= 1, n = 27) = 21.3, 
v.<0.005]. The remaining groups showed a significant tendency to answer in the 
same way [Year 5: McNemar ·l (corrected, df= 1, n = 25) = 19.4, n<0.005; Sixth-
form: McNemarx.2 (corrected, df= 1, n_ = 43) = 23.8, n<0.005]. 
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Table 4.6: Summary of the number of responses to the Evaluation question 
between conditions for all four participant groups. 
Patterns of responses between conditions 
Year *See versus Not See Control versus Not Control versus See 
Group See 
Response Good Job Bad Job Good Job Bad Job Good Job Bad Job 
to the 
Evaluation 
question 
Year 1 Good Job 40 3 38 5 39 5 
Bad Job 2 8 3 6 4 5 
Year3 Good Job 10 8 11 26 18 19 
Bad Job 2 30 1 12 1 12 
YearS Good Job 1 6 4 24 6 22 
Bad Job 6 32 1 16 4 13 
Sixth- Good Job 0 0 4 38 0 42 
form 
Bad Job 10 70 5 33 1 37 
.. .. 
* The flrst Condttlon menfloned corresponds to the verflcal and the second Condition mentioned 
refers to the horizontal. 
4.2.3.2. (c) Control versus See: Only 9 of the 5-6-year-olds provided 
different evaluations: five judged 'bad job' in the See condition and 'good job' in 
the Control and four responded in the reverse pattern. The 7-8 year-olds, by 
contrast, showed a strong tendency to judge that the speaker had done a 'bad job' 
in the See condition and a 'good job' in the Control (n = 19) compared to the 
reverse (n = 1) [McNemar:x.2 (corrected, df= 1, n = 20) = 14.4, n<0.005]. Again, 
the oldest two groups showed a similar pattern of responding to the Year 3 
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children; they were significantly more likely to judge 'bad job' in the See 
condition and 'good job' in the Control, compared to the reverse [Year 5: 
McNemar x,.2 (corrected, df= I, n = 26} =II. I, n<0.005; Sixth-form: McNemar x,.2 
(corrected, df= I, n = 43) = 37.2, n<0.005]. 
4.2.3.3. Justifications: Sixth-form Students. Justifications to the 
Evaluation question were coded in an identical way to the adult pilot data (see 
pp.I25-I26 for a summary of coding categories). There was an interrater 
agreement of 97%. Table 4.7 provides a summary of justifications for each 
experimental condition, according to whether participants answered yes or no to 
the Evaluation question. 
Table 4.7: Total number of justifications (and percentages) for the Sixth-form 
group, according to Condition and response to the Evaluation question. 
Number I 2 3 3a 4 5 6 7 
of Multiple Single Not Enough Speaker' Listener's No Hypoth 
responses objects object enough Info smental mental answer -eticals 
(%ge) info state state /Don't 
know 
Control 
Yes 0 34 0 6 0 0 2 0 
(8I) 
No I 2 I4 I 0 3 0 I4 
(37) {37) 
See 
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No 50 0 26 0 I 0 0 2 
(63) {33) 
Not See 
Yes 0 I I 7 0 0 I 0 
No 40 0 24 0 4 I 0 I 
(57) (34) 
8 
Other 
0 
3 
I 
0 
0 
0 
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Just over half of the sixth form students answered positively in the Control 
condition, and the majority of the justifications (81%) for the utterance being 
evaluated as a 'good job' were concerned with there being only one referent on 
display. Justifications for the speaker doing a 'bad job' in the Control condition 
were hi-modally distributed between saying that the speaker did not describe the 
referent in enough detail (37%) and invoking hypothetical scenarios (37% e.g. 
'there might have been more put in the window'). In the See condition, the 
majority of students responded negatively and the modal justification made 
reference to there being lots of similar items in the array (63%). The second most 
popular response was to state that the speaker had not provided enough 
information about the referent (33%). A very similar pattern of responding was 
found for the Not See condition. The modal justification for negative evaluations 
was to make reference to multiple items in the array (57%), followed by the 
second most popular response of the speaker not describing the referent in enough 
detail (34%). 
4.2.3.4. Interpretation question: Responses to this question were coded 
into three main categories, as before: (1) Referent: indicating that the listener 
would think the speaker wanted the r e f e r e n t ~ ~ (2) Question mark: indicating that 
the listener would not be able to tell which item the speaker wanted and (3) Other: 
indicating one of the alternative items in the display. Table 4.8 contains a 
summary of responses for each condition, according to whether participants 
answered yes or no to the Evaluation question. 
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Table 4.8: Summary of responses to the Interpretation question for each condition 
according to story scenario and response to the Evaluation question. 
Year] Year3 Year5 Year 12 
Good Job? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Control 
Referent 41 8 34 9 28 13 42 30 
Can't tell 3 1 4 2 1 4 0 8 
Other - - - - - - - -
See 
Referent 27 8 8 9 4 5 1 2 
Can't tell 3 1 7 16 3 28 0 75 
Other 13 0 4 6 3 2 0 2 
Not See 
Referent 17 5 7 8 0 8 0 3 
Can'ttell 4 2 3 23 3 31 7 64 
Other 20 4 2 7 2 2 2 4 
The vast majority of participants, across all four groups and irrespective of 
response on the Evaluation question, indicated correctly that the listener would 
pick the referent in the Control condition. In Year's 1,3,5 and 12 respectively 
92%, 88%, 89% and 90% of responses were in the 'referent' category. Chi-
squared analyses revealed that the participant groups did not differ significantly 
from each other in this condition. 
By contrast, the correct response in the See and Not See conditions was to 
say that the listener would not be able to tell which item the speaker wanted. 
Children's use of the 'can't tell' category showed an increase with age. In the See 
condition, the respective percentages of children answering 'can't tell' in Years 
1,3,5 and 12 were as follows: 7.7, 46.0, 68.8 and 93.7. The corresponding 
percentages for the Not See condition were: 11.5, 52.0, 73.9 and 88.7. The 7-8 and 
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9-10-year-olds did not differ significantly from each other in either condition, in 
terms of the number of referent versus nonreferent responses (see Table 4.9 for a 
summary of between-group referent versus nonreferent analyses for the See and 
Not See conditions).The 7-8-year-olds also did not differ from the 5-6-year-olds 
in this respect in the Not See condition, but they did differ significantly in See. It 
is noticeable that the majority (35 from 52) of the 5-6-year-olds and a large 
minority (17 from 50) of the 7-8-year-olds said that the listener would pick the 
referent in the See and Not See conditions. This is the item that the child 
participants knew to be the one that the speaker meant. By contrast, this type of 
response was very rare amongst the 9-1 0 and 17 -18-year-olds {9 from 46 and 3 
from 96 respectively). 
Table 4.9: Chi-squared values* for between-group comparisons of referent versus 
nonreferent responses to the Interpretation question: See and Not See conditions. 
See (upper diagonal) 
Year 1 3 5 12 
Group 
1 
- 11.1 19.9 59.0 
Not See (lower 3 1.20 
-
1.4 0 18.3 
diagonal) 5 7.3 8 2.0° 
-
6.9 8 
12 28.0 15.6 4.5 b 
-
*All values significant at n.<0.005 (Qf= I, corrected, in all cases) except for: 
• significant at n.<0.01. 
b significant at n.<0.05. 
o not significant 
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Finally, the data were analysed to see whether there was a tendency for 
participants to judge that the listener would choose the referent more often in the 
Not See compared to the See condition. This pattern of responding could arise if 
participants were influenced by their knowledge that the speaker's utterance was 
an adequate characterisation of their (the speaker's) meaning, and, therefore, 
judge the utterance to be adequate from a pragmatic perspective also. The 
breakdown of within-group referent versus nonreferent responses is included in 
Table 4.10. There was a significant tendency for the 5-6-year-olds to give the 
reverse pattern to that predicted above. That is, they were significantly more likely 
to say that the listener would pick the referent in the See condition and a 
nonreferent in the Not See condition, compared to the reverse [McNemar 'i 
(corrected, df= 1, n = 26) = 6.5, n<0.025]. For the remaining three groups, there 
were very few participants who changed their response between conditions and no 
significant differences between those who did judge differently. 
Table 4.10: Summary of within-group comparisons of referent versus nonreferent 
responses to the Interpretation question for the See and Not See conditions. 
Year Year 1 Year3 YearS Sixth-form 
Group See .See See See 
Ref Nonref Ref Nonref Ref Nonref Ref Nonref 
Referent 16 6 11 4 4 4 2 1 
Not See Nonreferent 20 11 6 29 5 33 0 77 
Evaluating discrepant utterances 145 
4.2.3.5. Order Effects: Data from the Sixth-form students were analysed 
separately, since the unequal numbers assigned to each rotation may have 
provided a misleading view of order effects in the three younger participant 
groups. Each condition was analysed separately, but data were combined across 
Years 1, 3 and 5. All order effects were calculated using chi-squared analysis. For 
the children in Years 1, 3 and 5, there were no significant effects associated with 
either rotation or question order. For the Sixth-form students, there were 
significant effects of rotation for all three experimental conditions [Control: ·l (df 
= 2, n = 80) = 11.40, n<0.005; See: x.2 (df= 2, n = 80) = 18.47, n<0.005; Not See: 
x.2 (Qf= 2, n = 80) = 18.47, n<0.005]. There was also a significant question order 
effect for the Year 12 group, but only in the Control condition [x.2 (corrected, df = 
1, n = 80) = 4.2, n<0.05]. As Table 4.11 testifies, there was a tendency for Sixth-
formers to say 'bad job' more often when the Evaluation question appeared before 
the Interpretation question, compared to the reverse. 
Table 4.11: Frequencies of yes and no responses to the Evaluation question for the 
Sixth-form group in the Control condition, according to order of question 
presentation. 
Question order Interpretation/ Evaluation/ Total 
Evaluation Interpretation 
Yes 25 17 42 
Good Job? 
No 13 25 38 
Total 38 42 80 
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4.2.4. Discussion 
There was little evidence amongst the children and the Sixth-form group 
that participants were including the speaker's mental representation, or belief 
state, in their utterance evaluations. Unlike the adults in Experiment 4.1, the 
Sixth-form students rarely judged that the speaker had done a 'good job' in the 
Not See condition. This was also the case for the 7-8 and 9-10-year-old children 
who answered 'no' on the majority of occasions in the Not See condition. 
Although the criteria for evaluations were not directly assessed in the children, the 
similarity of responding between Years 3 and 5 and the Sixth-form group is 
suggestive of similar strategy use. The justifications of the Sixth-formers in the 
Not See condition point overwhelmingly to the fact that they were focusing on the 
relationship between the utterance and the array rather than the utterance-internal 
representation link. Considering Category 1 (array based) and Category 3 
(utterance based) responses together, 91% of the Sixth-form justifications 
explicitly mentioned the utterance-array relationship. Even though there was some 
evidence in the Sixth-form group that they were starting to adopt the more 
sophisticated criterion of judging according to the speaker's belief state (10 out of 
70 said 'good job' in the Not See condition), they, nevertheless, failed to mention 
the speaker's belief state explicitly when asked to justify their responses. It seems 
unlikely, then, that the positive responses in this condition seen in the younger 
groups of children are a result of incorporating the speaker's internal 
representation into utterance evaluations. This is especially true of the 5-6-year-
olds who showed little discrimination between conditions, tending to respond 
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positively irrespective of whether the utterance was ambiguous. This pattern is 
consistent with previous literature, which suggests that younger children have 
little understanding of the role of the actual words of the utterance in referential 
communication tasks and so tend to say that messages are adequate (Mitchell & 
Robinson, 1994; Flavell, Speer, Green & August, 1981; Robinson & Whittaker, 
1987). 
All groups, apart from the 5-6-year-olds, discriminated between the See 
and Control conditions, with significant numbers in each age group judging that 
the speaker had done a 'bad job' in the See condition and a 'good job' in the 
Control. Consistent with the adults in the pilot study, the Sixth-form students 
judged negatively in the See condition on the grounds that the array was 
ambiguous or that the utterance was inadequate (96% of justifications fell into 
these categories combined). Given that there seemed to be a developmental 
increase in the number of negative responses in the See condition, it is 
conceivable that children were also judging negatively because they had noticed 
the discrepancy between the utterance and the array. In addition, the students, like 
the adults, judged positively in the Control condition 'because there was only one 
item there' (81% of justifications fell in this category). Again, it seems unlikely 
that children were using wildly different strategies to the adults and Sixth-form 
students and were proficient at noticing the adequacy of the utterance because 
there were no other items to which the utterance could refer. 
There was, however, a surprising tendency to evaluate the utterance 
negatively in the Control condition with increasing age. Moving chronologically 
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through the groups, from youngest to oldest, 17, 26, 37, and 47% of evaluations 
indicated that the speaker had not done a good job of saying exactly what he/she 
meant. This is especially surprising given the overwhelming preference amongst 
the adult group in Experiment 4.1 to say that the speaker had done a 'good job' in 
the Control condition. The finding that many participants judged negatively in the 
Control condition suggests that utterance evaluation does not simply take the form 
of mapping the utterance on to reality, or judging according to a perceived say-
mean discrepancy. Such is argued to be the key process in referential 
communication, allowing children to distinguish between messages that are 
ambiguous and those that are not (Olson , 1970). Generally, participants in the 
present experiment seemed unwilling to evaluate the utterance based on the 
information in front of them. Even though the utterance, the array and the 
speaker's internal representation were in harmony, and the 'current' state of 
reality was clearly visible to participants at the time they made their evaluations, 
the speaker was still judged to have done a 'bad job'. 
The present data seem to be consistent with the notion that children, even 
up to the age of 18 years, do not think a simple, adequate message is 'enough' in 
communicative terms. One possible reason why participants may not have 
sufficient confidence in their utterances is suggested by the types of justifications 
provided by the Sixth-form students for negative evaluations in the Control 
condition. Just over a third of justifications included the invocation of 
hypothetical scenarios that could render the utterance ambiguous. For example, 
students stated that there 'might be more bikes added to the window' or 'more 
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coats put on the pegs.' It is possible that, with increasing age, children become 
more familiar with instances in which communication failure has occurred. As a 
result, people may become more cautious about accepting utterances as accurate 
representations of reality and, therefore, engage in verbal redundancy or reasoning 
about hypothetical scenarios to limit their chances of being 'wrong'. After all, 
experience of being on the receiving end of inadequate utterances may teach us to 
be more careful, as speaker's, about how we characterise what we mean. There is 
some evidence of this in Lloyd {1991) and Redel in and Hjelmquist {1998), both of 
whom found that speakers were significantly more likely to give adequate 
messages if they had previously played the role of a listener. 
A problem with this interpretation is the finding that the adults in the pilot 
study rarely responded negatively in the Control condition. If there was a general 
increase with age in the tendency to treat utterances more cautiously, then this 
effect should be most pronounced in the oldest group of participants. However, it 
might be that the tendency to judge negatively in the Control condition in the 
Sixth-form group is a result of experimental artifact, rather than an extension of a 
developmental trend. The Sixth-form group may have responded in a way more 
consistent with the adults in the pilot study except that this was obscured by noise 
in the data {as a result of significant rotation effects). A further experiment is 
required to see whether a different group of adult participants would respond in a 
similar way. There was also a significant Question Order effect in the Control 
condition for the Sixth Form group. Students tended to say that the speaker had 
done a 'good job' significantly more often when they were asked to interpret the 
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utterance from the listener's perspective before they were asked to evaluate 
whether or not the speaker had done a 'good job'. This suggests that utterance 
evaluations were influenced by outcome, a finding normally only associated with 
children younger than about six years (e.g. Robinson & Whittaker, 1986). 
Generally, then, there is need for caution in making conclusions about the Sixth-
form data and, hence, doubt about the extent of a trend to evaluate adequate 
utterances negatively. 
The data from the Interpretation question seem much clearer: The Sixth-
form students almost never said that the listener would be able to choose the item 
that the speaker wanted in the See and Not See conditions. Only 6 responses from 
a total of 160 (4%) indicated that the referent would be chosen, compared to 
around 25% of the adults in Experiment 4.1. In other words, the vast majority of 
the Sixth-form students indicated that the listener would not be able to tell which 
referent the speaker wanted in the conditions in which the utterance was 
ambiguous. Therefore, removing any mention of a particular preference for a 
certain item, seemed to increase the number of students interpreting utterances 
according to referential ambiguity, rather than according to contextual detail in the 
narratives. 
Amongst the three groups of children there seemed to be a gradually 
developing tendency to say that the listener would not be able to tell which 
referent the speaker wanted in both the See and Not See conditions. This trend 
was accompanied by a corresponding decrease with age in the number of children 
saying that the listener would choose the referent. This seems to be similar to the 
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trend outlined in Braine and Rumain's (1983) chapter on logical reasoning (see 
also Robinson & Mitchell, 1990). The authors suggest that a 'can't tell' or 
'undecidable' response is a " ... cognitively complex response category" (p.274) 
which requires understanding the distinction between< I don't know whetherp or 
not> and <One can't know whether p or not>. Braine and Rumain (1983) suggest 
that the logic of an undecidable response category is not available to children until 
around the age of six years, but that it seems to be more or less in place by about 
9-10 years. Nevertheless, they suggest that there still remains a response bias 
against 'can't tell' responses which extends into adulthood, perhaps because 
"Subjects' reasoning strategies are probably geared toward making rather than 
shelving decisions, ... they prefer poorly based decisions to no decision" (p.276). 
To extrapolate to the present experiment, participants could prefer to pick one of 
the items in the array rather than answer 'can't tell' because they are still 
susceptible to an outcome bias. That is, it might be better to pick an item, even if 
it is not the referent, because it might serve as a suitable alternative (Mitchell & 
Russell, 1989). 
Despite some children's reluctance to use the 'can't tell' response 
category, many children were, nevertheless aware that the referent would be 
unlikely to be chosen by the listener. Although most of the children in the 
youngest group said that the listener would choose the referent in the See and Not 
See conditions, this type of response was much less common amongst the older 
children. Therefore, even though some children were unwilling to say 'can't tell' 
they tended to point to an item other than the referent as the one the speaker 
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would choose. This suggests that there was at least some awareness that the 
utterance was problematical. Additionally, children did not seem to be influenced 
by their own knowledge of the adequacy between the speaker's representation and 
their utterance in the Not See condition. Such an influence could have resulted in 
children judging that the listener would be able to choose the referent more often 
in the Not See compared to the See condition. However, very few children gave 
differing responses on the two conditions and there were no significant tendencies 
amongst these children to respond in the way described above. Therefore, the 
children in the present experiment seemed to have quite a good grasp of the 
pragmatic value of the utterance, and seemed to respond only to the information 
contained in the message instead of being influenced by knowledge of the 
speaker's representation. Interestingly, though, the 5-6-year-olds demonstrated a 
significant preference for saying that the speaker would pick the referent in the 
See condition and a nonreferent in the Not See condition, compared to the reverse. 
This suggests that although there was some difficulty for the youngest children in 
knowing how an ambiguous utterance influences the listener's knowledge state 
(there was a strong preference to say 'referent' in the See condition), they, 
nevertheless, seemed to recognise that the Not See condition was different, or 
problematical, in some way. 
Generally, the data from Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that children 
aged 5-10 years and adults aged 17 years and upwards tended not to use the 
speaker's internal representation as a criterion for utterance evaluation. However, 
it is not possible to tell whether children were answering in a similar way to adults 
Evaluating discrepant utterances 153 
for the same reasons. It could be that children were responding according to the 
utterance-array or utterance-meaning links, or they might have interpreted the 
Good Job question in a different way. For example, they could have said that the 
speaker had done a 'bad job' because he/she was not polite or because they didn't 
pronounce their words properly. Children were not asked to justify their responses 
for fear that this would be too difficult for them, however many children provided 
spontaneous explanations in Experiment 4.2. It was, therefore, decided that the 
same procedure would be repeated in Experiment 4.3 with the modification that 
children would be specifically asked to provide justifications to the Good Job 
question. 
Also, children were asked an additional Evaluation question in Experiment 
4.3. Rather than asking the children to interpret the utterance from the listener's 
perspective, as in Experiment 4.2, they were asked to evaluate the utterance from 
the listener's perspective. It seems clear that children have relatively few 
difficulties determining whether the listener will be able to choose the correct 
referent when they are asked to consider this directly. However, it is not clear how 
children might respond if they are asked to think explicitly about the quality of the 
utterance from the listener's point of view. It might be that children are more 
likely to consider the role of the speaker's representation if they are forced to 
think about the communication on behalf of one of the protagonists rather than 
simply as an uninvolved 'onlooker'. Keysar {1994) argues that a more naturalistic 
way of eliciting utterance evaluations from children is for them to consider what 
might happen next. As he points out ' ... people do not normally judge perceived 
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intentions in an explicit manner ... but they do habitually predict others' behavior' 
(Keysar, 1994; p.184). 
In Experiment 4.3, children were asked to predict whether the listener 
protagonist would ask the speaker for more information about the referent or 
whether they would just go to the mentioned location. This question requires an 
implicit inference about the listener's perception of the adequacy of the 
communication. If the child judges that the listener would ask for more 
information from the speaker, then it can be assumed that the child thinks the 
utterance is inadequate in some way (Lloyd, 1992). By contrast, ifthe child judges 
that the listener would just go to the mentioned location, it can be inferred that the 
message is perceived to be adequate. Evidence of children taking into account the 
speaker's internal representation should take the form of saying that the speaker 
did a 'good job' in the Not See condition and saying thatthe listener would just go 
to the location of the item. However, if the Ask More question allows children to 
consider the role of the speaker's representation more easily than the Good Job 
question, there might be a tendency to say that the listener would just go to the 
mentioned location, yet judge that the speaker had done a 'bad job'. 
Experiment 4.3 
4.3.1. Method 
4.3.1.1. Participants. A total of86 children were included. There were 29 
children from Year 1 (8 males, 21 females; mean age 6:0; range 5:7 to 6:6), 29 
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children from Year 3 (15 males, 14 females; mean age 7:11; range 7:4 to 8:5) and 
28 children from Year 5 (14 males, 14 females; mean age 9:11; range 9:6 to 10:6). 
All children attended a Voluntary Aided Catholic School in the West Midlands. 
4.3.1.2. Materials. All story scenarios were presented on A4 laminated 
card and illustrated using cartoon pictures. Each story was presented on a 
maximum of three separate cards. The story narratives were printed on the 
stimulus cards in 16pt Times Roman font. Responses were recorded on pre-
prepared data sheets. 
4.3.1.3. Design. Participants received a total of three story scenarios; one 
in each of the following experimental conditions: See, Not See and Control. The 
order of experimental conditions was rotated between participants and participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the possible rotations. Condition was mapped 
on to the type of story scenario, which was fixed across all participants. 
Participants were asked two main test questions and the order in which these 
appeared was counterbalanced across subjects and conditions. 
4.3.1.4 Procedure. Children were introduced to the task in the same way 
as the previous study and told that there were no right or wrong answers. The 
three story scenarios were Bike, Picture and Coat. The Bike and Picture stories 
were identical to those in the previous study, but the Coat story contained some 
modifications. In pilot work with adults, it was noted that there could be 
differential responding in the Coat story because of a status imbalance between 
the adult teacher (speaker) and the child (listener). As a result, the story was 
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changed to include two child protagonists. The modified Coat story is outlined 
below. 
Children were shown the first page of the story and the experimenter read 
the story aloud. For example, in the Coat story the first picture shows the 
protagonist hanging his coat above some bookshelves at a Youth Club. There are 
no other coats on any of the available pegs. The narrative for all experimental 
conditions began: 
'Nathan arrives at the Youth Club and hangs his coat above the 
bookshelves. His is the only coat hanging there.' * In the Control condition, the 
next picture children saw was of Nathan standing outside, talking to his friend 
Sam. The narrative continued: *'Whilst Sam and Nathan are outside playing, Sam 
decides to fetch a ball for their game. Nathan asks her if she could get his coat 
because he is cold. Sam asks how she will know which coat is Nathan's. He says 
"It's the one above the bookshelves." ' 
Between the points marked * the narrative included additional information 
in the other two conditions. In the See condition, children were shown a picture of 
Nathan looking at the hooks above the bookshelves, whilst more coats were added 
to the array by another person. There were now four different coats on the pegs 
(including Nathan's). Children were told 'Whilst Nathan waits for his friend, the 
youth leader moves some coats from a chair and hangs them up next to Nathan's. 
So there are lots of coats above the bookshelves now.' In the Not See condition, 
the picture showed the same person putting the four coats on the pegs, but Nathan 
was not shown to be watching the transfer. This time, children were told 'After 
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Nathan has gone outside, the club leader moves some coats from a chair and 
hangs them next to Nathan's. So there are lots of coats above the bookshelves 
now. • The picture showing the initial array and the picture showing the final array 
were both visible when children were asked to evaluate the utterances. Children 
were asked the following two test questions in counterbalanced order: 
(1) Ask More: Do you think Sam just goes to fetch the coat, OR does she 
ask Nathan any more about it? (the order of the action option of the 
listener was counterbalanced.) If the child indicated that the listener 
would ask for more information, they were asked to elaborate what 
kind of information would be asked for. 
(2) Good Job: Did Nathan do a good job of saying exactly which coat was 
his? Why/why not? 
Children were seen individually in a quiet room. After the procedure they 
were thanked for their help and given a sticker for their cooperation. 
4.3.2. Results. 
4.3.2.1. Evaluation questions. Children could either judge that the listener 
protagonist would ask for more information about the referent, or that they would 
just go to find the requested item. In addition, they could judge whether the 
speaker had done a good or a bad job of saying exactly which item they wanted. 
Table 4.12 contains a summary of children's a n ~ w e r s s to the two test questions. 
On a group basis, the 5-6 year-olds tended to judge positively on the Good 
Job question irrespective of experimental condition. Only one child in the Control 
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and three in the See and Not See conditions said that the speaker did not do a good 
job of saying exactly which item he/she wanted. By contrast, the 9-1 0-year-olds 
judged in the opposite way to the youngest children, with the majority judging 
negatively on all three conditions. The 7-8-year-olds were more divided in their 
responses. Just under half of the group (48%) responded positively in the Control 
condition, and 34% judged positively in the See condition. Children were slightly 
less willing to judge positively in theN ot See condition with 31% judging that the 
speaker had done a good job of saying exactly which item he/she wanted. 
Table 4.12: Summary of the total numbers (and percentages) of children in each 
Year Group answering yes or no to the Good Job question and ask more or just go 
to the Ask More question. 
Number Year 1 (5-6 years) Year 3 (7 -8 years) Year 5 (9-10 years) 
(%ge) 
Good Job? Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Control 28 (97) 1 (3) 14 (48) 15 (52) 4 (14) 24 (86) 
See 26 (90) 3 (10) 10 (34) 19 (66) 3 (11) 25 (89) 
Not See 26 (90) 3 (10) 9 (31) 20 (69) 2 (7) 26 (93) 
Ask Ask Just go Ask Just go Ask Just go 
More? more more more 
Control 16 (55) 13 (45) 20 (69) 9 (31) 2 ~ ~ (75) 7 (25) 
See 21 (72) 8 (28) 22 (76) 7 (24) 26 (93) 2 (7) 
Not See 16 (55) 13 (45) 23 (79) 6 (21) 23 (82) 5 (18) 
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For the Ask More question, the majority of 7-8 and 9-10-year-olds 
responded similarly across all three conditions saying that the listener would ask 
for more information from the speaker, rather than just go straight to the 
mentioned location. This tendency was also found amongst the 5-6-year-olds in 
the See condition. The youngest group showed a less clear preference in the 
Control and Not See conditions with 16 children judging that the listener would 
ask for more information in both cases, and 13 children judging that the listener 
would just go straight to the mentioned location. 
4.3.2.2. Comparisons between conditions (see Table 4.13 for a summary 
of responses). 
4.3.2.2. (a) Good Job Question; See versus Not See: Children in each 
year group gave very similar patterns of responses to their counterparts in the 
previous study. For all three groups, there were no significant preferences for 
answering 'good job' in one condition and 'bad job' in another. 
4.3.2.2. (b) Good Job Question; Control versus Not See: There were 
very few children who gave differing responses in Years 1 and 5 ( 4 and 2 
respectively). Slightly more children gave differing responses in Year 3, but there 
was no significant preference to answer in a particular way. Nine 7-8-year-olds 
judged 'bad job' for Not See and 'good job' for Control and four gave the reverse 
pattern, but this difference was not significant. 
4.3.2.2. (c) Good Job Question; Control versus See: Amongst the 7-8-
year-olds, more children judged 'bad job' for See and 'good job' for Control (n = 
6) compared to the opposite pattern (n = 2), but numbers were too small for 
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analysis. This was also true for the children in Years 1 and 5, where very few 
children gave differing responses to the two conditions ( 4 and 3 children 
respectively). 
Generally, the majority of the youngest children judged positively across 
all conditions, whilst the majority ofthe oldest children judged negatively across 
all conditions. The 7-8-year-olds were more mixed in their responses. There was a 
majority preference to judge negatively for all conditions, but this tendency was 
not as marked as for the 9-1 0-year-olds. 
Table 4.13: Summary of the number of responses to the Good Job question 
between conditions for Years 1, 3 and 5. 
Patterns of responses between conditions 
Year *See versus Not See Control versus Not Control versus See 
Group See 
Response Good Bad Job Good Bad Job Good Bad Job 
to the 
Good Job Job Job Job 
question 
Year1 Good Job 25 1 25 3 25 3 
Bad Job 1 2 1 0 1 0 
Year3 Good Job 6 4 5 9 8 6 
Bad Job 3 16 4 11 2 13 
YearS Good Job 2 1 2 2 2 2 
Bad Job 0 25 0 24 1 23 
.. . . 
* The first Condition mentioned corresponds to the Vertical and the second Condition mentioned 
refers to the horizontal. 
Evaluating discrepant utterances 161 
4.3.2.2. (d) Ask More Question; See versus Not See: (Responses are 
summarised in Table 4.14). For all three groups, very few children changed their 
responses between conditions and numbers were too small to compute statistical 
analyses. 
4.3.2.2. (e) Ask More Question; Control versus Not See: Again, there 
were only a few children in each Year Group who gave differing responses in the 
two conditions, and numbers were too small for analysis. 
Table 4.14: Summary of the number of responses to the Ask More question 
between conditions for Years 1, 3 and 5. 
Patterns of responses between conditions 
Year *See versus Not See Control versus Not Control versus See 
Group See 
Response Ask Just go Ask Just go Ask Just go 
to the Ask more more more 
More 
question 
Year1 Ask more 15 6 12 4 15 1 
Just go 1 7 4 9 6 7 
Year3 Ask more 18 4 17 3 17 3 
Just go 5 2 6 3 5 4 
Year5 Ask more 23 3 20 1 20 1 
Just go 1 1 4 3 6 1 
.. . . 
* The first Cond1t1on mentioned corresponds to the vertical and the second Condition mentioned 
refers to the horizontal. 
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4.3.2.2. (f) Ask More Question; Control versus See: The same pattern 
was repeated here, with only very small numbers of children altering evaluations 
between conditions. Generally, then, like the pattern for the Good Job question, 
the two older groups of children showed a preference for saying that the listener 
would ask for more information from the speaker across all conditions. However, 
unlike the Good Job question, the 5-6-year-olds seemed more inclined to evaluate 
the Ask More question negatively, with the modal response indicating that the 
listener would ask for more information. 
4.3.2.3. Comparing responses on Good Job and Ask More: Each 
evaluation question can be considered a separate measure of message adequacy 
(see Table 4.15 for a summary of frequency of responses). Firstly, McNemar x2 
analyses examined whether participants tended to answer the two questions 
differently, within each condition. 
For all three experimental conditions, the 5-6-year-olds judged that the 
speaker had done a good job, of saying exactly which item he/she wanted, but, 
nevertheless, that the listener would ask for more information from the speaker 
(compared to saying 'badjob' and 'just go') [Control: McNemarx,2 (corrected, df 
= 1, n = 17) = 11.5, n<0.005; Not See: McNemar x,2 (corrected, df= 1, n = 19) = 
7.6, n<0.01; See: McNemar x,2 (corrected, df = 1, n = 20) = 14.4, n<0.005]. By 
contrast, very few 7-8 or 9-1 0-year-olds gave inconsistent replies to the questions. 
Amongst the children giving different responses to the two questions, numbers 
were either too small for analysis or there were no significant preferences to 
respond in a particular pattern for any of the experimental conditions. 
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Secondly, general ·l analyses, or Fisher's Exact test in the case of small 
expected frequencies, examined whether there was a significant contingency 
between type of response, within each condition. Even though a majority of7-8 
and 9-IO-year olds answered both evaluation questions negatively (saying 'bad 
job' and 'ask more'), there were no significant trends within the data to suggest 
that participants treated the two questions similarly. 
Table 4.15: Summary of responses to the Ask More and Good Job questions for 
each condition for children in Years I, 3 and 5. 
Condition 
Year Control See Not See 
Group 
Ask Just go Ask Just go Ask Just go 
more more more 
Year I Good Job I6 I2 I9 7 I6 IO 
Bad Job 0 I 2 I 0 3 
Year3 Good Job 9 5 
' 
8 2 6 3 
Bad Job 11 4 I4 5 I7 3 
YearS Good Job 3 I 3 0 2 0 
Bad Job IS 6 23 2 22 4 
4.3.2.4. Order Effects: Data for the Good Job and Ask More questions 
were analysed separately. Frequencies for answering either 'good job' or 'bad 
job', and 'ask more' or 'just go' were summed across year groups, for each 
experimental condition, and submitted to chi-squared analysis. There were no 
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significant order effects associated with question order, that is, whether the Ask 
More question appeared first or second. There were also no significant effects 
associated with rotation for the Good Job question. There was, however, a 
significant effect of rotation for the Ask More question in the Control condition 
[x,2 (df= 2, n = 86) = 13.55, n<0.005]. Examining the data in Table 4.16, below, it 
seems that this effect arises because of a peculiarity in responding in Rotation 2. 
When the Control condition appeared last in the sequence of stories, children were 
much less likely to judge that the listener would ask the speaker for more 
information about the referent, compared to the other two rotations in which the 
Control condition appeared earlier in the sequence. 
Table 4.16: Numbers of responses to the Ask More question, across year groups, 
for each rotation. 
Rotation 1 Rotation 2 Rotation 3 
C o n t r o V S ~ o t S e e e See/Not See/Control Not See/ControVSee 
Ask More 24 11 22 
Just Go 6 17 6 
4.3.2.5. Justifications - Good Job question. Justifications were coded 
according to the criteria specified in the previous experiment and summarised in 
Table 4.17. There was a 94% level of agreement between raters. The 5-6-year-
olds provided very few justifications since they mostly evaluated positively and 
found it very difficult to explain why. Therefore, there are no justification data 
from the youngest group of children. Also, there were very few positive 
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evaluations amongst the two older groups of children and so only justifications for 
negative evaluations will be included. 
Table 4.17: Types of justifications provided in Years 3 and 5 for answering the 
Good Job question negatively. 
Number I 2 3 3a 4 5 6 7 
of Multiple Single Not Enough Speaker' Listener' No Hypoth 
responses objects object enough Info smental smental answer/ -eticals 
(%ge) info state state Don't 
know 
Control 
Year3 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 8 
(35) (47) 
Year5 0 0 I2 0 0 4 0 8 
(50) (33) 
See 
Year3 I2 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 
(67) (33) 
Year5 I3 0 8 0 0 I 0 3 
(52) (32) 
Not See 
Year3 8 0 IO 0 0 0 0 0 
(42) (53) 
Year5 6 0 IO 0 0 4 0 3 
(25) (42) 
Both groups of children gave very similar justifications in the Control 
condition for why the speaker had not done a good job of saying exactly which 
item he/she wanted. The 7-8 and 9-IO-year-olds stated that the speaker either did 
not describe the referent in enough detail or they invoked hypothetical changes 
that could occur to render the utterance ambiguous. By contrast, the modal 
response in the See condition, for both groups, was to mention the multiple similar 
objects in the array. In addition, a third of the 9-IO-year-olds preferred to mention 
explicitly the quality of the utterance, saying that the speaker did not provide 
8 
Other 
I 
0 
0 
0 
I 
(5) 
I 
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enough information about the referent A very similar pattern of explanations was 
found in the Not See condition, with responses being divided mostly between the 
ambiguous array and the lack of information in the utterance. Only the Year 5 
children made any mention of mental states, and even then, this was confined to 
the listener's mental state (i.e. the utterance was no good because the listener 
would not have known which item the speaker was referring to). 
4.3.2.6. Elaborations - Ask More question. Following Ironsmith & 
Whitehurst (1978), children's requests for more information were coded into 
either general or specific categories. Category I - General - included statements 
that would prove largely uninformative for the listener in terms of disambiguating 
information e.g. 'When did you want to buy it?'; 'How much is it'; 'Where in the 
school is the picture?' Category 2- Specific- included statements that mentioned 
a particular attribute of the referent, or indicated that the appearance of the object 
needed to be described in more detail, in order to help the listener disambiguate 
the utterance e.g. 'What colour is it?'; 'What does it look like?'; 'Is there only one 
picture next to the clock?' There was also a third category which included the 
children who did not give an answer and also 8 responses that did not seem to fit 
in either of the first two categories e.g. 'she tells her Dad to ask her more 
questions'; 'more people might have hung their coats up'; 'because all are above 
the bookshelf.' A 10% sample of elaborations was coded (cf. Camaioni et al., 
1998) by an independent rater. A 94% level of agreement was obtained between 
the experimenter and the second coder. The kinds of information that children 
judged would be asked for by the listener are summarised in Table 4.18. 
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Table 4.18: Children's suggestions of information asked for by the listener, 
according to Year Group and experimental condition. 
Number 1: General 2: Specific 3: Other Totals 
(%ge) 
Year! 4 (25) 9 (56) 3 (19) 16 
Control Year3 6 (30) 13 (65) 1 (5) 20 
Year5 7 (33) 12 (57) 2 (10) 21 
Year! 8 (38) 12 (57) 1 (5) 21 
See Year3 4 (18) 16 (73) 2 (9) 22 
Year5 4 (15) 19 (73) 3 (11) 26 
Year! 7 (44) 8 (50) 1 (6) 16 
Not see Year3 6 (26) 16 (70) 1 (4) 23 
Year5 6 (26) 15 (65) 2 (9) 23 
Children in all three year groups gave very similar responses in the 
Control condition. Between a quarter and a third of the children gave general 
statements and between a half and two-thirds provided more specific information 
about the referent Given that the utterance was unambiguous in this condition, 
however, it was not so crucial for children to recognise the need to provide more 
specific information. In the See and Not See conditions, where the utterance was 
ambiguous, the 7-8 and 9-10-year-olds tended to give more specific information 
than the 5-6-year-olds. There was also a corresponding decrease in more general 
questions amongst the two older groups. 
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To examine whether the older children were significantly more likely to 
provide specific suggestions for more information compared to the youngest 
group, the General and Other categories were combined and compared against the 
Specific category. Separate x.2 analyses were performed between pairs of year 
groups within each condition. Yates' Continuity Correction was applied in each 
case. There were no significant differences between any of the year groups in any 
ofthe conditions. 
4.3.3. Discussion. 
The results for the Good Job question replicate those in Experiment 4.2. In 
the See and Not See conditions, there was an overall preference to judge 
positively in the youngest group of children, moving through to mainly negative 
judgments in the older children. The inclusion of the justification question 
confirmed that the 7-8 and 9-10-year-old children were answering the Good Job 
question in the same way as the adults in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. Children 
judged that the speaker had done a 'bad job' in the See and Not See conditions 
either because of the ambiguity of the array or because of the failure of the 
utterance to adequately specify an item in the array. Generally, there was very 
little evidence to suggest that children evaluated utterances on the basis of the 
speaker's representation in the Not See condition, since very few of the older 
children said that the speaker did a good job of saying exactly which item he/she 
wanted. 
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Also in line with the results from Experiment 4.2, was the tendency to 
judge the Control condition more negatively with increasing age. However, this 
tendency was much more pronounced in the present sample of children with 86% 
of the 9-10-year-olds answering in this way (compared to 37% of this age group 
in the previous experiment). The 7-8-year-olds were fairly equally divided 
between saying 'good job' or 'bad job', whereas the 5-6-year-olds again judged 
positively. It is impossible to tell whether the youngest group were saying 'good 
job' for the right reasons (i.e. because the utterance can only refer to one item, it 
must be adequate), since they had great difficulty in providing explanations, or 
whether it was due to their lack of understanding about the utterance being an 
independent object of scrutiny. The latter is suggested by the finding that children 
this age did not discriminate between conditions in their evaluations, either in 
response to the Good Job or the Ask More question. 
The older children did not discriminate significantly between conditions 
either, but their justifications suggest that they were evaluating negatively for 
sensible reasons. In all three conditions, the majority of the 7-10-year-olds 
answered that the speaker had not done a good job of saying exactly which item 
he/she wanted. In the See and Not See conditions these children were sensitive to 
the ambiguity between the utterance and the array, and often stated this as the 
reason why the speaker had done a 'bad job.' The tendency to judge that the 
listener would ask for more information in the Control condition seemed to derive 
from an alternative basis, at least for some of the children. Like the children in 
Experiment 4.2, the 7-8 and 9-1 0-year-olds tended to invoke hypothetical changes 
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that could render the utterance ambiguous. Therefore, many children were not 
saying that the listener would ask for more information because they considered 
the utterance to be inadequate at that time but because, in the future, it might be. It 
is interesting that children were less likely to reason in this way if they saw the 
Control story last. This suggests that once children had been given the opportunity 
to contrast the Control condition against the See and Not See conditions, they 
were more likely to think the utterance was adequate. Overall, then, it seems that 
children were unwilling to treat informative messages as sufficient either because 
the utterance did not describe specific attributes of the referent, or because they 
reasoned about the possibility that the array could change. 
It is possible that the older children did not discriminate significantly 
between conditions because they were not sensitive to the differences between 
them. That is, the results could indicate that the conditions did not successfully 
represent different kinds of scenario, at least as far as the children were concerned. 
However, as described in the previous paragraph, the older children's 
justifications for their responses suggest that they understood the ambiguity of the 
utterances presented in the See and Not See conditions, and often stated different 
reasons for evaluating negatively in the Control condition. This suggests that 
children were aware of the differences between the scenarios in terms of actual 
versus possible ambiguity engendered by the utterance. 
There was also a failure to demonstrate that children were treating the two 
evaluation questions consistently, despite the fact that there was a majority 
preference amongst the 7-10-year-old children, in most conditions, to evaluate 
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negatively both times. This could indicate that the evaluation questions were not 
interpreted as being about message adequacy, resulting in children responding 
negatively for other reasons. However, again, children's justifications of their 
responses to the Good Job question suggest that they were attuned to message 
adequacy. Additionally, the type of information that children said the listener 
would ask for from the speaker supports the idea that children were sensitive to 
the reason why the utterance was problematical. Around half of the 5-6-year-olds 
and between two-thirds and three-quarters of the older children provided specific 
suggestions for the kind of information that would be asked for by the listener in 
the See and Not See conditions; allowing them to disambiguate the utterance. This 
tendency was also found in the Control condition, which could indicate that 
children were simply responding according to a general 'conversational' rule. 
That is, children said that the listener would ask for more information because 
they thought that was how listeners should normally behave. 
However, children were aware that there was something specific about the 
referent that could be described in order to help the listener pick it out; they gave 
sensible and relevant suggestions about the kind of questions a listener might ask. 
If they were simply responding according to the idea that the listener should ask 
for more information, but not know why the information is required, their 
suggestions would tend to be superfluous, nonsensical or irrelevant. These latter 
types of responses were more common amongst the youngest group of children 
compared to the other two groups, although not significantly so. Nevertheless, it is 
still reassuring that at least half of the 5-6-year-olds who said that the listener 
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would ask for more information were able to give specific suggestions about 
additional information that was required, and they did not differ significantly from 
the older children in this respect Therefore, the lack. of significant results 
concerning consistency of interpretation are likely to be due to the very small 
numbers of children who associated 'good job' and 'just go' when evaluating 
utterances, rather than due to children providing random answers. 
Even though it was not possible to demonstrate a significant effect 
amongst the 7-10-year-old children, the results generally suggest that children 
older than 6 years tended to treat the two evaluation questions similarly. That is, 
their explanations in the See and Not See conditions were often concerned with 
the ambiguity between the utterance and the array. Contrary to the original 
prediction, then, there was no evidence that older children found the Ask More 
question 'easier' in terms of judging according to the speaker's representation in 
the Not See condition; they very rarely indicated the speaker would just go to the 
mentioned location. Instead, they seemed to be focused on the pragmatic utility of 
the utterance, whether they had to judge from their own, or the listener's, 
perspective. 
The final experiment of this chapter explored whether adults answered in a 
similar way to the children. Adult participants were presented with story scenarios 
identical to those presented to children in Experiment 4.3. The inclusion of this 
group was necessary given the equivocal results from the adult group in 
Experiment 4.2. In addition, it was necessary to determine how adults answered 
the Ask More question. Given the lack of inclusion of the speaker's representation 
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by the children in the previous experiment, it was necessary to see whether this 
was a response that would be favoured even by the adult group. If adults do 
incorporate the speaker's representation into their judgments in the Not See 
condition, this will be indicated by judgments of message adequacy i.e. that the 
speaker did a 'good job' and the listener will just go to the mentioned location. 
Experiment 4.4. 
4.4.1. Method. 
4.4.1.1. Participants. 193 students were included with a mean age of 19:8 
(range 18:0 to 33:11). There were 125 females and 51 males (17 respondents did 
not provide this information). All were undergraduates at the University of 
Birmingham studying either Psychology or History. 
4.4.1.2. Materials. All story scenarios were presented on a single A4 page 
(one story per page). Story narratives were printed in 12pt font beneath black and 
white cartoon illustrations. Test questions were printed beneath the stories, with 
sufficient space for answers to be written. 
4.4.1.3. Design and Procedure. The adults participated in a between-
subjects design, rather than the within-subjects design presented to the children. 
This facilitated administration of the task. Consequently, participants received one 
story scenario only, in one of the following experimental conditions: Control, See 
or Not See. Each condition appeared in each of the three story scenarios, which 
were identical to those presented to the children (Bike, Picture and Coat). 
Stimulus sheets were randomly distributed to students in a lecture theatre. Pre-task 
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instructions to participants emphasised that there were no right or wrong answers. 
Students were also told that they should read through the story before answering 
the questions in the order in which they appeared on the sheet. Participants were 
presented with exactly the same pictures and narratives as those presented to the 
children, and were asked identical test questions, presented in counterbalanced 
order: 
(1) Evaluation - Good Job: Did (speaker) do a good job of saying exactly which 
(item) he wanted/ was his? Why/why not? 
(2} Evaluation - Ask More: Do you think (listener) just goes to fetch the (item), or 
does he/she ask (speaker) any more about it? (the order ofthe action option of the 
listener was counterbalanced). 
4.4.2. Results. 
4.4.2.1. Evaluation Questions. There were no significant differences in 
the way the Psychology and History undergraduates responded and so results are 
combined across the two groups. Each participant was coded according to whether 
they answered yes or no to the Good Job questions, and whether they judged that 
the listener would ask the speaker for more information about the referent or not. 
A summary of the total number of responses for each condition is included in 
Table 4.19. Preliminary analyses showed that there were no significant effects 
associated with question order. 
Generally, there was a tendency amongst the adult participants to say that 
the speaker had done a 'bad job' in the Control and See conditions, and a 'good 
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job' in the Not See condition. Also, there was a trend across all three experimental 
conditions to say that the listener would ask for more information about the 
referent. 
Table 4.19: Total number of responses (and percentages) to the Ask More and 
Good Job questions for each condition. 
Question Response Number of responses(%) 
Control See Not See 
Yes 23 (34) 9 (14) 36 (65) 
Good Job? 
No 45 (66) 57 (86) 19 (35) 
Yes 56 (82) 40 (61) 38 (69) 
Ask More? 
No 12(18) 26 {39) 17 (31) 
4.4.2.2. Between-group comparisons. For the following analyses, each 
question was considered separately. 
4.4.2.2. (a) Good Job Question. There was a significant difference 
between the Control and See conditions in terms of the number of yes and no 
responses [x.2 (corrected, df= 1, n = 134) = 6.4, ~ < 0 . 0 2 5 ] . . The majority response 
for both conditions was to say that the speaker had done a 'bad job', but this 
response was more common in the See condition. Also, participants were 
significantly more likely to say that the speaker had done a 'good job' in the Not 
See compared to the Control condition [x.2 (corrected, df = 1, n = 123) = 8.4, 
~ < 0 . 0 0 5 ] . . Finally, the number ofyes and no responses also differed significantly 
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between the See and Not See conditions [x.2 (corrected, df= 1, n = 121) = 32.3, 
}2<0.005]. Participants were much more likely to say that the speaker had done a 
'good job' in Not See than in See. 
4.4.2.2. (b) Ask More Question. There were no significant differences in 
responding between the Not See and Control conditions, or between the Not See 
and See conditions. However, the Control and See conditions did differ 
significantly in terms of the number of 'ask more' and 'just go' responses [x.2 
(corrected, df= 1, n = 134) = 6.7, Q<0.01]. Paradoxically, adults were more likely 
to judge that the listener would ask for more information in the Control condition, 
and more likely to say that the listener would 'just go' in the See condition. 
4.4.2.3. Comparing responses on Good Job and Ask More: The 
following analyses looked at whether participants responded inconsistently on the 
two questions (e.g. saying 'good job' and 'ask more'), and, if so, whether there 
was a tendency for them to respond negatively on one particular question (data are 
summarised in Table 4.20). 
Participants in the Control and Not See conditions were significantly more 
likely to say that the speaker had done a 'good job' and the listener would ask for 
more information, compared to the reverse [Control: McNemarx_2 (corrected, df= 
1, n = 23) = 4.3, }2<0.05; Not See: McNemar x.2 (corrected, df= 1, n = 31) = 10.4, 
12<0.005]. By contrast, the opposite pattern was found in the See condition, where 
there was a significant trend for participants to say that the speaker had done a 
'bad job' and yet the listener would just go to the location of the referent, 
compared to the reverse [McNemar x_2 (corrected, df= 1, n = 23) = 11.1, }2<0.005]. 
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Table 4.20: Summary of responses to the Ask More and Good Job questions by 
undergraduate students for each condition. 
Condition 
Control See Not See 
Ask More? Ask more Just go Ask more Just go Ask more Just go 
Good Job? 
Good Job 17 6 3 6 25 11 
Bad Job 39 6 37 20 13 6 
As in Experiment 4.3, general x2 analyses or Fisher's Exact test in the case 
of small expected frequencies, examined whether there was a significant 
contingency between type of response, within each condition. The majority 
response in the Control and See conditions was to say 'bad job' and 'ask more', 
but this preference was not significant in either condition. The majority response 
in the Not See condition was to say 'good job' and 'ask more', but again this trend 
did not yield a significant result. 
4.4.2.4. Justifications - Good Job Question. Justifications were coded 
according to the criteria specified in the previous experiment and are summarised 
in Table 4.21 below. There was a 96% interrater reliability. 
The majority of participants who indicated that the speaker had done a 
'good job' in the Control condition, justified their response with respect to the 
array. That is, they mentioned that there was only one item on display (64%). The 
justifications for those answering negatively in the Control condition were mainly 
split between two categories: 42% said that the speaker had done a 'bad job' 
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because they had not provided enough information about the referent, and a 
further 44% mentioned hypothetical scenarios (e.g. the message was no good 
because there 'could be more bikes added to the window'). 
Table 4.21: Types ofjustifications provided by undergraduate students according 
to condition and response to the Good Job question. 
Number 1 2 3 3a 4 5 6 7 
of Multiple Single Not Enough Speaker' Listener' No Hypoth 
responses objects object enough Info smental smental answer/ -eticals (%ge) info state state Don't 
know 
Control 
Yes 0 14 0 4 1 0 0 1 
(64) (18.2) 
No 1 0 19 0 0 2 0 20 
(42) (44) 
See 
Yes 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 
No 26 0 19 0 6 2 0 1 
(46) (33) 
Not See 
Yes 0 9 0 1 24 0 0 0 
(25) (67) 
No 4 0 6 0 4 1 0 1 
(21) (31) (21) 
In the See condition, the vast majority of participants gave negative 
evaluations and the modal justification was to mention the multiple similar items 
in the array (46%). A substantial proportion (33%) preferred to focus on the 
utterance, saying that the speaker did not provide enough information about the 
referent. There were also a few respondents who explicitly mentioned the 
speaker's mental state (I 0%). For example, they said that the speaker did not do a 
'good job' because 'he knew there were other coats there.' 
8 
Other 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
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By contrast. most of the people evaluating positively in the Not See 
condition made reference to the speaker's mental state ( 67% ). That is, they tended 
to say that the speaker had done a 'good job' because, for example, 'her 
description was sufficient according to her knowledge.' A further 25% of 'good 
job' justifications fell into the Single Object category. For example, statements 
such as 'there was only one when he walked past', and 'there was only one bike at 
the time he looked' were included in this category rather than in category 4 
because the speaker's mental state was not mentioned explicitly. Justifications for 
negative evaluations in the Not See condition were more varied, with the majority 
split between three different categories: Multiple objects in the array (21 %), 
Speaker's mental state {21 %) and Speaker not providing enough information 
(31%). 
4.4.3. Discussion. 
In line with the adults in Experiment 4.1, there was a significant tendency 
to judge the utterance positively in the Not See condition compared to See. 
Therefore, even though the relationship between the utterance and the array was 
ambiguous in both cases, the adult participants often preferred to use the speaker's 
belief state in the Not See condition as the main criterion for evaluation, compared 
to the utterance-array relationship in the See condition. Again, this is supported by 
the types of justifications provided, since the majority of explanations for positive 
evaluations made explicit reference to the speaker's mental state. However, like 
the children in Experiment 4.2 and the children and the Sixth-form students in 
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Experiment 4.3. there was also a significant tendency for adult participants to 
judge that the speaker had done a 'bad job' in the Control condition (66%). Just 
under half of the justifications for these negative evaluations made reference to 
future hypothetical scenarios, whereas a similar percentage indicated that the 
speaker had not provided enough information. Therefore, like the older groups of 
children in Experiment 4.3 and the Sixth-form students in Experiment 4.2, there 
was a noticeable trend for participants to treat the sufficiently informative 
utterance as not 'good enough', and to respond according to an hypothetical state 
of affairs, not included in the story. 
There was a strong tendency for participants to treat the informative 
utterance as inadequate when they responded to the Ask More question. Indeed, 
judgments that the listener would ask for more information were significantly 
more common in the Control condition than in the See condition. There was a 
preference for negative judgments in response to the Good Job question also, 
perhaps suggesting that the majority of adult participants treated the utterance 
similarly in the Control and See conditions. That is, the modal response in each 
condition was to say that the speaker had done a 'bad job' and the listener would 
ask for more information. However, this trend was not significant in either the 
Control or the See condition. Overall, treating the two evaluation questions 
similarly was no more common than treating the questions inconsistently. This 
should not be surprising, given the significant trends to treat the questions 
differently in all three conditions. Possible reasons for why the questions were 
treated differently in each condition are explored in section 4.3. 
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In the Not See condition, adults were significantly more likely to say that 
the speaker had done a 'good job', yet judged that the listener would ask for more 
information, compared to the opposite response of 'bad job' and 'just go'. The 
hypothesis concerning adults was that if they incorporated the speaker's internal 
representation into their 'good job' evaluations, then they would also tend to say 
that the listener would just go to the mentioned location, since both responses 
imply perceived message adequacy. 
However, there were only II participants who indicated that the speaker 
had done a 'good job' and the listener would just go to the mentioned location. 
The general patterns from the See and Not See conditions suggest that adults 
treated these conditions similarly in response to the Ask More question, but very 
differently in response to the Good Job question. There was a strong preference 
for adults to judge that the listener would ask for more information in both 
conditions, but evaluate positively ('good job') in Not See and negatively ('bad 
job') in See. In other words, when making judgments from the listener's 
perspective (Ask More question), adults evaluated problematical utterances 
pragmatically. This pragmatic focus was also evident in judgments from their own 
perspective in the See condition (Good Job question), but not in the Not See 
condition where participants often made reference to the speaker's belief state, 
rather than focusing on the relationship between the utterance and the array. 
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4.3. General Discussion. 
The main aim of the four experiments, was to explore the extent to which 
children, and adults, incorporate the speaker's internal representation in judgments 
of message adequacy when a criterion for evaluation is not specified by the test 
question. Participants were asked whether the speaker had done a 'good job of 
saying exactly which item he/she wanted' in a scenario in which the utterance was 
adequate as far as the speaker was concerned, but inadequate insofar as far as the 
referential array was concerned. Consequently, participants could choose to 
respond either according to the link between the utterance and the array, or 
according to the link between the utterance and the speaker's meaning. The adult 
participants responded quite differently to the children in one main respect. 
Generally, they were much more willing to evaluate according to the speaker's 
internal representation (say 'good job' in the Not See condition), when there was a 
choice of doing so, compared to the 7-8 and 9-10-year-old children, who almost 
never judged in this way. In other words, as far as the referential triangle is 
concerned, children seemed to focus on the relationship between the utterance and 
the array at the expense of the speaker's belief state. 
By contrast, the adults often preferred to make evaluations based on the 
utterance-meaning relationship. In terms of the suggestion made in the 
Introduction concerning the possibility of aU-shaped development of responses to 
the Good Job question (c£ Mitchell & Robinson, 1994), it was not clear at what 
age children might be more inclined to judge according to the speaker's 
representation rather than the utterance-array relationship. It turns out that moving 
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beyond the literal, pragmatic, interpretation of a problematical utterance Gudging 
'bad job') to include the speaker's representation Gudging 'good job') is a 
sophisticated response only available to adult participants. 
Nevertheless, between 35% and 87% of the adult participants still did not 
utilise the speaker's internal representation as the central criterion for evaluations, 
under some circumstances. The literature summarised in the Introduction suggests 
that even four-year-olds can attend to the speaker's nonliteral meaning if they are 
asked to make an interpretation of the utterance (Mitchell et al., 1999; Robinson & 
Mitchell, 1992; 1994), or if they are directed towards a specific criterion when 
making an evaluation ofthe utterance (Mitchell & Robinson, 1994). However, the 
present results suggest that even adults may not spontaneously attend to the 
speaker's internal representation for the purpose of utterance evaluation when 
they are not directed towards a specific criterion either by the test question or 
contextual detail. Instead, they often seem to assign greater weight to the literal 
reading of the utterance (i.e. how the very words of the utterance relate to the 
array; Olson, 1970). Mitchell et at., (1999) suggest that ' ... children who are aged 
about 7 years and older would not necessarily be captured by their initial literal 
reading because they are effective in considering a range of possible options, and 
selecting from them the one that seems most appropriate after considering 
additional factors (e.g. the state of the speaker's belief)' (p.61). For many adults in 
the present experiments, then, the speaker's belief state was not considered to be 
sufficiently important to merit a criterion for evaluation when an alternative literal 
criterion could be utilised. 
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Gilbert (1991) suggests that we initially accept a literal representation as 
true as part of the comprehension process. Arguing from a Spino zan perspective, 
he claims that' ... the acceptance of an idea is part of the automatic comprehension 
of that idea and ... the rejection of an idea occurs subsequent to, and more 
effortfully than, its acceptance' (p.107). That is, propositions expressed (e.g. in 
sentences) are automatically accepted and can only be 'unaccepted' in the 
presence of very strong cues or contrary evidence. In the context of the present 
experiments, most participants accepted the literal representation of the utterance 
and failed to move beyond it to consider the speaker's representation. It seems 
that when strong cues concerning the appropriate criterion for evaluation are 
absent, an acceptance of the literal reading of the utterance may be a default 
setting that occurs as part of a general cognitive process as we come to believe 
propositions that we see or hear. Moving beyond the literal reading requires more 
effort, and further processing, that can only be applied once the literal has already 
been comprehended (see also Mitchell, et al., 1999). 
Another main finding of interest was the tendency amongst the majority of 
groups to judge that the sufficiently informative utterance in the Control condition 
was inadequate. This was evidenced by the large percentage of older children and 
adults saying that the speaker had done a 'bad job' and judging that the listener 
would ask for more information from the speaker. In other words, many 
participants did not consider the utterance to be 'good enough' for effective 
communication and frequently required more information about the referent, even 
though this was redundant in terms of allowing a listener to select the correct item. 
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There is related evidence that children, and even adults, are not always 
satisfied by simple, contrastive messages and tend to prefer verbal redundancy in 
some circumstances. Whitehurst (1976) and Sonnenschein (1985) found that older 
children and adult speakers continued to include redundancy in their messages, 
because this was cognitively less demanding and often, more helpful, than 
excluding redundant information. The preference for redundancy, especially with 
large stimulus arrays, was also found for 8-year-olds and University students 
(Sonnenschein & Whitehurst, 1982) and 9-year-olds (Sonnenschein, 1982) when 
they were assigned to a listener's role. That is, older participants (but not those 
aged around 6 years) were more likely to find the correct target in a stimulus array 
when they heard a redundant message rather than a contrastive one (mentioning 
the minimum necessary to be informative). Perhaps more importantly, the 9-year-
olds in Sonnenschein (1982) were significantly more likely to judge that a 
message did not describe any of the pictures in an array when a message was 
contrastive rather than redundant. Simply, the children judged the message to be 
inadequate even though it was sufficiently informative. Lloyd (1991; 1992), using 
a more naturalistic paradigm coupled with discourse analysis, found that children, 
and adults ' ... continued to negotiate meaning after the standard measures of 
completion had been reached' (1991; p.188). That is participants continued to 
engage in task-related conversation after an adequate utterance had been 
formulated and/or a referent selected. Lloyd suggests that this is because speakers 
may often lack confidence in their utterances, but this cannot usually be 
demonstrated using traditional referential communication paradigms. 
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At the very least this finding suggests that children are not simply judging 
according to a mapping strategy in the Control condition. Such a strategy involves 
comparing the utterance to the array to determine if an item is uniquely specified 
or not. If this were the case, the majority of evaluations in this condition should 
have been positive. This strategy seemed to predominate in the See and Not See 
conditions, especially amongst the 7-8 and 9-10-year-olds, and was supported by 
the tendency to focus on the utterance-array link when justifying responses. 
However, the justifications provided for negative evaluations in the Control 
condition strongly hint that rather than relying on the information provided in 
front of them, participants often appealed to plausible, imaginary scenarios that 
could result in the utterance being rendered ambiguous. To borrow Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1982) terminology, participants seemed to use a simulation heuristic, 
in which they incorporated 'downhill changes' to make the scenario more 
realistic. A downhill change is defined as ' ... one that removes a surprising or 
unexpected aspect of the story, or otherwise increases its internal coherence' 
(p.205). Participants may have considered that the likelihood of only one bike 
remaining in the window (for example) was low, and instead, introduced changes 
to the scenario that would result in a more probable end-state (that more bikes 
would be added to the window). These changes were completed for the 
participants in the Not See and See conditions, perhaps making it more likely that 
they would respond only to the information contained in the story. 
However, there was still a significant minority of adult participants who 
said that the speaker had done a 'bad job' in the See condition, but also said that 
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the listener would just go to the mentioned location of the referent. Again, this is 
suggestive of participants including extra-contextual information in their 
reasoning. For example, the speaker in the See condition knowingly gives an 
ambiguous message, since they clearly witness the addition of more items to the 
array and yet still underspecify the referent. Participants could reason that the 
speaker is untrustworthy, and, presumably, the listener would also know this and 
so there would be little point in asking for more (equally uninformative) 
information. Sa and Stanovich (1999) and Nelson, Plesa and Henseler {1998} 
present direct evidence for the tendency of adult participants to 'complexify' 
theory of mind tasks by including other situational variables into story scenarios. 
In both studies, adults were asked to provide justifications for their responses to 
false belief tasks and many provided narratives that went beyond the given 
information. The finding that 7-8 and 9-10-year-olds also included hypothetical 
states in their justifications in the present experiments, suggests that this tendency 
also exists amongst younger participants. The main implication of this is that there 
needs to be some caution in assuming that children and adults are responding only 
on the basis of the logical or causal reasoning that is purposely manipulated by 
experimenters, and is argued to underlie the cognitive processing that is required 
by tasks like these. 
Despite the significant minority of adults making inconsistent evaluations 
in the See condition, the majority of the adults and the 7-10-year-old children 
judged negatively in this condition, saying that the speaker had done a 'bad job' 
and the listener would ask for more information. This pattern of responding was 
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common amongst the older children in the Not See condition, indicating that there 
was very little incorporation of the speaker's internal representation in children's 
judgments. 
This was not the case for the adult participants in Experiment 4.4 who 
showed a significant (and majority) preference to say that the speaker had done a 
'good job' but that the listener would ask for more information from the speaker 
in the Not See condition. This suggests that whilst the speaker's representation 
was included in Good I ob evaluations, the utterance was not deemed adequate 
from the listener's perspective. If the speaker was judged to have done a good job 
J 
of saying exactly which item she wanted, then, assuming that the listener also 
treats the utterance as a product of the speaker's mental model of reality, the 
listener should consider the utterance to be sufficiently informative. Instead, 
participants tended to use their own knowledge of reality as the primary criterion 
for their judgments; behaving as if the ambiguity of reference was transparent to 
the listener. In other words, judgments were based on the referential success of the 
utterance, rather than on the specific belief framework within which the utterance 
was produced. This tendency is consistent with research which suggests there is a 
'realism bias' which persists into adulthood in related theory of mind domains, for 
example, false beliefs (Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs & Nye, 1996} and appearance-
reality (Taylor & Mitchell, 1997). In both studies, adults were found to be 
significantly influenced by their own knowledge of reality, resulting in a difficulty 
making unbiased judgments either about what a story protagonist would believe, 
or about the shape of an object 
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However, this interpretation remains highly speculative given the tendency 
for adult participants to judge that the listener would ask for more information in 
the Control condition also. The justifications for responses to the Good Job 
question suggest that evaluations in the Control condition might have a different 
basis: namely, that participants often tend to invoke hypothetical changes rather 
than consider the status of the array. Therefore, the reality bias could be evident in 
adults' evaluations of ambiguous utterances, but the Control condition does not 
provide a sufficiently unambiguous contrast to allow the bias to be seen in the Not 
See condition. This possibility could be checked in a follow-up study, in which 
the likelihood that participants could respond according to hypothetical states of 
affairs in the Control condition is limited. It might be that adults find it difficult to 
evaluate utterances with respect to the belief states of the speakers and listeners 
involved. Instead, participants may make judgments based on their own 
knowledge of the referential success of the utterance, rather than the specific 
belief framework within which the utterance is produced. This suggests that there 
could be a more widespread difficulty with knowing how to tailor communication 
to the informational needs of a listener. 
4.4. Summary and Conclusion 
In summary, children in their middle school years tend to be heavily 
focused on the relationship between the utterance and the array when evaluating 
problematical utterances. This was the case whether children were asked to make 
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an evaluation from their own, or a listener protagonist's perspective. This 
tendency was evident even in the Not See condition where it was equally 
appropriate to respond either according to the array, or to the speaker's internal 
representation. Even children aged 9-10 years did not consider the role of the 
speaker's belief in the formation of an utterance, when there was no criterion for 
evaluation specified by the test question. 
By contrast, although around half of the adult participants did evaluate 
according to the speaker's representation when judging whether the speaker had 
done a 'good job' in the Not See condition, they tended to overapply a reality 
criterion when evaluating on behalf of the listener. In other words, even though 
many adult participants did consider the match between the speaker's belief and 
their utterance to be important, their knowledge about the discrepancy between 
utterance and reality tended to dominate their judgments. It seems that when 
thought content is not depicted directly, as in Chapter 3, children and adults tend 
to focus mostly on the utterance-array relationship rather than on the utterance-
meaning relationship. Consequently, there might be a tendency to under-include 
thought content by virtue of the fact that it is usually intangible and unobservable. 
Reality might be particularly salient for children, drawing their attention away 
from thought content (Mitchell, 1996). Similarly, Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe and 
Tidswell (1991) suggest that" ... for the young child physical knowledge is more 
salient than mental knowledge so that in circumstances where the two are in 
competition, the former wins out" (p.343). At least under the circumstances 
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presented in these experiments, it seems that this process might also apply to older 
children and adults. 
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CHAPTERS 
Does the realist bias in adult reasoning extend to evaluations of ambiguous 
utterances? 
5.1. Introduction 
In Experiment 4.4, a majority of adult participants evaluated a 
superficially ambiguous utterance positively, but, nevertheless, judged that the 
listener would ask the speaker for more information about the referent. It was 
suggested that this tendency may arise because the participants' own knowledge 
about the change in reality renders them unable to adopt the role of the listener 
objectively. That is. since the adults were quite happy to judge that the speaker 
had done a good job of saying exactly which item he/she wanted, they should also 
judge the message to be adequate from the perspective of the listener. However, 
they rarely judged in this way and, instead, seemed to be more influenced by the 
fact that the state of reality had altered - even though the speaker and listener 
protagonists did not know this. 
The problem with this interpretation was that participants also judged that 
the listener would ask for more information from the speaker in the Control 
condition. If participants' own knowledge of the state of the array formed the 
main basis of evaluations, then they should have said that the listener would 'just 
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go' to the mentioned location since there is only one item on display. However, 
participants tended to 'complexify' the stories in Experiment 4.4 by introducing 
extra-contextual information and hypothetical states of affairs. Consequently, 
judgments that the listener would ask for more information may have been based 
on information not actually contained in the story. 
In principle, then, the paradigm utilised in Chapter 4 allows scope for adult 
realism. It might be that adults are influenced by their own knowledge of reality in 
this context, but the Control condition did not provide a suitably unambiguous 
contrast to allow the bias to appear as a significant difference. The aim of the 
following two experiments was to investigate the possibility of a realism bias 
directly, with an improved Control condition. If adults show a significant 
tendency to be influenced by their own knowledge of reality when responding to 
utterances from other people, this could provide evidence that they experience 
difficulty treating utterances as the products of other minds. 
5.2. Background literature 
The tendency to base judgments on reality rather than belief originates in 
early childhood. Children aged 3-4 years demonstrate great difficulty 
understanding that a belief can be false, that is, that a belief can be discrepant in 
some way from the current state of reality (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). The 
interesting point is that this difficulty manifests itself in a very particular way. 
Children do not just make random errors or guesses when they get false belief 
tasks 'wrong'; instead, they make systematic realist errors (reporting the current 
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state of reality) when they should be reporting the content of the protagonist's 
false belief. For example, if Paul's chocolate has been moved from the drawer to 
the fridge in his absence, and the child participant is asked where Paul thinks the 
chocolate is, a typical3-year-old will say that Paul thinks the chocolate is actually 
in the fridge. Of course, this is the location where the child knows the chocolate is 
currently residing. However, a typical4-year-old will be able to answer according 
to Paul's belief and say that he will think the chocolate is in the drawer (where he 
left it). In short, the 3-year-old seems unable to separate their own knowledge of 
reality from someone else's. 
This problem in separating belief from reality extends to judgments about 
the appearance of objects. For example, in the classic appearance-reality task 
(Gopnik & Astington, 1988), a sponge is painted to look like a rock and 3-4-year-
olds are asked what the object looks like, what the object feels like and what they 
thought the object was when they first saw it. Normally developing 4-year-olds 
are able to make the distinction between what the object looks like and what they 
know about the object's true identity. By contrast, 3-year-olds will say that they 
thought the object was a sponge when they first saw it, even though upon first 
presentation they said it was a rock. Simply, they tend to confuse their own 
knowledge of reality (rock is really a sponge) with their prior belief about reality 
(the object is a rock). 
Pemer (1991) argues that the early difficulty with treating beliefs and 
reality as separable representations is a result of a deficit in conceptual 
understanding prior to the age of four years. Ferner's argument is that the child 
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undergoes a radical conceptual shift around the time of her fourth birthday, 
furnishing her with the new concept that beliefs are actually only representations 
of reality and may, therefore, also misrepresent reality. This view entails the 
acceptance that concept acquisition is an ali-or-none phenomenon. That is, the 
child will fail a false-belief task before acquiring the concept and pass it with ease 
once the concept has appeared. 
However, work by Mitchell and colleagues has challenged the notion of a 
radical representational shift at age four years. In Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs and 
Nye (1996), adult participants demonstrated a significant difficulty separating 
their own knowledge of reality from someone else's. The authors found that adults 
were significantly influenced by their own knowledge of whether an utterance was 
true or false when judging whether a listener protagonist would believe a message. 
Participants were presented with story scenarios in which they (the participants, 
but not the listener protagonist) were given privileged information about the truth 
or falsity of a speaker's utterance about the contents of a jug. Adults tended to 
judge that a message would be believed by a listener protagonist if they 
themselves knew that the message was true and disbelieved if they (the 
participant) knew the message to be false. The interpretation favoured by Mitchell 
et al. was that the adults tended to adopt a more sophisticated role-taking 
perspective and tried to interpret the message from the perspective of the listener. 
This led them to believe that it would have been impossible to reach any other 
conclusion than the one they knew to be true. 
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Additionally, Taylor & Mitchell (1997) presented adults with a 
sophisticated appearance-reality task. They found that participants who knew that 
an elliptical shape they were asked to view was really a circular disc, tended to 
significantly exaggerate the circularity of the disc when asked to reproduce the 
shape on a computer screen. This was contrasted with a group of participants who 
were not initially exposed to the actual shape of the disc. Their ability to match 
the viewed shape with the one on the computer screen was significantly more 
accurate than the informed group. These two studies together suggest that 
difficulties in separating belieffrom reality can continue into adulthood, albeit in a 
more subtle form. 
There is also evidence more closely related to utterance evaluation which 
suggests that a similar process occurs when adults are asked to make judgments 
about perceived intentions of speakers when reading story vignettes. Keysar 
(1994) asked participants to take the perspective of a listener who heard a 
statement about the quality of a particular restaurant (for example) from a speaker. 
The statement could either be sarcastic or not sarcastic, but information relevant to 
a particular interpretation was only available to the participant. Results showed 
that when participants perceived the speaker to be making a sarcastic remark, they 
were significantly more likely to judge that a naive listener would also perceive 
sarcasm. This was the case even though the utterance was presented in written 
form and so there were no paralinguistic cues present, which could have indicated 
one interpretation over another. 
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It is possible that a similar process could operate in the paradigm outlined 
in Experiment 4.4, although there was no direct evidence to suggest this was the 
case. In the previous experiment, adults were asked to adopt the perspective of a 
naive listener, who heard an utterance that only the participant knew was 
ambiguous or unambiguous. Participants were also asked to provide an evaluation 
of the utterance, based on a question that did not specify from whose perspective 
the judgment needed to be made. Whilst many of the participants judged that the 
speaker had done a good job of saying exactly which item he/she wanted, they 
nevertheless judged that a listener would ask for more information about the 
referent from the speaker. It might be the case that adults try to adopt the role of 
the listener, but are unable to give an unbiased judgment because they (the adult 
participant) know that more items have been added to the display. Consequently, 
they realise that the listener will need to ask for more information if they are to 
successfully choose the correct referent from the display. 
As noted in the Introductory paragraph to the present chapter (section 5.1 ), 
a limitation to this interpretation is that there was also a strong tendency for 
participants to judge that the listener would ask for more information in the 
Control condition in Experiment 4.4. This was the case even though participants 
could see that no more items had been added to the array. A possible clue to why 
participants responded in this way comes from the types of justifications they 
provided for their 'good job' evaluations. 44% of those who said that the speaker 
did a bad job in the Control condition, invoked hypothetical changes to the 
display. This was because the scenarios were such that it was entirely likely that a 
' 
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change to the array could occur between the utterance being made and the listener 
seeing the array. In the following two experiments it was, therefore, important to 
try to establish a Control condition in which participants were less likely to think 
that changes could take place between the speaker seeing the display and telling 
the listener about it Pilot work on earlier versions of the stories confirmed that 
participants were likely to create intermediate hypotheses about this interim 
period. Therefore, it was necessary to create scenarios in which the 'blanks' were 
filled in as much as possible. This could enable participants to focus on the 
information presented to them, rather than invoking hypothetical changes. In an 
attempt to make the Control condition as unambiguous as possible, two main 
features of the story were emphasised: (a) the speaker's belief that there was only 
one jumper and (b) the fact that no more jumpers were added to the display. 
The aim of the following two experiments, then, was to directly investigate 
the potential phenomenon of a realist bias in utterance evaluation in the adult 
population. Following the methodology of Chapter 4, adult participants were 
presented with story scenarios in which they (but not a speaker or listener 
protagonist) know that something has happened to render the utterance 
ambiguous. This was contrasted with a scenario in which the utterance remains 
unambiguous. For example, if Rachel sees a jumper in the shop window (it is the 
only one there) and goes home to tell her friend about it, her utterance will be 
unambiguous if she states "there's a really nice jumper on display in the window 
in Stevenson • s clothes shop. You 'II spot it easily because it is the only one there." 
However, if during Rachel's walk home the shopkeeper added more jumpers to 
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the display (without Rachel's knowledge), then her utterance is rendered 
ambiguous by the change in reality. The important point is that in both conditions 
the belief states of the speaker and listener are identical. The only difference 
between the two groups is that in the second scenario the participants are privy to 
information that rendered Rachel's utterance objectively ambiguous; that is, it was 
no longer adequately specifying the intended referent. If adults are uninfluenced 
by their knowledge of the change in reality, they should judge that a listener 
would ask for more information no more often in the Ambiguous (Not See) than 
in the Unambiguous (formerly 'Control') condition. However, if adults find it 
difficult to divorce their own knowledge of reality from what an uninformed 
listener may know about it, they will be more likely to judge that the listener 
would ask for more information in the Ambiguous compared to the Unambiguous 
condition. 
Experiment 5.1. 
5.1.1. Method 
5.1.1.1. Participants. 57 mature students were included, aged between 
19:10 and 61:3 with a mean age of38:6. There were 49 females and 8 males. All 
students attended a LEA funded College of Further Education in Birmingham, 
West Midlands. 
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5.1.1.2. Materials. All story scenarios were typed and printed in 12 ptfont 
on an A4 sheet of paper. There were no cartoon illustrations. Two different stories 
appeared on each sheet of paper. 
5.1.1.3. Design and Procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to 
either the Unambiguous or Ambiguous condition. A between-subjects design was 
chosen for ease of administration and, importantly, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983) note that: " Judgment problems in real life do not usually present 
themselves in the format of a within-subjects design or a direct test of the laws of 
probability. Consequently, subjects' performance in a between-subjects test may 
offer a more realistic view of everyday reasoning" (p.311 ). 
Each participant was opportunistically sampled from the college cafeteria 
and asked to take part in a study looking at adult reasoning. They were told to read 
the stories on the sheet provided and to answer the questions that followed. They 
were also encouraged not to discuss their answers with their neighbour. Each 
participant saw two scenarios, a Jumper story and a Bar story. Type of condition 
(Ambiguous or Unambiguous) was mapped on to story scenario, and the order in 
which Jumper and Bar appeared was counterbalanced between subjects. For 
example, in the Unambiguous condition, participants were presented with the 
following story: 
"Julie went to the night-club bar to get a round of drinks. There was a really good-
looking guy behind the bar. He was the only guy there. All of the other bartenders 
were women. Julie couldn't carry all of the drinks herself so she asked the barman 
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if he could look after them. Then Julie walked back to her friends.* No other guys 
were working behind the bar that night. Claire offered to fetch the remaining 
drinks from the bar and wanted to know who she should ask. Julie said "There is 
a really cute guy serving the drinks. You'll spot him easily because he is the 
only guy there." Claire was glad to discover that the drinks were waiting for her 
at the bar. She was eager to get the drinks as soon as possible so that she could see 
the guy Julie was talking about" 
The Ambiguous version was identical except for the additional information at * 
that more male bar staff had arrived for work and so there were a few guys 
serving behind the bar now. Participants were then presented with the Evaluation 
question, which required a categorical response: 
What do you think happened next? (circle either A or B). 
(A) Do you think Claire asked Julie any more about the appearance of the guy 
behind the bar? 
OR 
(B) Do you think Claire went straight away to fetch the drinks? 
The order in which the action options appeared was the same for each participant, 
but was systematically varied between participants. Participants were debriefed 
upon completion of the task and thanked for their help. 
5.1.2. Results 
5.1.2.1. Responses to the Ask More question. Participants could either 
indicate that the listener would ask the speaker for more information about the 
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referent, or they could say that the listener would just go straight to the mentioned 
location. Students were given a score of 1 each time they judged that the listener 
would ask for more information, resulting in a possible score from 0-2. A 
breakdown of the total number of responses in each of these categories is included 
in Table 5.1. 
Compared to the adults in Experiment 4.4, far fewer participants indicated 
that the listener would ask for more information from the speaker in the 
Unambiguous condition. The two experiments cannot be compared directly, but 
from the total number of Unambiguous stories presented to participants in the 
present experiment (n =58), the listener was judged to ask for more information 
on only 16 occasions (28%). The equivalent percentage of participants who 
indicated that the listener would ask for more information in the Control condition 
in Experiment 4.4 was 82%. The aim of the present experiment was to create a 
condition in which the default response was not 'ask more.' It seems that by 
highlighting the belief of the speaker and by emphasising the state of the array 
(e.g. there being only one jumper on display), participants were less likely to 
include extra-contextual information and more likely to consider the utterance to 
be adequate. 
Table 5.1: Total number of participants judging that the listener would ask for 
more information on neither, one or both of the stories. 
Ask for more Neither story One story Both stories 
information·on ... 
Unambiguous 15 12 2 
Ambiguous 7 15 6 
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The scores in Table 5.1 were submitted to a 2(Version: Ambiguous or 
Unambiguous) x 2(Story Order: Barman first or Jumper first) x 2(Question Option 
Order: 'ask more' first or 'just go' first) ANOV A. All three factors were between-
subject classifications. 
There was a significant main effect for Version [E(1,49) = 7.88, n<0.01]. 
Mean scores (see Table 5.2) confirm that this was in the predicted direction with 
adults significantly more likely to say that the listener would ask for more 
information when the utterance was Ambiguous compared to when it was 
Unambiguous. There was also a significant main effect for Story Order [1:(1,49) = 
5.84, n<0.05]. Participants were significantly more likely to say that the listener 
would ask for more information when the Bar story preceded the Jumper story 
than when the Jumper story appeared first (see Table 5.2 for a summary). 
Table 5.2: Mean 'ask more' scores, from a total of2, (and standard deviations) for 
Version and Story Order 
Version Story Order 
Unambiguous Ambiguous Jumper/Bar Bar/Jumper 
Mean scores 0.55 0.96 0.57 0.93 
(0.63) (0.69) (0.63) (0.70) 
Breaking the data down further (see Table 5.3), this main effect can be 
attributed to the tendency for participants to judge that the listener would ask for 
more information specifically in the Jumper story compared to much less frequent 
Realism and ambiguous utterances 204 
judgments of 'ask more' in the Barman story. There was no effect of Question 
Option Order and no significant interactions between any of the independent 
variables. 
Table 5.3: Total number of responses to the Ask More question according to Story 
Order. 
Story Type Response to Ask Story Order 
more question 
Jumper/Bar Bar/Jumper 
Jumper Just Go 17 11 
Ask more 11 18 
Bar Just Go 23 20 
Ask more 5 9 
5.1.3. Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to see whether adult participants were able 
to make unbiased judgments about the adequacy of an utterance, when they had to 
adopt the perspective of an uninformed listener. Only the adult participants, but 
not the speaker or listener protagonists, knew that a change in the array had 
rendered an utterance ambiguous. If adults are 'uncontaminated' by their 
knowledge of the addition of extra items, they should treat this situation 
identically to one in which the utterance remains unambiguous. However, the 
participants in the present study did not respond in this way (at least in the Jumper 
story). Instead, they were influenced by their privileged knowledge of the updated 
state of reality and tended to judge that the listener would ask for more 
information from the speaker significantly more often in the Ambiguous condition 
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compared to the Unambiguous condition. Given that there was no reason to expect 
that the speaker was deliberately trying to mislead in the Ambiguous condition, 
the utterance should have been treated identically to the one in the Unambiguous 
condition. However, by treating the objectively Ambiguous utterance as 
inadequate, adults tended to use reality as the primary criterion for their 
judgments; behaving as if the ambiguity of reference was transparent to the 
listener. 
It could be argued that the observed order effect accounts for this finding. 
However, Order did not significantly interact with Version. This suggests that 
whilst experimental design may lead to noise in the data, this does not threaten 
the theoretical interpretation due to this noise being equally distributed across 
versions because of counterbalancing and random assignment of participants. 
According to Olson (1970) the problem of referential ambiguity can be 
solved by comparing the words of the utterance to the array, and it is only when 
children understand the role of literal meaning in referential communication that 
they begin to judge messages to be inadequate. It seems that adults are very 
proficient at this comparison process also. That is, the participants knew that there 
was an element of referential ambiguity and so they tended to respond as if they 
were mapping the words of the utterance on to the referent display. This is exactly 
the correct procedure for determining whether an utterance is adequate or not, in 
most tests of referential ambiguity. However, in the present task, it is no longer 
sufficient simply to compare the words of the utterance with the referent display 
in order to decide how to evaluate the utterance. Instead, participants have to 
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make a judgment from the perspective of the listener who, in the context of the 
story, does not have access to the same information as the adult participant 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider how the listener would behave based on the 
information available to him/her in the utterance only. The mapping of the 
utterance on to reality becomes a redundant process, because the information 
concerning the referent display is not available to the listener. 
The finding that adults often preferred to base their judgments on a 
comparison between the utterance and the array, rather than on the belief state of 
the speaker, is surprising given that even children aged below 6 years seemingly 
have little difficulty utilising the speaker's belief when asked to make an 
interpretation or an evaluation of an utterance (Mitchell, Robinson & Thompson, 
1999; Robinson & Mitchell, 1992; Mitchell & Robinson, 1994). Also, in the 
previous experiment, adults often incorporated the speaker's belief in their 
evaluations ofwhetherthe speaker had done a 'good job', suggesting that they are 
able to recognise the importance of the speaker's belief under certain 
circumstances. Perhaps the difference in findings arises from the fact that 
participants were required to 'step into the shoes' of the listener protagonist in 
order to judge the adequacy of the message in the present procedure, whilst in the 
procedures mentioned above participants could take a more objective perspective. 
As noted in the Introduction to this chapter {p.l87), it could be that by being 
explicitly asked to assume the perspective of the listener, participants engage in 
advanced role-taking which makes it hard for them to consider alternative 
outcomes to the one they know to be true (Mitchell et al., 1996). 
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A reductive explanation for the present results might argue that a similar 
pattern of data could be obtained if participants were simply trying to demonstrate 
that they had comprehended the alteration in the state of reality. That is, they 
might just say that the listener would ask for more information because they 
wanted to show that they had noted more jumpers had been added to the window. 
One way to solve this problem would be to add more items to the display in the 
Unambiguous version, such that the addition of the items does not influence the 
(un)ambiguity of reference. Therefore, if participants still demonstrate a 
significant tendency to say that the listener would ask for more information in the 
Ambiguous condition, this cannot simply be because they are trying to 
demonstrate that they have acknowledged the alteration in reality. If this were the 
case, participants would be expected to perform similarly on the Ambiguous and 
Unambiguous versions. 
An additional concern with the present procedure is that the change in 
reality that occurs in both stories might unwittingly provide information about the 
predictability of the event. Participants could reason that if the change in the array 
happens this time, it is probably a fairly common occurrence. Presumably if the 
listener knows this is common also, they would be more likely to ask for more 
information from the speaker. This is reminiscent of the types of cognitive 
heuristics that adults commonly use in reasoning tasks when they are uncertain 
about their response, or important information is unavailable (e.g. Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973; Taylor, 1982). For example, Tversky & Kahneman (1982) suggest 
that people use an 'availability heuristic' to reduce the uncertainty about making a 
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judgment. That is. they tend to judge that an event is highly probable if examples 
of similar events come quickly and easily to mind. This heuristic is employed 
even if the actual occurrence of the event is relatively rare according to veridical 
or objective criteria (Tversky & Kahneman. 1983; Kahneman & Tversky. 1973). 
This heuristic (and the simulation heuristic; Kahneman & Tversky. 1982) 
produces characteristic biases in favour of events which are thought to be 
plausible and predictable. with a corresponding tendency to underestimate the 
likelihood of events that are produced in a multitude of unlikely ways. As a result. 
the participants in the present study could reason that more staff turning up at the 
bar. or more jumpers being added to the shop window are events that are highly 
plausible and. therefore. predictable. Presumably. the listener would also know 
this and would need to ask for clarifying information from the speaker in order to 
anticipate such a likely occurrence. 
To control for this problem. predictable and unpredictable versions of the 
same scenario would need to be produced. In addition. participants could be asked 
to evaluate the perceived probability of the change in reality actually occurring. If 
participants still show a tendency to judge that more information would be asked 
for in an ambiguous. yet unpredictable. condition. this would provide much 
stronger evidence that adults are specifically contaminated by their own 
knowledge of reality when making judgments of this kind. Moreover. it would 
also suggest that 'realism' is a process that works in addition to the biases that 
Kahneman & Tversky talk about in their work. That is. if participants were to 
continue to ask for more information in an unpredictable. ambiguous scenario. it 
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would suggest that t h e ~ r r knowledge of reality tends to override their tendency to 
underestimate the like!ihood that unpredictable events will occur. 
Experiment 5.2. 
5.2.1. Method 
5.2.1.1. Participants. 95 undergraduate students were included, aged 18:6 
to 41:6 with a mean age of21:9. There were 78 females and 17 males. All were 
studying psychology at the University ofNottingham. 
5.2.1.2. Materials. Story scenarios and related questions were printed in 
12pt on A4 paper. All the information required by each participant was included 
on one sheet only. 
5.2.1.3. Design and Procedure. A completely between-subjects design 
was employed, with participants randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions. All four conditions were based on the same story 
scenario, which involved Mark (the speaker) and Jim (the listener) biking about 
books in the library. 
In the Unambiguous version, books are added to a different desk whilst 
Mark is absent Hence the addition of books to the desk does not alter the 
informative value of the utterance. In the Ambiguous version books are added to 
Mark's desk, without his knowledge. Therefore, his utterance is rendered 
ambiguous by the change in reality. The Predictable change version described 
how books were placed on the desk as Sue left the library. The desk was described 
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as being by the exit. with the implication that this was a frequent occurrence 
because people often put their books in a convenient location as they leave the 
building. The Unpredictable change version described how Sue was struggling 
past the desk with a heavy box and books were accidentally spilled onto the desk. 
Participants are told that the books are being moved to a new room in the library 
with the implication that this is a relatively infrequent occurrence. To illustrate, 
the basic story - Predictable/Unambiguous - is outlined below in addition to the 
specific variants for each condition: 
"Mark is reading a book at desk 31 in the busy college library. It is the 
only book on his desk. He decides he needs some more information and goes to 
the bookshelves on the next floor. *Whilst Mark is walking to the shelves, Sue is 
on her way out of the library. She has finished reading her books and puts them 
down on desk 32, the desk next to Mark's.* At the bookshelves, he sees his friend 
Jim, who is reading about a similar topic. Jim asks Mark if there is a book he can 
recommend. Mark says "Yes. I have a great one downstairs on my desk. You'll 
spot it easily because it's the only one there." Mark tells Jim he is sitting at desk 
31, near the exit" 
The remaining three versions were identical except for the change in 
information included between the points marked *: 
Unpredictable/Unambiguous: Whilst Mark is walking to the shelves, a 
Librarian struggles past desk 32 with a heavy over-filled box. She is transferring 
some books to a new room in the library. Some of the books fall onto desk 32, the 
desk next to Mark's. 
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Predictable/Ambiguous: Whilst Mark is walking to the shelves, Sue is on 
her way out of the library. She has finished reading her books and puts them down 
on desk 31, next to the book that Mark was reading. 
Unpredictable/ Ambiguous: Whilst Mark is walking to the shelves, Sue the 
Librarian struggles past desk 31 with a heavy over-filled box. She is transferring 
some books to a new room in the library. Some of the books fall onto Mark's 
desk, next to the book that Mark was reading. 
The response section was then divided into three parts, which was 
presented in fiXed order for all participants: 
Participants were asked to indirectly evaluate the utterance. They were asked: 
(1) What do you think happened next? (circle either A orB) 
(A) Do you think Jim went straight away to fetch the book from the desk? 
OR 
(B) Do you think Jim asked Mark for more information about the book? (the order 
of these options was counterbalanced between subjects). 
Next, they were asked to evaluate the percentage likelihood of the change in 
reality occurring: 
(2) How often do extra books end up on people's desks like this? 
[If 0% represents Very Rarely, 50% represents Sometimes and 1 00% represents 
Very Frequently, give a percentage value anywhere between 0-100 that estimates 
the frequency with which you would expect this to happen.] 
Finally, participants were asked to categorise their percentage response according 
to a number of pre-specified frequencies. This was to control for the possibility 
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that participants may misunderstand what is required from them in Question 2 
resulting in widely varying data. They were told to: 
(3) Indicate on the list below the description that most closely represents the 
percentage value that you have stated above. 
Everyday 
Every 2-3 days 
Once a week 
Once a fortnight 
Once a month 
Less than once a month 
Less than once every six months 
Less than once a year 
Almost never 
Participants completed the task, without any opportunity for collaboration, in a 
lecture theatre. They were told that there were no right or wrong answers and that 
they should complete the questions in the order they were presented on the sheet 
After completing the task, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
cooperation. 
5.2.2. Results 
5.2.2.1. Responses to the Ask More question. Table 5.4 contains a 
summary of the number of participants in each condition who judged that the 
listener would ask for more information from the speaker. Overall, there were 
very few participants from the total group who answered in this way (29%). There 
was no tendency to judge that the listener would ask for more information from 
the speaker when the utterance was Ambiguous. Indeed, more people judged that 
the listener would ask for more information when the utterance was 
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Unambiguous. This is in the opposite direction to the experimental hypothesis and 
so no analyses were carried out on this data. In addition, there was almost no 
difference in the numbers of participants judging 'ask more' between the 
Predictable and Unpredictable conditions. Combining across the Unambiguous 
and Ambiguous conditions, 15 people said 'ask more' in the Predictable version 
and 13 people gave this response in the Unpredictable condition. 
Table 5.4: Total number of responses to the Ask More question according to 
predictability of change and ambiguity of utterance. 
Story Version Predictable Unpredictable 
Ask Just Go Ask Just Go 
More More 
Ambiguous 4 18 4 20 
Unambiguous 11 14 9 15 
5.2.2.2. Percentage estimations of probability of change. The 
participants estimated the probability of the change in reality, described in the 
story, actually occurring as a percentage. The mean percentages for each condition 
are summarised in Table 5.5. Overall, there was very little difference between 
judged frequencies according to whether the utterance was Ambiguous or 
Unambiguous. However, there was a marked difference in estimated percentages 
between the Predictable and Unpredictable versions of the story. Participants 
judged that the change described in the story would occur less frequently in the 
Unpredictable version compared to the Predictable version. This difference was 
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confirmed in a 2(Ambiguity ofUtterance) x 2(Predictability of Change) x 2(0rder 
of alternatives in Question 1) ANOV A Ail three factors were between-subject 
variables. The only significant result was a main effect for Predictability [E.(1,87) 
= 18.73, n<0.001] in the direction described above. There was no effect of 
Ambiguity and no significant interactions between any of the variables. 
Table 5.5: Mean percentages (and standard deviations) for the judged likelihood 
of the change in reality, as described in the story, actually occurring. 
Version Predictable Unpredictable Overaii mean 
Ambiguous 39.4 22.2 30.4 
(24.9) (22.8) (25.1) 
Unambiguous 40.7 18.0 29.6 
(24.1) (20.7) (25.0) 
Overaii mean 40.1 20.1 
-
(24.2) (21.6) 
5.2.2.3. Category judgments of probability of change. Participants were 
also asked to categorise their estimated percentages according to a pre-specified 
list of varying frequency labels. The list was divided into High Frequency and 
Low Frequency categories. High Frequency ranged from 'Every day' to 'Once a 
month' inclusive, and Low Frequency ranged from 'Less than once a month' to 
'Almost never.' High and Low Frequency responses were classified (a) according 
to Predictability, to see whether the manipulated level of predictability was 
reflected in participants' perception of the likelihood of change actuaily occurring, 
and (b) according to Ambiguity, to see if categorical responses were influenced by 
the ambiguity of reference (summarised in Table 5.6). 
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Firstly, there was a significant correlation between Predictability and 
perceived categorical Frequency [X2 (corrected, df = I, n = 95) = 8.2, Jl<O.OOS]. 
Participants were significantly more likely to judge that Predictable scenarios 
would occur more frequently than Unpredictable scenarios. Secondly, in line with 
the lack of an effect for Ambiguity on the mean percentage scores outlined above, 
there was no significant correlation between Ambiguity and perceived categorical 
Frequency [X2 (corrected, df= I, n = 95) = 0.3, n.s.]. 
Table 5.6: Number of participants giving High or Low Frequency responses to 
Question 3, according to Predictability of version and Ambiguity of utterance. 
Response High Frequency Low Frequency 
Version 
Predictable 36 11 
Unpredictable 22 26 
Unambiguous 28 2I 
Ambiguous 30 I6 
5.2.3. Discussion 
There was no evidence to suggest that adults were influenced by their own 
knowledge of reality when making evaluations of ambiguous utterances. Very few 
participants suggested that the listener would ask for more information from the 
speaker in the Ambiguous condition. Indeed, there were more 'ask more' 
responses in the Unambiguous condition. This suggests that these adults did not 
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seem to be judging according to their knowledge of the referential success of the 
utterance. 
The predictability of the alteration to reality occurring did not seem to 
influence evaluations either. Participants were not more likely to judge that the 
listener would ask for more information if the change was a predictable rather 
than an unpredictable one. The lack of an effect for predictability cannot be 
attributed to participants' lack of sensitivity to the manipulated likelihood of the 
event occurring. There was a significant correlation between the experimenter's 
and the participants' ideas of what constituted an unpredictable or a predictable 
change. Moreover, there was a significant difference between the unpredictable 
and predictable scenarios in terms of the percentage frequencies participants 
provided to indicate the likelihood that more books would be added to the desk in 
the manner described. Therefore, the stimuli provided seemed to be successful in 
manipulating perceived predictability, but this did not influence utterance 
evaluations from the perspective of the listener. 
5.3. General Discussion 
The aim of these two experiments was to see whether adults are 
'contaminated' by their own knowledge of reality when making evaluations of 
utterances. Adults were provided with scenarios in which they knew the utterance 
was ambiguous, but neither the speaker or listener story protagonists were aware 
of this fact If adults are not influenced by their knowledge of the ambiguity of 
reference, they should treat this utterance identically to one in which the speaker 
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and listener have identical belief frameworks to the ambiguous scenario, with the 
only difference being that the utterance remains pragmatically adequate. 
There was some evidence that adults were influenced by their privileged 
knowledge in the first experiment. They were significantly more likely to judge 
that the listener would ask for more information from the speaker in the 
Ambiguous condition compared to the Unambiguous condition. However, this 
effect was confined to one particular story scenario involving buying a jumper 
from a shop. Participants may have judged that the listener would ask for more 
information because it is quite plausible that more jumpers could be added to the 
display in the period between the utterance being made and the listener seeing the 
shop window. Therefore, judgments may have been based on the perceived 
predictability of the change occurring rather than on the knowledge that the 
change had actually occurred. 
This possibility was assessed directly in the second experiment, where the 
predictability of the change to the array was manipulated in addition to the 
ambiguity of the utterance. Utterance evaluations were not influenced by the level 
of predictability, suggesting that the significant effect found in the first 
experiment may have been a result of a realism bias. However, this is an 
extremely tentative argument given that the story in the second experiment did not 
produce a realism effect. It might still be that participants considered a change in 
reality to be more likely in the Jumper story than in the Bar or Library story, 
resulting in the significant tendency to judge that the listener would ask for more 
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infonnation. This possibility would need to be tested directly using predictable 
and unpredictable versions of the Jumper story. 
The failure to find an effect in the Library (Experiment 5.2) and Bar 
(Experiment 5.1) stories suggests that, if there is a realism bias in utterance 
evaluation, it is only a weak and context-specific effect. The elusive nature of the 
trend may be exacerbated by the mode of presentation of the stories. In the present 
procedure, participants were asked to read vignettes from a sheet of paper. This 
may encourage a more deliberative and analytical approach because the relevant 
infonnation can be isolated within the text and important points can be re-read by 
the participant. Consequently, the belief states of the speaker and listener 
protagonists may be especially clear to participants, because they can reflect on 
the circumstances within which the beliefs are fanned. 
Additionally, the array (at the time the speaker made their utterance) was 
not depicted, limiting the likelihood that participants could use an utterance-array 
comparison as the basis for their evaluations. Again, this might explain why the 
Jumper story generated a significant effect. It may have been easier for 
participants to imagine an altered array in the Jumper story compared to the Bar or 
Library stories, based on their familiarity with such a scenario (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982). 
Consequently, follow-up work would need to provide a clear depiction of 
the array, preferably within a more realistic setting. For example, videos provide 
an ideal medium for the presentation of scenarios, allowing a more naturalistic 
display of communication. Mitchell, et al. (1996) used video scenarios to elicit a 
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realist bias in false belief reasoning in adults. It could be that the 'contaminating' 
effect of privileged knowledge works best when participants do not have the 
opportunity to pore over details of the story. Instead, they are required to respond 
in a way that is more reminiscent of the rapid and dynamic nature of real human 
interaction. 
Methodological concerns aside, it might be that the lack of a consistent 
significant effect reflects the fact that adults are quite resistant to the influence of 
their privileged knowledge when making utterance evaluations. This might not be 
so surprising given the importance of considering the speaker's own conceptual 
framework during communication. As Mitchell (1999) suggests, 'What people say 
enlightens us about the perspective they have on r e a l i t y ~ ~ it tells us what kind of 
interpretation they favour of the events all around' (p.189). Therefore, if 
communication is to be meaningful and successful for the people involved, it is 
crucial that the speaker's belief, or meaning, is considered in addition to the literal 
words of the utterance. 
5.4. Conclusion 
It is perhaps reassuring that adults in the present studies seemed to be well 
attuned to the role ofthe speaker's belief in the creation of utterances. Rather than 
favouring a literal interpretation of the utterance (and, as a result, focusing on the 
utterance-array link), adults often responded in a way that suggested they were 
able to separate their own knowledge from that of a naive listener, attributing 
more importance to the speaker's conceptual framework. This suggests that this 
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group of adults, at least, have a good understanding about the role of the utterance 
as an externalisation of the speaker's internal representation. 
CHAPTER6 
General Discussion 
6.1. Introduction 
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This thesis was primarily concerned with the referential triangle that 
characterises verbal communication. The three elements of the triangle - the 
utterance, the speaker's internal representation and reality - contribute to the 
production and interpretation of utterances. Sometimes-it may not be sufficient to 
consider only the speaker's utterance and how it relates to reality. If the utterance 
underspecifies reality in some way, then a consideration of the speaker's belief or 
internal representation may be central to understanding what the speaker really 
means. 
A crucial developmental milestone involves the child commg to 
understand that what is said is a representation of what is meant. That is, the child 
needs to understand that utterances are extemalisations of a speaker's internal 
representation. Additionally, the developing child needs to understand that an 
utterance has a special relationship with reality insofar as the words of the 
utterance must adequately describe an object in order to allow a unique 
identification of the object from a set of alternatives. Therefore, understanding an 
utterance as an externalisation of an internal representation requires an awareness 
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of how the utterance, the speaker's meaning and reality relate to each other within 
referential communication. One of the limitations of traditional referential 
communication research is that usually only one of these relationships is 
considered at a time. Consequently, it is not clear how children treat these 
relationships when they have to consider them simultaneously. In other words, 
little is known about how children and adults handle the triangular relationship 
when all three elements need to be considered. 
The thesis consists of two main approaches to investigating how people 
respond when all three elements of r e f e r e n t ~ a l l communication are manipulated. 
The first approach involved presenting the utterance, the array and the speaker's 
meaning as separate, substantive elements with the help of cartoon thought and 
speech bubbles. The second approach involved presenting children and adults 
with discrepant utterances: what was said and what was meant were isomorphic, 
but discrepant with the current state of reality. As a result, it was possible to 
examine whether people considered the (discrepant) relationship between the 
array and the utterance, or the (consistent) relationship between the belief and the 
utterance to be more important in judging message adequacy. 
Both approaches required participants to make evaluations about 
utterances. Evaluation forces participants to be explicit about why an utterance 
may be adequate or inadequate. That is, evaluation provides a greater opportunity 
to consider all three elements of the referential triangle. In contrast, participants 
can interpret utterances correctly without necessarily having to consider all three 
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elements of the triangle and the resultant relationships between the elements (see 
pp. I 09-110 for an expansion of this point). 
The thesis was not designed to test a specific theory of referential 
communication, although different theories are relevant to each chapter. The aim 
was to provide an exploration of how people evaluate utterances when the 
tripartite relationship between the utterance, the array and the speaker's meaning 
has to be considered directly. Nevertheless, the overall picture from the results can 
be interpreted within certain theoretical frameworks. The main results from each 
of the two approaches to investigating the referential triangle will be summarised 
below before considering the theoretical, as well as the broader, implications of 
the findings. 
6.2. Presenting the referential triangle as substantive elements 
The value of using cartoon thought bubbles to depict thought content was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2. Normally developing children and children with 
autism were significantly helped to answer correctly about a story protagonist's 
false belief when they saw the thought content depicted in a thought bubble, 
compared to a standard false belief task in which no thought bubble was present. 
Both groups of children were able to answer correctly about reality also, 
suggesting that they understood how the protagonist could hold a belief that was 
discrepant with the current state of reality. Therefore, they seemed to understand 
thought bubbles in an appropriately representational way. 
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Given this facilitation, thought bubbles provided an ideal opportunity to 
present the speaker's meaning in a concrete and tangible way in a referential 
communication task. In Chapter 3, thought bubbles allowed the speaker's 
meaning to be represented separately from the utterance and from reality. In this 
approach, the speaker's meaning could be understood as an internal representation 
and not just as the intended outcome of the communication. This is a crucial 
distinction within the referential triangle, since meaning and reality were no 
longer confounded in terms ofhow they were presented to the children ( cf. Beal & 
Flavell, 1984). Therefore, even though speaker meaning and reality were 
isomorphic in this procedure - as in traditional ambiguity research (Robinson & 
Whittaker, 1987) - it was possible to investigate whether children were more 
concerned with utterance-array relations or utterance-meaning relations because 
children could justify their responses with reference to either of these links. 
In the ambiguous condition, and in the absence of a thought bubble 
(Experiment 3.2), the majority of children aged 6-10 years indicated that the 
speaker had not said exactly which item he/she wanted. These children 
overwhelmingly indicated that this was because the array was ambiguous (e.g. 
'there were four yellow bags'). By contrast, although the majority of 6-10-year-
olds again evaluated ambiguous utterances negatively in the presence of a thought 
bubble, their stated reasons for doing so were markedly different. Rather than 
concentrating on the relationship between the utterance and the array, they 
focused on the say-mean discrepancy instead. That is, children said that the 
speaker had not provided enough information or had not said exactly the same 
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words as those contained in the thought bubble. This tendency was especially 
strong amongst the 6-7-year-olds and then diminished with increasing age. The 
older children showed an increasing preference with age for stating the ambiguity 
between the utterance and the array as the source of the problem with the 
message, in the presence of a thought bubble. In other words, they overlooked the 
discrepancy between what was said and what was meant and focused on the 
pragmatic relationship instead. This suggests that the 9-1 0-year-olds, and a group 
of adults, treated the literal meaning (i.e. how the utterance maps on to the array) 
as more important for determining whether an ambiguous message is adequate or 
not (cf. Olson, 1970). 
Given this understanding when responding to ambiguous messages, it was 
perhaps even more surprising that children aged 6-10 years evaluated the 
utterance negatively in the unambiguous condition. Rather than demonstrating a 
diminishing tendency to evaluate according to the utterance-meaning relationship, 
as in the ambiguous condition, a consistent proportion of the 6-1 0-year-olds 
(around 50%} judged unambiguous utterances negatively. The main reason given 
for a negative evaluation was the speaker not describing the item in enough detail. 
Very few children answered in this way in the absence of a thought bubble, 
suggesting that evaluations and justifications were heavily influenced by seeing 
the speaker's meaning written in a thought bubble. In other words, children 
seemed to respond as if they thought that an utterance can only be adequate if 
what is said and what is meant are identical. They seemed to have difficulty 
understanding that an utterance can be referentially adequate (it uniquely 
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identifies the referent m an array) even though speech might underspecify 
thought. 
In a more stringent within-subjects test of the influence of seeing the 
speaker's meaning encapsulated in a thought bubble (Experiment 3.3), only the 7-
8-year-olds showed a similar tendency to judge unambiguous utterances 
negatively. The same group of7-8-year-olds were also significantly more likely to 
judge, in the presence of a thought bubble, that a listener would not be able to pick 
the right object. This was despite the fact that the speaker's utterance allowed a 
unique identification of the item in the array. This group of children seemed to 
overlook pragmatic adequacy when they were required to make an evaluation of 
the utterance, and they also overlooked the pragmatics of the communication 
when they were specifically focused on the utterance-array relationship. 
Overall, Chapter 3 presented children with situations in which utterance 
and meaning differed, but reality and meaning were isomorphic. In the ambiguous 
condition, the utterance underspecified the array such that the referent could not 
be uniquely identified. Hence, there was a discrepancy between the utterance and 
the array as well as between the utterance and thought content. At around the age 
of 6 or 7 years, children focused on the say-mean discrepancy when evaluating 
ambiguous utterances. For example, they evaluated the utterance negatively 
'because she didn't say 'flowers' (i.e. the description contained in the thought 
bubble). After this age, there was a decreasing tendency to state the say-mean 
discrepancy as the reason why the message was inadequate and a corresponding 
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increase in statements that it was the ambiguous array that was the source of the 
problem. 
In the unambiguous condition, 6-1 0-year-old children focused on the say-
mean discrepancy to the extent that they overlooked the pragmatic adequacy of 
the utterance. That is, they did not seem to realise that the redundant information 
in the thought bubble could be ignored because the utterance alone allowed a 
unique identification of the referent. These children behaved as if the presence of 
a say-mean discrepancy indicated that the message was no good, irrespective of 
the adequacy between the utterance and the array. Robinson and Whittaker (1986) 
suggest that "In order to realize that messages can be ambiguous, it is necessary 
for children to see that messages are representations of, and hence distinct from, 
intended meanings" (p.42). This understanding should apply equally to situations 
in which the utterance is unambiguous. However, this seems to be especially 
difficult for children, perhaps because an isomorphism between thought and 
speech is always assumed in the case of unambiguous utterances. 
Of course, the situation of depicting thought content directly is somewhat 
artificial. Perhaps it should not be surprising that children found it difficult to 
reconcile the idea of a say-mean discrepancy with a referentially adequate 
utterance. Interestingly, though, Robinson (1994) suggests that experimental 
designs which give "children ... privileged access to the speaker's belief, may 
allow children to demonstrate understanding of links between utterance, reality, 
and belief in a way in which they could not in more complex and everyday 
situations" (p.377). In other words, showing the speaker's meaning in a thought 
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bubble may provide an ideal situation in which it is possible to investigate the 
strengths and weaknesses in children's understanding of utterances as 
externalisations of internal representations. 
6.3. Discrepant utterances 
The source of the discrepancy within the referential triangle differed in 
Chapter 4 compared to Chapter 3. In the Not See condition, the discrepancy arose 
between reality and meaning, whilst speech and meaning were isomorphic. 
Consequently, there was also a discrepancy between speech and reality. Chapter 4 
utilised a different paradigm to the one included in Chapter 3 so that it was 
possible to see whether participants spontaneously evaluated utterances according 
to the relationship between thought and speech when speaker meaning had to be 
inferred rather than depicted directly. A test question was included that 
deliberately did not specify which criterion was the 'correct' one for utterance 
evaluation (Did speaker do a good job of saying exactly which item he/she 
wanted?). This was so that the relative importance of the relationships within the 
referential triangle could be ascertained because it was up to the individual to 
decide which link was of primary significance. It was possible that participants 
could have used their knowledge that the speaker held a false belief to evaluate 
the utterance according to the speaker's representation, rather than according to 
the utterance-array relationship. 
Children aged 6-10 years overwhelmingly chose to focus on the 
relationship between utterance and reality when evaluating an utterance that was 
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isomorphic with the speaker's belief, but outdated in terms of how well it 
characterised the current state of reality (Not See c o n d i t i o n ~ ~ Experiments 4.2 and 
4.3). That is, children judged that the speaker had not done a good job of saying 
exactly which item he/she wanted because the array was ambiguous ('there are 
four bikes there') or because the utterance underspecified the item in the 
ambiguous array ('he didn't say the colour'). This pattern of responding was also 
found with a question that asked children to evaluate the utterance from an 
uninformed listener's perspective (Do you think the listener just goes to fetch the 
item, or does she ask the speaker any more about i t ? ~ ~ Experiment 4.3). Children 
judged according to the pragmatic adequacy of the utterance. They said that the 
listener would ask the speaker for more information about the utterance because 
the utterance was ambiguous with respect to the array. Only adult participants 
evaluated utterances in the Not See condition according to the good match 
between the speaker's belief and their ensuing utterance. The adult group said that 
the speaker had done a 'good job' despite the fact that what was said was at odds 
with the known state of reality (Experiments 4.1 and 4.4). However, this response 
pattern was characteristic of only around half of the adult sample at b e s t ~ ~ the 
remainder of the group preferred to focus on the discrepancy between speech and 
the array instead. 
The tendency to respond according to the utterance-array relationship was 
also very strong in the See condition. In this condition, the listener protagonist 
saw the change to the array and produced an ambiguous utterance. The speaker's 
internal representation of the array was consistent with reality but their utterance 
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did not allow a unique identification of the referent There was no obvious reason 
why participants should consider the speaker's internal representation in this case, 
since the locus ofthe problem lay between the utterance and the array (Robinson 
& Mitchell, 1992; Robinson & Whittaker, 1987). Indeed, most children and adults 
specifically mentioned the ambiguous array or the underspecification of the 
utterance in relation to the array when explaining why the speaker had done a 'bad 
job'. There seemed to be few problems with 'mapping' the utterance on to the 
array when the speaker's internal representation was consistent with reality. 
Curiously, many participants (children and adults) did not use this 
'mapping' strategy between utterance and array in a Control condition in which 
all three elements of the referential triangle were in agreement. That is, the 
speaker's utterance was consistent with their belief, which was, in tum, consistent 
with reality. Rather than judging that the speaker had done a good job of saying 
exactly which item he/she wanted, children aged 6-10 years, and many of the 
adult participants, suggested that the speaker had done a 'bad job' based on the 
likelihood that a change to the array could occur in the future that would render 
the speaker's utterance ambiguous. In other words, many participants chose to 
invoke a discrepancy between the utterance and the array rather than judge 
according to the information that was presented to them. 
It was hypothesised that the tendency to base judgments on knowledge of 
a discrepancy between the utterance and the array might be so strong that 
participants would continue to focus on this even in a situation where it was 
inappropriate to do so. There was some suggestion in the results of Experiment 
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4.4 that at least half of the adult participants evaluated the utterance according to 
the speaker's belief state in the Not See condition. They judged that the speaker 
had done a •good job' because he/she was ignorant about the change to the array. 
However, when the same adults were asked to evaluate the utterance from an 
uninformed listener's perspective, they failed to consider the speaker's internal 
representation and, instead, judged according to the mismatch between the 
utterance and the array. That is, they said that even though the speaker had done a 
good job of saying exactly which item he/she wanted, the listener would, 
nevertheless, ask the speaker for more information about the item. Given that the 
speaker was not being deliberately vague or misleading and that the participant 
was aware ofthe match between the speaker's belief and utterance, the responses 
to the two different questions concerning message adequacy should have been the 
same. The listener protagonist did not know about the change in reality and so 
reference to the array in terms of how the naive listener would interpret the 
utterance, was no longer appropriate. In short, it seems participants' knowledge 
about the discrepancy between the speaker's utterance and the altered array 
influenced their judgments of message adequacy from the perspective of the 
listener. 
A problem with this interpretation was that adults also said that the listener 
would ask for more information from the speaker in the Control condition. If 
participants were judging message adequacy according to the utterance-array link 
they should have judged the message to be adequate in this case because there was 
only one object that matched the speaker's description. However, it has already 
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been noted above that there was a strong tendency in the Control condition to 
invoke hypothetical changes to the array that might render the (unambiguous) 
utterance ambiguous. Consequently, the trend for participants to judge that the 
listener would ask for more information from the speaker in the Control condition, 
could be based on the future, hypothetical discrepancy between the utterance and 
the array. In other words, although both the Control and Not See conditions 
produced response patterns consistent with perceived discrepancies between the 
utterance and the array, each pattern could have a different basis: real in the Not 
See condition and assumed in the Control. As a result, there might have been a 
tendency for adults to overapply their knowledge of the utterance-world 
discrepancy, but the Control condition did not provide a suitable contrast due to 
the ease with which extra-contextual information was included in the stories. 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 were devised to directly test the possibility that 
adults were inappropriately evaluating the utterance according to their own 
knowledge of the utterance-world discrepancy. Based on the results ofExperiment 
4.4, it was crucial to try to establish a Control condition in which the likelihood 
that participants would consider future states of affairs was minimised. In 
Experiment 5.1, the speaker's belief that there was only one item that matched 
his/her utterance was emphasised, in addition to the fact that no more items were 
added to· the array in the u n a m b i g ~ o u s s condition. Under these circumstances, 
participants were much more likely to judge that the listener would just go to the 
mentioned location rather than ask the speaker for more information. By contrast, 
even though the speaker's and listener's belief states were identical in the 
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unambiguous and ambiguous conditions, participants were significantly more 
likely to judge that the listener would ask the speaker for more information about 
the utterance in the ambiguous condition, when they (the participant) knew that 
the utterance was discrepant with reality. In other words, participants once again 
seemed to overlook the isomorphism between speaker's utterance and belief, in 
favour of their own knowledge pertaining to the discrepancy between utterance 
and the array (a 'realism' effect; cf. Mitchell et al, 1996). 
Experiment 5.2 investigated the possibility that participants in Experiment 
5.1 were simply responding according to the predictability of the change to the 
array occurring. In the ambiguous condition, a change to the array takes place 
without the speaker's knowledge. However, because the alteration has happened, 
the participant might think that this is a common event which, presumably, the 
listener would also realise. Therefore, the judgment that the listener would ask for 
more information from the speaker in the ambiguous condition may arise because 
participants reason it is likely that the change would occur, rather than because 
they know the change has actually occurred. In Experiment 5.2, predictable and 
unpredictable versions of a story scenario were crossed with unambiguous and 
ambiguous conditions, to see whether adults would still be susceptible to a 
'realism' effect. This would be evidenced by judgments that the listener would ask 
for more information from the speaker in the ambiguous condition, even when the 
alteration to the array was unpredictable. 
Adult participants were sensitive to the manipulated predictability of the 
change to the array actually occurring. They discriminated significantly between 
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unpredictable and predictable versions of the story when asked to estimate the 
frequency with which the change in the story might occur. Importantly, though, 
utterance evaluation was not influenced by the predictability of change. There was 
no difference between predictable and unpredictable versions in terms of 
judgments of whether the listener would ask the speaker for more information 
about the desired object. Also, contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant 
tendency for adults to judge that the listener would be more likely to ask for 
additional information in the ambiguous compared to the unambiguous condition. 
This group of adults appeared not to be influenced by their knowledge that the 
array had changed when considering utterance adequacy from the perspective of a 
listener protagonist However, there were a number of methodological flaws, 
which may have contributed to the failure to find a significant effect. Perhaps the 
most important of these was the fact that the array was never depicted, thereby 
limiting the opportunity for utterance-array comparisons to take place. 
Overall, the results in this thesis show that children attend to the speaker's 
meaning under some circumstances, whilst under different circumstances they 
attend to the literal meaning of the utterance. In summarising a similar pattern of 
findings, Robinson and Whittaker (1986) suggest that children's difficulties with 
knowing which relationship to focus on might arise because understanding 
referential communication requires" ... seeing the message both as a stimulus to be 
interpreted in its own right and also as representation of a speaker's intended 
meaning which may on some occasions be inadequate" (p.43). In other words, the 
problem with understanding the tripartite nature of referential communication is 
General Discussion 235 
due to the complicated relationship between the elements of the referential 
triangle! This is tautological and does not explain why the difficulties might arise. 
What follows, therefore, is a summary of two, broad, competing theories that 
might go some way to explain why the tripartite relationship that exists m 
referential communication could be problematical for utterance evaluation. 
6.4. Theoretical explanations 
The first account that follows is based on the 'reality masking' hypothesis 
proposed by Mitchell (e.g. 1994). He suggests that children and adults may find 
reality particularly salient when making judgments about knowledge and beliefs. 
This may result in the content of the mental representation being overlooked in 
favour of what is known about reality. In terms of the referential triangle, a focus 
on reality would be suggested by judgments based on the array rather than the 
speaker's belief Additionally, the 'reality masking' hypothesis predicts that if a 
mental representation can be made as salient as reality, a judgment based on the 
mental representation is more likely because reality no longer dominates 
responses. The implication for referential communication, is that if the speaker's 
belief and reality are equally salient, evaluations based on the speaker's belief 
might predominate. These possibilities might help to explain some of the results in 
this thesis and are explored in Section 6.4.1. 
A second explanation for the range of results obtained is based on the idea 
that understanding the tripartite nature of referential communication may be hard 
because discrepancies may exist between the elements in the triangle. 
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Understanding that what is said can differ from what is meant is an important 
developmental milestone. Hence, a say-mean discrepancy can provide a strong 
clue about message adequacy. There might be some circumstances, though, under 
which a discrepancy between thought and speech can be overlooked because the 
utterance is pragmatically adequate. The important distinction that needs to be 
made is not whether there is a discrepancy between certain elements in the 
triangle, but whether it is important to use the discrepancy as the main criterion 
for evaluation. This account is discussed in more detail in Section 6.4.3. 
6.4.1. The Reality Masking Hypothesis. 
Mitchell (1994; 1996; also Saltmarsh, Mitchell & Robinson ,1995) argues 
that reality holds an attentional salience for children because it is more important 
for children to negotiate the real world in their early years, rather than the mental 
realm. It is crucial for the child to understand how things work in the world that 
surrounds them, so that they can function safely and effectively. A bias towards 
reality may help to reduce the unpredictability of a dynamic and complex 
environment. Moreover, current reality, rather than belief, may be salient 
because, until the age of around 3 or 4 years, a child is usually looked after by her 
family who meet all of her physical needs. This is not because the child has had to 
engage in any subtle or manipulative behaviours to coerce the family to behave in 
this way, but rather this situation arises by default. Accordingly, beliefs have a 
low attentional priority for the pre-school child because her needs are met 
automatically by the family. It is only when the child enters a different 
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environment, such as nursery education or school, that this situation begins to 
change. In such an environment, it is extremely unlikely that all of the people 
surrounding the child will cater solely for her needs and desires. Instead, their 
time is divided between many individuals, compelling children to give a high 
priority to other people's beliefs in order to make friends and influence others' 
behaviour. 
According to this account, the pre-school child has some insight into the 
representational nature of the mind but this is often masked by the salience of 
reality. This stands in contrast to Perner (1991) who argues that children have no 
representational understanding of ~ h e e mind before the age of about 4 years. He 
suggests the child undergoes a cognitive revolution at the age of four years which 
furnishes them with the necessary conceptual understanding that beliefs are 
representations of reality. Hence demonstrations that children could understand 
the mind as representational before the age of four years would prove damaging to 
Pemer's claim, whilst providing supporting evidence for the reality masking 
account. 
Such evidence involves paradigms that elevate belief to an equivalent par 
with reality. For example, Mitchell and Lacohee (1991), and Freeman and 
Lacohee (1995), found that 3-year-old children showed impressive abilities to 
pass false belief tasks when their previous belief had been bolstered by a 
counterpart in reality (e.g. a picture of the child's belief was posted into a toy 
postbox before the test questions were asked). Saltmarsh and Mitchell (1999) 
found similar results when children were presented with video evidence of their 
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false beliefs. Generally, equating reality and belief in terms of level of physical 
salience and tangibility allowed children to demonstrate their understanding of the 
mind because their attention was no longer dominated by reality. 
Robinson (1994) suggests that utterances may be difficult to understand as 
clues to internal representations because they offer no protection from the 
" ... salience of immediately perceptible reality ... " (p.373). In other words, 
because utterances are (usually) ephemeral and non-substantive it is difficult to 
treat them as emanating from, and relating to, the mind because reality (in this 
case, the array) captures the child's attention. In Chapter 3, it might be that many 
children did not respond according to how the message related to the array 
because the presentation of the utterance alongside the belief/meaning of the 
speaker encapsulated in a thought bubble protected children from the perceptual 
draw of reality. That is, children could consider how the utterance was related to 
speaker meaning because both were depicted at an equivalent salience to reality. 
A similar effect was observed in Chapter 2, where the presence of a 
thought bubble in a false belief task seemed to protect children against realist 
errors and enabled them to judge appropriately about belief. Ironically, the 
operation of this effect in Chapter 3 may have meant that children judged 
'incorrectly' in the unambiguous condition because the meaning of the utterance 
was made as salient as the array. Consequently, the pattern of results in Chapter 3 
may be more indicative of children focusing on a mentalistic criterion because the 
array no longer dominated their attention, rather than a fundamental problem with 
understanding the pragmatic value of the utterance (but maybe not- see below). 
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The results of Chapter 4 are also consistent with the idea that social 
cognition may be biased towards reality. On the majority of occasions, children 
and adults evaluated ambiguous utterances according to their relation to the array 
(i.e. reality) rather than according to the speaker's meaning. It seems unlikely that 
participants did not understand that what was said was a representation of what 
was meant, especially since signs of this kind of understanding emerge at around 
the age of four years (e.g. Mitchell, Robinson and Thompson, 1999). Instead, 
when there was a choice between judgments based on reality versus judgments 
based on belief, participants tended to focus on the former rather than the latter. 
According to Russell et al. (1991) and Mitchell's reality masking account, this is 
because physical reality is more salient than the mental domain. 
It is worth noting that the conditions presented to participants in Chapter 4 
resembled the ·real world' more closely than the paradigm utilised in Chapter 3, 
in the sense that •reality' was perceptually salient, whilst the speaker's belief had 
· to be inferred from their behaviour and from their utterance. By contrast, the array 
was not depicted in Chapter 5, perhaps making it less likely that participants 
:would focus on reality at the expense of belief. Indeed, in Experiment 5.2 where 
reality and belief were equally salient because both had to be generated from a 
story narrative, participants behaved in a way more consistent with them taking 
the speaker's belief into account. That is, in both the unambiguous and ambiguous 
conditions participants judged that the listener would just go to the mentioned 
location rather than ask the speaker for more information. This suggests that 
adults assumed that the speaker was being truthful and sufficiently informative in 
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both cases and so judged in accordance with the speaker's (inferred) belief rather 
than in accordance with their own privileged knowledge of reality. 
6.4.2. Limitations to the Reality Masking account. 
Many of the present results can be accommodated within this explanatory 
framework, but there are some aspects of the findings that do not fit so 
comfortably within the 'reality hypothesis.' In particular, The Control condition 
was often treated as inadequate in Chapter 4. Given that reality was perceptually 
salient for participants in this paradigm, and they were responding in line with the 
predictions of the reality hypothesis, participants should have focused on the 
(adequate) relationship between the utterance and the array and judged the 
utterance positively. Instead, many child and adult participants evaluated the 
utterance negatively in this condition either because the speaker did not describe 
the desired item in enough detail or because they created imaginary, future 
scenarios in which the utterance was rendered ambiguous by a change to the 
array. It is difficult to see how the reality hypothesis can account for this 
tendency. 
6.4.3. The Discrepancy account. 
An alternative explanation that could account for the tendency to treat the 
Control condition as inadequate in Chapter 4 is based on the idea that children 
may be focused on discrepancies rather than reality. Overall, the majority of the 
evidence presented in the thesis is consistent with the idea that a known 
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discrepancy between elements in the referential triangle may be particularly 
difficult to overlook when making judgments about message adequacy. Children 
seem to have difficulty overlooking the discrepancy between thought and speech 
when evaluating unambiguous utterances (Chapter 3); and children and adults 
evaluated messages according to an utterance-array discrepancy over and above a 
match between utterance and belief (Chapter 4; Experiment 5.1 ). In Chapter 4 and 
Experiment 5.1, participants may have focused on the discrepancy between the 
utterance and the array, not because of the salience of reality, but because that was 
the source of the discrepancy. Moreover, it is possible that a preference for 
discrepancy within the referential triangle is so strong that participants chose to 
invoke a discrepancy within the referential triangle rather than respond to the 
information provided for them. Hence, the utterance in the Control condition in 
Chapter 4 was often evaluated as inadequate. 
Preferences for discrepancies are not unusual and exist in domains other 
than utterance evaluation. In social psychology, Hansen and Hansen {1988) 
showed that adult participants easily picked out a single angry face amongst a 
crowd of happy faces. Bargh {1989) suggests that this tendency arises because our 
attention is automatically drawn to things that are unusual or different. So, in the 
above example, it is not that we notice an angry face in the crowd and choose to 
pay attention to it Rather, our attention is 'captured' by the fact that the face is 
different from the others, and only then do we notice that the expression on the 
face is one of anger. Friedman (1979) demonstrated a similar phenomenon in a 
paradigm investigating encoding processes in memory. Participants were required 
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to remember complex representations of rooms and were then shown a number of 
stimuli that either matched or differed from the original map. At the most basic 
level, the results indicated that inconsistent or unexpected information was 
remembered more frequently than predictable and compatible information. 
The discrepancies that exist between different elements within the 
referential triangle might dominate response criteria simply because they are 
salient and 'capture' our attention ( cf. Bargh, 1989). However, the story might not 
be as simple as that statement suggests. In Experiment 3.2, children showed a 
developmental trend in their evaluations of ambiguous utterances. In the presence 
of a thought bubble showing the speaker's meaning, 6-7-year-olds had a strong 
preference to judge that the speaker had not said exactly which item he/she 
wanted on the grounds that the utterance-belief relationship was discrepant. By 
contrast, older children were much less likely to state the utterance-belief link as 
the source of the problem, and showed a growing tendency towards saying that 
the speaker had not said exactly which item he/she wanted on the grounds that the 
utterance was discrepant with the array. The main point is that there were two 
sources of discrepancy in this condition. The younger children focused on the 
utterance-belief relationship, whilst the older children focused on the utterance-
array relationship. It is unlikely that one discrepancy is intrinsically more salient 
than another. If this were the case, most children, irrespective of age, would notice 
the more salient discrepancy and judge accordingly. The change in response 
criteria with age is more suggestive of a change in children's understanding of 
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which (discrepant) relationship was important for evaluating the quality of a 
message. 
In the unambiguous condition (Experiments 3.2 and 3.3), in the presence 
of a thought bubble, there was only one source of discrepancy - between the 
utterance and the speaker's meaning. Around half of the children aged 6-10 years 
judged in accordance with this discrepancy and seemingly did not apply their 
understanding of the importance of the relationship between the utterance and the 
array. This tendency could arise because discrepancy is more salient to children 
than, in this case, the pragmatic adequacy of the message. Therefore, even though 
children might know that the utterance-reality link is more important under these 
circumstances, they might not apply this knowledge because their attention is 
drawn to the say-mean discrepancy. However, again there is some suggestion that 
the problem is not just one of the salience of the discrepancy, but rather, that 
children might have more of a conceptual difficulty in understanding the role of 
discrepancies in referential communication. 
Many of the children indicated that the speaker had said exactly which 
item he/she wanted in the presence of a thought bubble. However, a surprising 
number of these children (including 58.6% of the 9-1 0-year-olds in Experiment 
3.2) were unable to explain why they had given a positive response. Therefore, 
unlike the ambiguous condition, in which the vast majority of children were able 
to give some indication of why they thought the message was bad, the children 
who answered positively in the unambiguous condition had problems saying why 
they thought the message was good. It was as if they had difficulty reconciling 
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their knowledge of the discrepancy between thought and speech with their 
knowledge of the adequacy between the utterance and the array. 
Generally, children seem to accept quite readily that discrepancies can 
occur between the elements in the referential triangle. However, the reason why 
understanding utterances as externalisations of internal representations might be 
difficult is because this also requires an understanding of when it is appropriate to 
give the discrepancy primary importance, versus situations in which the 
discrepancy should be overlooked in favour of an adequate match between other 
elements in the triangle. When children were given the opportunity to compare 
thought bubble absent and present trials in Experiment 3.3, they were much better 
at overlooking the say-mean discrepancy and, instead, judged the unambiguous 
utterance positively because it was pragmatically adequate. Being able to compare 
the conditions may have provided clues about when it was acceptable to ignore 
the discrepancy between what was said and what was meant. 
Some researchers suggest that coming to understand that what is said can 
differ from what is meant is fundamental to understanding referential ambiguity 
(e.g. Beal, 1988; Bonitatibus, 1988a). Once children understand that say-mean 
discrepancies are important for determining communicative success, they can use 
the existence of such a discrepancy as a clue to the fact that the message might be 
problematical. Children might initially focus on the discrepancy because they 
realise that the say-mean link can tell them a great deal about the adequacy of 
verbal messages. After this time, children realise that the existence of a say-mean 
discrepancy simply serves as a useful clue to the fact that a referentially poor 
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utterance has been produced, and that it is the link between the utterance and the 
array that is crucial as far as picking the correct object is concerned (c£ Olson, 
1970). The results from the unambiguous conditions suggest that children's 
understanding of the role of say-mean discrepancies in referential communication 
might not be fully formed. It seems that they have difficulty understanding how an 
utterance can still be adequate, even though what is said and what is meant might 
differ. Instead, children seem to assume that if a say-mean discrepancy exists, the 
utterance must be inadequate. 
An awareness of the relevance of discrepancies within the referential 
triangle must develop alongside an understanding of the potential fallibility of 
referential communication. Experience of communication failures may teach us to 
be more cautious in accepting exactly what we are told. As a result, older children 
and adults might have a greater understanding of the importance of discrepancies 
within referential communication in addition to a more sceptical approach towards 
the veracity of verbal utterances. A combination of these insights could help to 
explain why the adult participants and older children in Experiments 4.2, 4.3 and 
4.4 were more likely than younger children to judge that the utterance was 
inadequate in the Control condition. They could reason that communication is 
rarely as simple as the Control scenario suggests. The possibility that all three 
elements in the triangle could be in perfect harmony is unlikely and so a 
discrepancy is invoked between the utterance and the array in order to 
demonstrate an understanding that communication is likely to go wrong in this 
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instance. As a consequence, it is the discrepancy that reveals the source of the 
problem with the utterance and so the message is evaluated negatively. 
Note also that the discrepancy account only applies to those children who 
recognise that discrepancies between elements in the triangle are possible. This 
explains why 5-6-year-olds did not judge in accordance with the discrepancies. In 
response to ambiguous utterances, they judged that the speaker had said exactly 
which item he/she wanted (Chapter 3) and that the speaker had done a good job of 
saying exactly which item he/she wanted (Chapter 4). This again suggests that 
judgments based on discrepancies are not made simply because the discrepancies 
are salient. If this were the case, presumably the S-6 year-olds would also focus on 
the salient aspects of the stimuli and respond accordingly. Instead, it seems that 
there is a developmental progression in terms of understanding that discrepancies 
can occur and when it is appropriate to evaluate utterances in accordance with 
them. 
6.4.4. Limitations to the Discrepancy account. 
Perhaps the finding that around half of the adult participants in 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.4 did not make utterance evaluations in accordance with 
the discrepancy between the utterance and the array in the Not See condition 
suggests that the discrepancy account is limited. However, the intention is not to 
suggest that a discrepancy criterion is unthinkingly applied to utterance 
evaluations, but rather that there is an increasing understanding with age about the 
relative importance of discrepancies within the referential triangle. 
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It was suggested in Chapter 4 that making a 'good job' evaluation in the 
Not See condition appears to be a sophisticated response criterion, available only 
to adult participants. This response may require quite a substantial amount of 
processing in order to move past the literal reading of the utterance to access the 
speaker's belief (cf. Gilbert, 1991). Given that the discrepancy between the 
utterance and the array is usually a good indicator that the message is problematic, 
participants may adhere to the cognitively less challenging heuristic of judging on 
the basis of the discrepancy rather than engaging in the extra work required to 
evaluate according to the speaker's belief. In short, a discrepancy may serve as a 
particularly useful clue concerning the adequacy of the message and so remains 
the dominant criterion on which evaluations are based. Overriding the powerful 
cue of the discrepancy may require extra effort, and may not even be especially 
useful. For example, even though the speaker may have done a good job 
according to his/her own knowledge, this might not be helpful to the listener 
because they are unable to uniquely identify the desired referent 
6.5. Is it possible to arbitrate between the Discrepancy and Reality accounts? 
It would be naive to think that evaluation of utterances in referential 
communication could be explained solely on the basis of one of the above 
accounts. There are many factors that influence communication and how it is 
interpreted and evaluated by the interlocutors. For example, the decision to adhere 
to a discrepancy or reality-based evaluation is likely to be influenced by 
contextual factors, including the shared common ground between speaker and 
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listener and memory factors influencing the access to such shared meaning or 
knowledge (Ackerman, 1993}. Additionally, the present discussion focuses on 
utterance evaluation from an observer's or listener's perspective. At no point is 
there any claim being made about a speaker's production of utterances and how 
the role of discrepancy within the referential triangle might be important in the 
formulation and shaping of utterances. That would require a whole other thesis! 
Nevertheless, the Reality and Discrepancy accounts both seem to have 
quite wide explanatory value, at least as far as the present results are concerned. 
To move the research forward, it would be interesting to explore (a) whether 
participants do seem to have a preference for discrepancy and (b) whether this 
preference for discrepancy might be favoured over knowledge of reality. 
Possibilities for exploring these issues are presented below. 
6.5.1. A preference for Discrepancy? 
It would be useful to consider directly whether it is knowledge of the say-
mean discrepancy that results in children overlooking the pragmatic adequacy of 
the utterance. Experiment 3.3 presented children with thought bubbles in pictorial 
and textual format. The discrepancy between what was said and what was meant 
was not so clear in the pictorial condition and so children might have been more 
likely to focus on the relationship between the utterance and the array. However, 
there was no difference between the textual and pictorial conditions in terms of 
children's tendency to evaluate unambiguous utterances negatively. Overall, 
though, the total number of negative responses was relatively low and the raw 
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data showed that the majority of these responses were confined to the textual 
condition. Consequently, there might have been a significant trend to say that the 
speaker had not said exactly which item he/she wanted in the textual rather than 
the pictorial condition, but the numbers were too small to generate a significant 
difference. 
This issue could be explored directly by presenting children with thought 
content that is either discrepant or isomorphic with an ambiguous or unambiguous 
utterance. Children might only overlook the relationship between the utterance 
and array when the say-mean relationship is discrepant This would suggest that it 
is specifically the discrepancy between thought and speech, rather than simply -
knowing the speaker's meaning that presents a problem for children (cf Beal & 
Flavell, 1984). 
6.5.2. Reality versus Discrepancy? 
It would also be interesting to see how participants handle situations in 
which the quality of the reality-based relationship was systematically varied with 
source of discrepancy. For example, the paradigm utilised in Chapter 4 would be 
useful for investigating this issue, but with some modifications. One of the 
problems with the Not See condition as it stands is that the source of the 
discrepancy is confounded with the utterance-array relationship. Consequently, an 
experimental design is required that separates the source of the discrepancy from 
the reality-based relationship. One possible way to achieve this would be to 
combine the approaches of Chapters 3 and 4 in order to present children with a 2 x 
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2 design in which Type of discrepancy (consistent or discrepant) is crossed with 
Source of discrepancy (utterance-array or utterance-belief). Thought bubbles 
would reveal the speaker's meaning so that the utterance-belief relationship could 
be manipulated. 
If children have a tendency to focus on a discrepancy over and above the 
reality-based relationship this will be evidenced by a trend to answer according to 
the discrepancy across conditions. It would be crucial to try to make all three 
elements of the triangle equally salient Whether this could be achieved by 
presenting words, pictures or a combination of both requires careful thought 
because type of medium could have important implications for ease of comparison 
between, and salience of: the elements within the triangle. Overall, this kind of 
approach might help to provide new insights into which aspects of referential 
communication children struggle with. 
6.6. Broader implications ofReferential Communication 
It seems that there are still many unanswered questions within referential 
communication research. Although the research focus on referential 
communication declined somewhat during the late 1980's and 90's, the 
importance of referential communication should not be underestimated or 
forgotten. Lloyd (e.g. 1992, 1994; Lloyd, Boada & Foms, 1992) has continued to 
promote the importance of referential communication, suggesting that it should 
form the basis of a standardised test for school children. Given that the skills 
involved in referential communication- sending and receiving clear and adequate 
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verbal messages - are especially relevant in a school environment (see also 
Robinson & Whittaker, 1986} developing such a test seems like a good way to 
augment assessments of educational achievement. 
The importance of retaining a focus on this paradigm becomes especially 
important in the light of evidence that suggests children's understanding of 
referential communication is by no means fully developed by the end of the 
primary school years (Lloyd, Camaioni & Ercolani, 1995}, or even by the age of 
thirteen years (Anderson, Clark & Mullin, 1994 ). As Lloyd et al. point out, the 
majority of referential communication research typically restricts participant 
groups to children aged around 6-7 years. However, it seems that there are 
developments in understanding that occur beyond this time. 
Consequently, there is a need for continued basic research in this area 
because it may be that too much has been taken for granted. In particular, it is 
usually assumed that children's understanding of the adequacy of unambiguous 
utterances is exemplary. Some of the results presented in this thesis suggest that 
this might not be the case. This type of approach can usefully inform, and benefit 
from, more ambitious, large-scale projects such as the standardised test of 
referential communication proposed by Lloyd et al. Continued advocacy of the 
importance of referential communication is crucial, in addition to the stimulation 
of new research in this area. These approaches will hopefully provide a more 
representative idea of what children understand about communicating 
referentially. 
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Story scripts for Chapter 2 
A. False belief: Change of location 
(1) Paul and the chocolate. 
"This is Paul. Paul has been shopping and he has bought a large bar of chocolate. 
He puts his bar of chocolate in the kitchen drawer and remembers very carefully 
where he put it because he will want to eat some later." 
Prompt: Where did Paul put the chocolate? 
"Now Paul goes outside to play football. Whilst he is outside, Paul's Mum comes 
into the kitchen looking for some chocolate for a cake. She finds Paul's bar in the 
kitchen drawer, uses some of it for her cake and then puts the chocolate in the 
fridge instead of back in the drawer." 
Check: Did Paul see Mum do that? No, he didn't! 
"Paul is playing outside so he couldn't see where Mum put the chocolate. Paul has 
come back into the kitchen." 
(2) John and the cars. 
"This is John. John is playing with his toy cars but he wants to watch TV in the 
other room. He packs his cars away into the drawer and then leaves the room." 
Prompt: Where did John put his cars? 
" Whilst John is watching the TV, his brother Mark comes into the playroom 
looking for the toy cars. He finds them in the drawer, plays with then and then 
puts the cars in the toy box instead of back in the drawer." 
Check: Did John see Mark do that? No, he didn't! 
" John was watching the TV so he didn't see Mark put the cars in the toy box. 
John has come back into the room now." 
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B. False belief: change of contents 
(I) Susie and her swimming bag. 
"This is Susie. She decides to go swimming. Susie packs her swimsuit into her 
bag. Susie has left her money upstairs, so she leaves the room to get it" 
Prompt: What did Susie put in her bag? 
"Whilst Susie is gone, her Mum comes into the room. She's doing some laundry 
and is looking for some clothes to wash. She takes Susie's swimsuit out of her bag 
and puts a jacket in the bag instead- thinking that Susie might need it later." 
Check: Did Susie see Mum do that? No, she didn't! 
"Susie was upstairs so she didn't see Mum put the jacket in the bag. Now Susie 
has come back downstairs." 
(2) Claire and her shoes. 
••This is Claire. Claire has been shopping to buy a new pair of shoes. Here they are 
in the red box. Claire puts the shoe box on the kitchen table and goes to play 
outside." 
Prompt: What did Claire have in the red box? 
"Whilst she is outside, Claire's Mum comes into the kitchen. She's looking for a 
box to send a present to a friend. She's bought her friend a woolly jumper for her 
birthday. Mum takes Claire's shoes out of the box and puts them into a bag. Then 
she folds the jumper and puts it in the box. Mum puts the lid on the box and leaves 
the room." 
Check: Did Claire see Mum do that? No, she didn't! 
"Claire was playing outside so she couldn't see Mum put the jumper in the box. 
Now Claire's come back into the kitchen." 
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Story scripts for Chapter 3 
Note that the narratives changed slightly between Experiments 3.1 and 3.2. The 
additional information included in the speech bubbles in Experiment 3.2 (and 3.3.) 
is displayed in italics after the original utterance included in Experiment 3 .1. 
(1) Sam goes to the shop to buy some sweets. He asks the man behind the counter 
to get one of the jars from the window. The man asks Sam which sweets he 
wants [Sam thinks "the orange ones with the stripes"] Sam says "the orange 
ones in the jar' 
(2) Mrs. Edwards goes to the pet shop to buy a puppy. She tells the shop owner 
she would like one of the puppies in the front of the shop. He asks her which 
one she wants. [Mrs. Edwards thinks "the black one with brown ears"] Mrs. 
Edwards says "the black one on the blanket' 
(3) Sophie has drawn a picture for the Parent's Evening. Later, she tells her Dad 
to make sure he looks at the picture of a horse. Dad asks Sophie which horse 
picture is hers. [Sophie thinks "the white one with the birds"] Sophie says "the 
white one on the waif' 
(4) Rosie is getting ready to go swimming at the pool. In the pool, her friend 
Megan swims over to her and ~ s k s s to borrow Rosie's swimming goggles. 
Rosie tells her they are in her bag in the changing rooms. Megan asks which 
bag. [Rosie thinks " the yellow one with the flowers"] Rosie says "the yellow 
one in the changing rooms" 
(5) Dad is getting ready to go outside gardening with Fiona. Later, he starts to get 
cold and asks Fiona to fetch him a jumper from his bedroom. Fiona asks Dad 
which jumper he wants. [Dad thinks "the green one with red sleeves"] Dad 
says "the green one in the wardrobe" 
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(6) Dave sees some new bikes in Marsh's shop window whilst he is out shopping. 
Later he tells his Mum about the bikes. She asks him which one he liked. 
[Dave thinks " the red one with the horn"] Dave says " the red one in the 
window" 
(7) Claire sees some balls in her classroom before she goes out for break. At 
break, her friend Anna wants to play ball. Claire tells her there are some balls 
in her classroom. Anna asks her which ball she wants. [Claire thinks "the 
brown one with spots"] Claire says "the brown one on the floor" 
(8) At school, Mr. Riley hangs his coat up in the staff room. Later, Mr. Riley asks 
Nathan if he could fetch his coat. Nathan asks him which coat is his. [Mr.Riley 
thinks "the blue one with the hood"] Mr. Riley says "the blue one on the peg' 
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CIS!NS/tlgj 
Adam comes home after school and is feeling hungry. He sees the glass biscuit jar on 
the shelf out of reach. There is only one biscuit left in the jar. It's a chocolate one 
which is Adam's favourite. Adam asks Dad if he can get a biscuit for him. Dad says 
"Yes, which biscuit would you like?" Adam says "I'd like the biscuit in the jar please". 
Dad goes to get a biscuit for Adam ...... . 
? 
• 
(1) Which biscuit will ~ a d d think Adam wants? 
(Please circle one of the' pictured biscuits or the'?' if you think Dad won't be able to 
tell) 
(2) Did Adam do a good job of saying exactly which biscuit he wanted? Yes/* 
(3) Why/why not? b e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~
.. 
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CISINS/tlgj 
-
Sophie has drawn a picture for her school's open evening. It has a large white horse on 
it. She helps her teacher put the picture on the empty wall next to the classroom clock. 
The teacher then asks Sophie to help her put some more pictures around the clock. 
There are lots of pictures next to the clock now. Later at home, Dad asks Sophie 
which picture to look out for when he visits the school. Sophie says "My picture is the 
one by the clock." 
Dad goes to the school to look at the pictures ......... . 
· ~ . .
I 
(!)Which picture will Dad think is Sophie's? 
(Please circle one of the pictures or the '?' if you think Dad won't be able to tell) 
(2)Did Sophie do a good job of saying exactly which picture was hers? "'1>5/No 
~ ~
(3)Why/Whynot? ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ < ~ ~ ( p . ' ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ c}ad(_ 
-
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CIS!NS!tlgj 
Dave is shopping in town with his friends when they walk past the toy shop. In the 
window is a new bike, which Dave stops to have a look at. Whilst Dave walks home, 
the shopkeeper brings out more bikes to display in the window. There are lots of bikes 
on display now. Later at home, Dave's Mum asks him if he has seen anything he 
would like to have for his birthday. Dave says "Yes, there was a bike in the toy shop 
window today. fd like to have that." 
The next day, Mum goes to buy the bike ............ . 
(1) Which bike will Mur;n think Dave wants? 
(Please circle one of the pictured bikes or the '?' if you think Mum won't be able to 
tell) 
(2) Did Dave do a good job of saying exactly which bike he wants? -m-/No 
(3) \Vhy/why not? e e ~ ~ t'1."-Qft. · ctre lcr\.-:) at ~ ~
.. 
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NS/C/S/gj/t 
(1) Did Mr. Riley do a good job of saying exactly which coat was his? YesW 
(2) Why/Why not? lk..:.o 
~ - s s c,J;o:...:.z_ -t£<:4 
a-or- ~ ~ ' 
(3) Which coat will Nathan think Mr. Riley wants? (please circle one of the pictured coats 
or the '?' if you think Nathan won't be able to tell) 
( 1) Did Sophie do a good job of saying exactly which picture was hers? YestfJi) 
(2)Why/whynot? s ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
I f ' - ' ~ ~ ~ ~ . . Q , . : . . k ~ ~ ~ ~ e o . - . : > « « .:;:tt..v- p i ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - . . . - a l . . . ~ ~ ~ & : - . .
(3) Which picture will Dad think is Sophie's? 
(1) Did Dave do a good job of saying exactly which bike he wants? Ye® 
(2) Why/why not? V;d _,8- (-df 
k ~ ~
(3) Which bike will'Mum think Dave wants? 
.. 
Appendix 284 
At school, 1v1t. Riley walks into the staffroom and hangs his coat 
above the boo.kshelves. 
Appendix 285 
At school, Mr. Riley walks into the staffroom and hangs his coat 
above the bookshelves. So, there is only one coat hanging there. 
•, 
.. 
Appendix 286 
Whilst he drinks a cup of c o f f e e ~ ~ more teachers come in and hang 
their coats up. There are lots of coats above the bookshelves now . 
.... 
Appendix 287 
After Mr.Riley has ieft to go to his classroom, more· teachers .arrive 
and hang their coats up. There are lots of coats above the 
bookshelves now. 
y · ~ ~
-
Appendix 288 
Later, :Nlr. Riley wants to show his. class something outside and 
asks Nathan if he would fetch his coat from the staffroom. Nathan 
asks how he will know which coat is Nlr. Riley's. "It" s the one 
.. 
above the bookshelves" says Nl.r. Riley. 

Appendix 290 
. " 
Appendix 291 
Nathan arrives at the Youth Club and hangs his coat above the 
bookshelves. His is the only coat hanging there . 
\Vhilst Nathan waits for his friend, the youth leader moves some Appendix 292 
coats from a chair and hangs them up next to Nathan's. So there 
are lots of coats above the bookshelves now. 
i.E : ; t & 
· Appendix 293 
After Nathan has gone outside, the club leader moves some coats 
from a chair and hangs them next to Nathan's. So there are lots of 
coats above the bookshelves now . 
.. 
Appendix 294 
• • 
• • • 
Whilst Sam and Nathan are outside playing, Sam decides to fetch 
a ball for their game. Nathan asks her if she could get his coat 
because he is cold. Sam asks how she will know which coat is 
Nathan's . .He says "It's the one above the bookshelves." 
Ophie has drawn a picture for her school's open 
vening. It has a large white horse on it. She puts 
er picture on the empty wall next to the classroom 
lock. So there is only one picture oh the wall. 
Appendix 295 
Later at home, Dad asks Sophie which picture to look 
out for when he visits the school. Sophie says "My 
picture is the one by the clock." 
Did Sophie do a good job of saying exactly which picture was hers? lft'e5\/ No 
Why/why not? 
~ C o . . J . A A ~ ~ " " ~ ~
""-c.-.0- ~ ~
Do you think Dad asks Sophie any more about the picture, OR does he just head off to the school? 
'-1 ~ ~ S 1 ~ w w \J \ ~ ~ l? t ~ ~ DON'T FORGET ..... . 
Age (years and months): 
ll1 
Sex: ~ F e m a l e e
.. 
THANKS VERY MUCH! 
v ~ v v
Nathan arrives at the Youth Club and hangs 
his coat above the bookshelves. His is the 
only coat hanging there. 
Whilst Nathan waits for his friend, the youth 
leader moves some coats from a chair and hangs 
them up next to Nathan's. So there arc Jots of 
coats above the bookshelves now. 
Did Nathan do a good job of saying exactly which coat was his? ~ / N o o
• I • ' • 
Whilst Sam and Nathan are outside playing, 
Sam decides to fetch a ball for their game. Nathan 
asks her if she could get his coat because he is cold 
Sam asks how she will know which coat is Nathan' 
He says "It's the one above the bookshelves." 
Why/why not? f3Eca,(lt,se . hJz._ c o w d ' ~ ~ euessed t:hctk MOte· ~ ~ GJaul:i1ve, 
put e h t l - ~ ~ a x l l ~ ~ Cll (:::ruL., ccctt rx:ctc,s ~ ~ I:NL tcokj'(2}(tfr) 
DON'T FORGET ...... • 
Do you think Sam just goes to fetch the coal, OR docs she ask Nathan any more about it? 
5aM G ~ ~ ~ c 9 9 prclx<bL(j astc S o ~ ~Mere cfuJl:etJ(J CLJrcU: l t-
lcokS f.,'"kfL) So f::ra}C. hlr ::xJ(AmetJ ~ ~ ~ ~ b e ~ ~ V.:X2,t:Sfsc:d·. 
Age (years and months): 
\ q ~ , s s ? r v t ~ ~ ~
Sex: Male/ Female 
. - ~ ~ ·"' / , ; ~ ~
0 
ve is shopping in town when he walks past 
1e toy shop. In the window is a new bike which 
vc stops to have a look at. So, there is only 
ne bike on display. 
Whilst Dave walks home, the shopkeeper brings 
out more bikes to display in the window. There 
are lots of bikes on display now. 
you think Mum just heads off to the shops, OR does she ask Dave any more about the bike? 
j rz...e • c;( ~ ~ k hc/r? W hef--t i.-(: ~ c ( . . Uk ..JL 
Did Dave do a good job of saying exactly which bike he wanted? Yes I :Mo 
Wlty/wlty not? / 1-z.f:vre ~ ~ ~ ~ t-"YUZ- t..V I ~ ~ 1-uz_ 
-r...v o.-c.kR....cl- j:J ~ . ( : ; ; ' 
"' •• _..t 
Later at home, Dave's Mum asks him if he has 
'seen anything he would like to have for his birlh-
day. Dave says "Yes, ther«? was a bike in lhe toy 
shop window today. I'd really like that." 
DON'T FORGET ..... . 
Age (years and months): 
/9 ':! 7J J rYJ-e-Y?tf.. 
Sex: M<trc./ Female 
-----•f-7".:.....:1 7 o'\ ,.._, 1<' c;;o 'rr-' R ~ ~ ~ ,1\ ~ r r ,,....., !! 
• 
I 
00 
0\ 
;) s't 
~ ~ 1. Uas/AB/jumper first 
:a j Please give your age _il_years; ~ m o n t h s . . Please circle: Male 8 
Rachel went shopping for some groceries. On the way back, she passed Stevenson's clothes shop and saw a really stylish jumper in the window. It was 
the only"jumper on display. The rest of the clothes were dresses and coats. Rachel then went straight home. No more jumpers were added to the 
display in Stevenson's shop. When Rachel arrived home, her friend Susan greeted her and asked if there was anything she would like for her birthday, 
which was tomorrow. Rachel said: "There's a really nice jumper on display in the window in Stevenson's clothes shop. You'll spot it easily 
because it's the only one there." Susan was glad to discover Rachel had seen something specific and decided to get the jumper. Susan was very 
eager to set out to buy the jumper as soon as possible, especially as it was nearing closing time. 
Question: What do you think happened next? (circle either A or B) 
(A) Do you think Susan asked Rachel for more infonnation about the appearance of the jumper?· 
~ D o o you think Susan went out right away to Stevenson's clothes shop? 
Julie went to the night-club bar to get a round of drinks. There was a really good-looking guy behind the bar. He was the only guy there. All of the 
other bartenders were women. Julie couldn't carry all the drinks herself so she asked the barman if he could look after them. Then Julie walked back to 
her friends. No other guys were working behind the bar that night. Claire offered to fetch the remaining drinks from the bar and wanted to know who 
she should ask. Julie said: "There is n really cute guy serving the drinks. You'll spot him easily because lie Is the only guy there." Claire was 
glad to discover that the drinks were waiting for her at the bar. She was eager to get lhc drinks as soon as possible so that she could see the guy Julie 
was talking about. 
Question: What do you think happened next? (please circle either A or D) 
~ D o o you think Claire asked Julie any more about the appearance of the guy behind the bar? 
(D) Do you think Claire went straight away to fetch the drinks? 
a 
0\ 
0\ 
N 
>( 
'f-{r 
;g 7. As/ AB/bar first 
j: Please give your age Yd__years; 5 montlJS. Please circle: Malec;;) 
Julie went to the night-club bar to get a round of drinks. There was a really good-looking guy behind the har. He was the only guy there. All of the 
other hartemlcrs were women. Julie couldn't carry all the drinks herself so she asked the harm;m if he could look aflcr I hem. Then .Julie walked hack lo 
her friends. Meanwhile, more male bar staff arrived for work so there were a few guys behind the bar now. Claire oiTcrcd to fetch the remaining drinks 
from the bar and wanted lo know who she should ask. Julie said: "There is a really cute guy serving the drinks. You'll spot him easily hccausc he 
is the only guy there." Claire was glad to discover that the drinks were wailing for her at the bar. She was eager to get the drinks as soon as possible 
so that she could see the guy Julie was talking about. 
1!Estion: What do you think happened next? (please circle either A or B) 
(A) Po you think Claire asked Julie any more about the appearance of the guy behind the bar? 
(D) Do you think Claire went straight away to fetch the drinks? 
Rachel went shopping for some groceries. On the way back, she passed Stevenson's clothes shop and saw a really stylish jumper in the window. It was 
the only jumper on display. The rest of the clothes were dresses and coats. Rachelthcn went straight home. Meanwhile, the owner of Stevenson's shop 
rearranged the window. He removed the dresses and coats but added several jumpers to accompany the one alrsady on display. When Rachel arrived 
home, her friend Susnn greeted her and asked ir lhcrc was anything she would like ror her birthday, which was tomorrow. Hache! said: "There's a 
really nice jumper on display in the \Vindow in Stevenson's clothes shop. You'll spot it easily because it's the only one lhc•·e." Susan was glad 
lo discover Rachel had seen something spcciric ami decided to gclthc jumper. Susan was very eager to sel uutto buy the jumper as soon as possible, 
especially as it was nearing closing time. 
Question: What do you think happened next? (circle either A or D) 
(A) Do you think Susan asked Rachel for more infonnation about the appearance of the jumper? 
~ o o you think Susan went out right away t ~ ~ Stevenson's clothes shop1 
. .-.-- . - . . . 
• 
. · ~ - - · · ·
----· 
Appendix 300 
Please give your age .2L years; _l months. Please circle: Male ~ . .
Mark is reading a book at desk 31 in the busy college library. It is the only book on 
his desk. He decides he needs some more information and goes to the bookshelves on 
the next floor. Whilst Mark is walking to the shelves, Sue is on her way out of the 
library. She has .finished reading her books and puts them down on desk 31, next to 
the book that Mark was reading. At the bookshelves, he sees his friend Jim, who is 
reading about a similar topic. Jim asks Mark if there is a book he can recommend. 
Mark says "Yes. I have a great one downstairs on my desk. You'll spot it easily 
because it's the only one there." Mark tells Jim he is sat at desk 31, near the exit. 
(1) What do you think happened next? (circle either A or B) 
A) Do you think Jim asked Mark for more information about the book? 
OR 
~ o o you think Jim went straight away to fetch the book from the desk? 
(2) How often do extra books end up on people's desks like this? 1g . 
(IfO% represents Very Rarely, 50% represents Sometimes and 100% represents Very 
Frequently, give a percentage value anywhere between 0-100 that estimates the 
frequency with which you would expect this to happen.] 
(3) Indicate on the list below the description that most closely represents the· 
percentage value that you have stated above. 
S,.very day 
\fovery 2-3 days 
Once a week 
Once a fortnight 
Once a month 
Less than once a month 
Less than once every six months 
Less than once a year 
Almost never 
l.pre/am/b · 
.. 
-
~ - : . . - - · ·
. ,.,. 
Appendix 301 
Please give your age ~ y e a r s ; _ : [ _ _ _ months. Please circle: Male ~ ~
Mark is reading a book at desk 31 in the busy college library. It is the only book on 
his desk. He decides he needs some more information and goes to the bookshelves on 
the next floor. Whilst Mark is walking to the shelves, Sue the Librarian struggles past 
desk 31 with a heavy over-filled box. She is transferring some books to a new room in 
the library. Some of the books fall onto Mark's desk, next to the book that Mark was 
reading. At the bookshelves, he sees his friend Jim, who is reading about a similar 
topic. Jim asks.Mark if there is a book he can recommend. Mark says ''Yes. I have a 
great one downstairs on my desk. You'll spot it easily because it's the only one 
there." Mark tells Jim he is sat at desk 31, near the exit. 
(1) \Vhat do you·think happened next? (circle either A or B) 
A) Do you think Jim asked Mark for more information about the book? 
OR 
@no you think Jim went straight away to fetch the book from the desk? 
(2) How often do extra books end up on people's desks like this? 
(If 0% represents Very Rarely, 50% represents Sometimes and 100% represents Very 
Frequently, give a percentage value anywhere between 0-100 that estimates the 
frequency with which you would expect this to happen.] 
'}_,'1· 
(3) Indicate on the list below the description th"at most closely represents the 
percentage value that you have stated above . 
. Every day 
Every 2-3 days 
Once a week 
Once a fortnight 
Once a month 
Less than once a month 
Less than once every six months 
~ a a year 
Almost never 
2.unp/amlb 
.. 
~ - - -- 4" .... 
Appendix 302 
Please give your age 3::.1_ years; _l_ months. Please circle: Male 
Mark is reading a book at desk 31 in the busy college library. It is the only book on 
his desk. He decides he needs some more information and goes to the bookshelves on 
the next floor. Whilst Mark is walking to the shelves, Sue is on her way out of the 
library. She has finished reading her books and puts them down on desk 32, the desk 
next to Mark's. At the bookshelves, he sees his friend Jim, who is reading about a 
similar topic. Jim asks Mark if there is a book he can recommend. Mark says "Yes. I 
have a great one downstairs on my desk. You'll spot it easily because it's the only one 
there." Mark tells Jim he is sat at desk 31, near the exit. 
(1) What do you think happened next? (circle either A or B) 
@oo you think Jim went straight away to fetch the book from the desk? 
OR 
B) Do you think Jim asked Mark for more information about the book? 
(2) How often do extra books end up on people's desks like this? 
[IfO% represents Very Rarely, 50% represents Sometimes and 100% represents Very 
Frequently, give a percentage value anywhere between 0-100 that estimates the 
frequency with which you would expect this to happen.] 
G6 7o 
' (3) lr.dicate on the list below the description that most closely represents the 
percentage value that you have stated above. 
Every day , 
Every 2-3 days/ , 
Once a week 
Once a fortnight 
Once a month 
Less than once a month 
Less than once every six months 
Less than once a year 
Almost never 
3. pre/unarn/a . 
Appendix 303 
Please give your age j_g_ years;__:;];__ months. Please circle: Male 
Mark is reading a book at desk 31 in the busy college litrary. It is the only book on 
his desk. He decides he needs some more information and goes to the bookshelves on 
the next floor. Whilst Mark is walking to the shelves, a Librarian struggles past desk 
32 with a heavy over-filled box. She is transferring some books to a new room in the 
library. Some of the books fall onto desk 32, the desk next to Mark's. At the 
bookshelves, he sees his friend Jim, who is reading about a similar topic. Jim asks 
Mark if there is a book he can recommend. Mark says "Yes. I have a great one 
downstairs on my desk. You'll spot it easily because it's the only one there." Mark 
tells Jim he is sat at desk 31, near the exit. 
(1) What do you think happened next? (circle either A or B) 
A) Do you think Jim asked rv!ark for more information about the book? 
OR 
@no you think Jim went straight away to fetch the book from the desk? 
(2) How often do extra books end up on people's desks like this? I 0 o/. 
[If 0% represents Very Rarely, 50% represents Sometimes and 100% represents Very 
Frequently, give a percentage value anywhere between 0-100 that estimates the 
frequency with which you would expect this to happen.] 
(3) Indicate on the list below the description that most closely represents the 
percentage value that you have stated above. 
Every day 
Every 2-3 days 
Once a week 
Once a fortnight 
Once a month 
I 
Less than once a month 
-Lesstfian-once every six monthS) 
Less than once a year---· 
Almost never 
4. unpr/unam/b 
-
